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Trump v. Hawaii
16-1540
Ruling Below: Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017).
The state of Hawaii and Dr. Elshikh filed a claim seeking a temporary restraining
order (TRO) on Executive Order 13780 on the basis that it violated the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment; the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause on the basis of religion and/or national origin, nationality, or alienage; the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment based on substantive due process rights; the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment based on procedural due process rights; the Immigration and Nationality
Act; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; and the Administrative Procedure Act.
Hawaii issued a nationwide TRO on the grounds that it was likely the plaintiffs could prove their
claims. The government appealed. The 9th Circuit affirmed without ruling on the merits of the
claims.
Question Presented: Whether respondents' challenge to the temporary suspension of entry of
aliens abroad under Section 2(c) of Executive Order No. 13,780 is justiciable?
Whether Section 2(c)'s temporary suspension of entry violates the Establishment Clause?
Whether the global injunction, which rests on alleged injury to a single individual plaintiff, is
impermissibly overbroad?
Whether the challenges to Section 2(c) became moot on June 14, 2017?

The State of Hawai’i,
v.
Donald J. Trump.
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Decided on June 12, 2017
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
PER CURIAM:
We are asked to delineate the statutory and
constitutional limits to the President's power
to control immigration in this appeal of the
district court's order preliminarily enjoining
two sections of Executive Order 13780
("EO2" or "the Order"), "Protecting the
Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the

United States." The Immigration and
Nationality Act ("INA") gives the President
broad powers to control the entry of aliens,
and to take actions to protect the American
public. But immigration, even for the
President, is not a one-person show. The
President's authority is subject to certain
statutory and constitutional restraints. We
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conclude that the President, in issuing the
Executive Order, exceeded the scope of the
authority delegated to him by Congress. In
suspending the entry of more than 180
million nationals from six countries,
suspending the entry of all refugees, and
reducing the cap on the admission of refugees
from 110,000 to 50,000 for the 2017 fiscal
year, the President did not meet the essential
precondition to exercising his delegated
authority: The President must make a
sufficient finding that the entry of these
classes of people would be "detrimental to the
interests of the United States." Further, the
Order runs afoul of other provisions of the
INA
that
prohibit
nationality-based
discrimination and require the President to
follow a specific process when setting the
annual cap on the admission of refugees. On
these statutory bases, we affirm in large part
the district court's order preliminarily
enjoining Sections 2 and 6 of the Executive
Order.

the United States refugee resettlement
program." Id.
EO1 mandated two main courses of action to
assure that the United States remain "vigilant
during the visa-issuance process to ensure
that those approved for admission do not
intend to harm Americans and that they have
no ties to terrorism." Id. In Section 3, the
President invoked his authority under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(f) to suspend for 90 days
immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the
United States of nationals from seven
majority-Muslim countries: Iraq, Iran, Libya,
Sudan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. See id. at
8978. In Section 5, the President immediately
suspended the U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program ("USRAP") for 120 days, imposed a
ban of indefinite duration on the entry of
refugees from Syria, and limited the entry of
refugees to 50,000 in fiscal year 2017. Id. at
8979. EO1 also ordered that changes be made
to the refugee screening process "to prioritize
refugee claims made by individuals on the
basis of religious-based persecution,
provided that the religion of the individual is
a minority religion in the individual's country
of nationality." Id. EO1 permitted the
Secretaries of State and Homeland Security
to make case-by-case exceptions to these
restrictions "when in the national interest,"
and explained that it would be in the national
interest "when the person is a religious
minority in his country of nationality facing
religious persecution." Id.

I
A
One week after inauguration and without
interagency review, President Donald J.
Trump issued Executive Order 13769
("EO1"). Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed.
Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). Entitled
"Protecting the Nation From Foreign
Terrorist Entry Into the United States," EO1's
stated purpose was to "protect the American
people from terrorist attacks by foreign
nationals
admitted
to
the
United
States." Id. EO1
recited
that
"[n]umerous foreign-born individuals have
been convicted or implicated in terrorismrelated crimes since September 11, 2001,
including foreign nationals who entered the
United States after receiving visitor, student,
or employment visas, or who entered through

EO1 took immediate effect, causing great
uncertainty as to the scope of the order,
particularly in its application to lawful
permanent residents. Notably, federal
officials themselves were unsure as to the
scope of EO1, which caused mass confusion
at airports and other ports of entry. See Brief
of the Foundation of Children of Iran and
Iranian Alliance Across Borders as Amici
Curiae, Dkt. No. 77 at 11-12 (describing how
an Iranian visa holder was turned away
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while en route to the United States because of
the confusion regarding the contours of
EO1's scope); Brief of Former National
Security Officials as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No.
108 at 25 n.53 & 54 (noting confusion at
airports because officials were neither
consulted nor informed of EO1 in advance).
Shortly after EO1 issued, the States of
Washington and Minnesota filed suit in the
Western District of Washington to enjoin
EO1. On February 3, 2017, the district court
granted a temporary restraining order
("TRO"). Washi ngton v. Trump, No. C170141JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16012,
2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3,
2017). On February 4, 2017, the Government
filed an emergency motion in our court,
seeking a stay of the TRO pending appeal.
On February 9, 2017, this court denied the
Government's emergency motion for a stay of
the injunction. Washington v. Trump, 847
F.3d
1151
(9th
Cir.
2017) (per curiam), reconsideration en banc
denied, 853 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2017). In so
doing, the panel rejected the Government's
arguments
that
EO1
was
wholly
unreviewable. See id. at
1161-64. After
determining that the states had standing
based on the alleged harms to their
proprietary interests, id. at 1159-61, this
court concluded that the states demonstrated
a likelihood of success on their procedural
due process claim, at least as to lawful
permanent residents and nonimmigrant visa
holders, id. at 1164-66. The panel did not
review the states' other claims, including the
statutory-based claims. Id. at 1164.

B
On March 6, 2017, the President issued EO2,
also entitled "Protecting the Nation From
Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United
States." Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg.
13209 (Mar. 6, 2017). The revised Order was
to take effect on March 16, 2017, at which
point EO1 would be revoked. Id. at
13218. The Order expressly stated that EO1
"did not provide a basis for discriminating for
or against members of any particular
religion" and was "not motivated by animus
toward any religion." Id. at 13210.
Section 2—"Temporary Suspension of Entry
for Nationals of Countries of Particular
Concern During Review Period"—reinstates
the 90-day ban on travel for nationals of six
of the seven majority-Muslim countries
identified in EO1: Iran, Libya, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Id. at 13213.
Section 2 also directs the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Secretary of State,
and the Director of National Intelligence to
"conduct a worldwide review to identify
whether, and if so what, additional
information will be needed from each foreign
country to adjudicate an application by a
national of that country for a visa, admission,
or other benefit under the INA
(adjudications) in order to determine that the
individual is not a security or public-safety
threat." Id. at 13212. Section 2(c) states in
full:
To temporarily reduce investigative burdens
on relevant agencies during the review period
described in subsection (a) of this section, to
ensure the proper review and maximum
utilization of available resources for the
screening and vetting of foreign nationals, to
ensure that adequate standards are
established to prevent infiltration by foreign
terrorists, and in light of the national security
concerns referenced in section 1 of this order,
I hereby proclaim, pursuant to sections

Rather than continue with the litigation, the
Government filed an unopposed motion to
voluntarily dismiss the underlying appeal
after the President signed EO2. On March 8,
2017, this court granted that motion, which
substantially ended the story of EO1. The
curtain opens next to the present controversy
regarding EO2.
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212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. [§§]
1182(f) and 1185(a), that the unrestricted
entry into the United States of nationals of
Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and
Yemen would be detrimental to the interests
of the United States. I therefore direct that the
entry into the United States of nationals of
those six countries be suspended for 90 days
from the effective date of this order, subject
to the limitations, waivers, and exceptions set
forth in sections 3 and 12 of this order.

relationship" with the United States and its
recent efforts to enhance its travel
documentation procedures. Id. at 13212. The
Order also states that its scope has been
narrowed from EO1 in response to "judicial
concerns" about the suspension of entry with
respect
to
certain
categories
of
aliens. Id. EO2 applies only to individuals
outside of the United States who do not have
a valid visa as of the issuance of EO1 or
EO2. EO2, unlike EO1, expressly exempts
lawful permanent residents, dual citizens
traveling under a passport issued by a country
not on the banned list, asylees, and refugees
already
admitted
to
the
United
States. See id. at 13213-14. The Order also
provides that consular officers or Customs
and Border Protection officials can exercise
discretion in authorizing case-by-case
waivers to issue visas and grant entry during
the suspension period, and offers examples of
when
waivers
"could
be
appropriate." See id. at 13214-15.

Regarding the six identified countries, EO2
explains:
Each of these countries is a state sponsor of
terrorism,
has
been
significantly
compromised by terrorist organizations, or
contains active conflict zones. Any of these
circumstances diminishes the foreign
government's willingness or ability to share
or validate important information about
individuals seeking to travel to the United
States. Moreover, the significant presence in
each of these countries of terrorist
organizations, their members, and others
exposed to those organizations increases the
chance that conditions will be exploited to
enable terrorist operatives or sympathizers to
travel to the United States. Finally, once
foreign nationals from these countries are
admitted to the United States, it is often
difficult to remove them, because many of
these countries typically delay issuing, or
refuse to issue, travel documents.

Section 6—"Realignment of the U.S.
Refugee Admissions Program for Fiscal Year
2017"—suspends USRAP for 120 days. Id. at
13215. During this period, the heads of
certain executive agencies are directed to
review the current USRAP application and
adjudication processes, and to determine the
additional procedures that "should" be
required for individuals seeking admission as
refugees. See id. at
13215-16. Invoking 8
U.S.C. § 1182(f), Section 6(b) reduces the
number of refugees to be admitted from
110,000 to 50,000 in fiscal year 2017. Id. at
13216. The Order also removes EO1's
preference for refugees facing persecution as
a member of a minority religion, and no
longer imposes a complete ban on Syrian
refugees. Section 6 further provides for
discretionary case-by-case waivers. Id.
EO2 supplies additional information relevant
to national security concerns. The Order
includes
excerpts
from
the
State

Id. at 13210. Based on the conditions of these
six countries, "the risk of erroneously
permitting entry of a national of one of these
countries who intends to commit terrorist acts
or otherwise harm the national security of the
United States is unacceptably high." Id. at
13211.
The Order states that it no longer includes
Iraq on the list of designated countries
because of Iraq's "close cooperative
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Department's 2015 Country Reports on
Terrorism, that it asserts demonstrate "why .
. . nationals [from the designated countries]
continue to present heightened risk to the
security of the United States." Id. at
13210; see id. at 13210-11 (providing a brief
description of country conditions for each of
the designated countries). The Order states
that foreign nationals and refugees have
committed acts of terrorism:

Two versions of a report from the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS")
surfaced after EO1 issued. First, a draft report
from DHS, prepared about one month after
EO1 issued and two weeks prior to EO2's
issuance, concluded that citizenship "is
unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential
terrorist activity" and that citizens of
countries
affected
by
EO1
are
"[r]arely [i]mplicated in
U.S.[b]ased [t]errorism." Specifically, the DHS
report determined that since the spring of
2011, at least eighty-two individuals were
inspired by a foreign terrorist group to carry
out or attempt to carry out an attack in the
United States. Slightly more than half were
U.S. citizens born in the United States, and
the remaining persons were from twenty-six
different
countries—with
the
most
individuals originating from Pakistan,
followed by Somalia, Bangladesh, Cuba,
Ethiopia, Iraq, and Uzbekistan. Id. Of the six
countries included in EO2, only Somalia was
identified as being among the "top"
countries-of-origin for the terrorists analyzed
in the report. During the time period covered
in the report, three offenders were from
Somalia; one was from Iran, Sudan, and
Yemen each; and none was from Syria or
Libya. The final version of the report, issued
five days prior to EO2, concluded "that most
foreign-born, [U.S.]-based violent extremists
likely radicalized several years after their
entry to the United States, [thus] limiting the
ability of screening and vetting officials to
prevent their entry because of national
security concerns" (emphasis added).

Recent history shows that some of those who
have entered the United States through our
immigration system have proved to be threats
to our national security. Since 2001,
hundreds of persons born abroad have been
convicted of terrorism-related crimes in the
United States. They have included not just
persons who came here legally on visas but
also individuals who first entered the
country as refugees. For example, in January
2013, two Iraqi nationals admitted to the
United States as refugees in 2009 were
sentenced to 40 years and to life in prison,
respectively, for multiple terrorism-related
offenses. And in October 2014, a native of
Somalia who had been brought to the United
States as a child refugee and later became a
naturalized United States citizen was
sentenced to 30 years in prison for attempting
to use a weapon of mass destruction as part
of a plot to detonate a bomb at a crowded
Christmas-tree-lighting
ceremony
in
Portland, Oregon. The Attorney General has
reported to me that more than 300 persons
who entered the United States as refugees are
currently the subjects of counterterrorism
investigations by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.

The same day EO2 issued, Attorney
General Jefferson B. Sessions III and
Secretary of Homeland Security John F.
Kelly submitted a letter to the President
recommending that he "direct[] a temporary
pause in entry" from countries that are
"unable or unwilling to provide the United
States with adequate information about their

Id. at 13212. EO2 does not discuss any
instances of domestic terrorism involving
nationals from Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, or
Yemen.
C
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Fifth Amendment based on procedural due
process
rights;
the Immigration
and
Nationality Act; the Religious Freedom
Restoration
Act;
and
the Administrative Procedure Act. For their
INA claim, Plaintiffs specifically contend
that EO2 violates the INA by discriminating
on the basis of nationality, ignoring and
modifying the statutory criteria for
determining
terrorism-related
inadmissibility, and exceeding the President's
delegated authority under the INA. Plaintiffs
also filed a motion for a TRO along with their
amended complaint.

nationals" or are designated as "state
sponsors of terrorism."
D
The State of Hawai'i ("the State") filed a
motion for a TRO seeking to enjoin EO1,
which the District of Hawai'i did not rule on
because of the nationwide TRO entered in the
Western District of Washington. After EO2
issued, the State filed an amended complaint
challenging EO2 in order "to protect its
residents, its employers, its educational
institutions,
and
its
sovereignty."
Dr. Elshikh, the Imam of the Muslim
Association of Hawai'i, joined the State's
challenge because the Order "inflicts a grave
injury on Muslims in Hawai'i, including
Dr. Elshikh, his family, and members of his
Mosque." In 2015, Dr. Elshikh's wife filed an
I-130 Petition for Alien Relative on behalf of
her mother—Dr. Elshikh's mother-in-law—a
Syrian
national
living
in
Syria.
Dr. Elshikh fears that his mother-in-law will
not be able to enter the United States if EO2
is implemented. Plaintiffs named as
Defendants Donald J. Trump, in his official
capacity as President of the United States; the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; John
F. Kelly, in his official capacity as Secretary
of Homeland Security; the U.S. Department
of State; Rex W. Tillerson, in his official
capacity as Secretary of State; and the United
States of America (collectively referred to as
"the Government").

On March 15, 2017, the district court granted
the TRO, holding that Plaintiffs had shown a
likelihood of success on the merits of
their Establishment
Clause claim,
and
entered a nationwide injunction prohibiting
enforcement of Sections 2 and 6 of
EO2. See Hawai'i v. Trump, No. CV 1700050 DKW-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
36935, 2017 WL 1011673 (D. Haw. Mar.
15, 2017) ("Hawai'i TRO"). On March 29,
2017, the district court granted Plaintiffs'
motion to convert the TRO to a preliminary
injunction. See Hawai'i v. Trump, No. CV 1700050 DKW-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47042, 2017 WL 1167383 (D. Haw. Mar. 29,
2017) ("Hawai'i PI"). The district court
declined to narrow the scope of the
injunction, concluding that the entirety of
Sections 2 and 6 of the Order ran afoul of
the Establishment Clause and that the
Government did not provide a workable
framework for narrowing the scope of the
enjoined conduct. See 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47042, [WL] at *8. The court entered the
following injunction:

Plaintiffs allege that EO2 suffers similar
constitutional and statutory defects as EO1
and claim that the Order violates:
the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment; the equal protection guarantees
of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause on the basis of religion and/or national
origin, nationality, or alienage; the Due
Process
Clause
of
the
Fifth
Amendment based on substantive due
process rights; the Due Process Clause of the

Defendants and all their respective officers,
agents, servants, employees, and attorneys,
and persons in active concert or participation
with them, are hereby enjoined from
enforcing or implementing Sections 2 and 6
of the Executive Order across the Nation.
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Enforcement of these provisions in all
places, including the United States, at all
United States borders and ports of entry, and
in the issuance of visas is prohibited, pending
further orders from this Court.

claim. Am. Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel,
490 U.S. 153, 161, 109 S. Ct. 1693, 104 L.
Ed. 2d 139 (1989) (per curiam); accord Lying
v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 445, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 99 L. Ed. 2d
534
(1988) ("A
fundamental
and
longstanding principle of judicial restraint
requires that courts avoid reaching
constitutional questions in advance of the
necessity of deciding them.").

On March 30, 2017, the Government filed a
notice of appeal. This court granted the
Government's unopposed motion to expedite
the case. The Government requests that this
court vacate the preliminary injunction, or at
least narrow the injunction, and also stay the
injunction pending appeal.

After first determining that Plaintiffs have
standing to assert their INA-based statutory
claim, we conclude that Plaintiffs have
shown a likelihood of success on the merits
of that claim and that the district court's
preliminary injunction order can be affirmed
in large part based on statutory grounds. For
reasons further explained below, we need
not, and do not, reach the Establishment
Clause claim
to
resolve
this
appeal. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,
297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S. Ct. 466, 80 L. Ed.
688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[I]f a
case can be decided on either of two grounds,
one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or
general law, the Court will decide only the
latter.").

II
The district court held that Plaintiffs were
entitled to preliminary relief because they
had made a strong showing of success on the
merits of their Establishment Clause claim.
Applying the secular purpose test
from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 61213, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1971),
and relying on the historical record that
contained "significant and unrebutted
evidence of religious animus driving the
promulgation of the Executive Order," the
district court concluded that EO2 was issued
with an intent to disfavor people of Islamic
faith. See Hawai'i TRO, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 36935, 2017 WL 1011673, at *1216. In so doing, the district court decided an
important and controversial constitutional
claim without first expressing its views on
Plaintiffs' statutory claims, including their
INA-based claim. See 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
36935, [WL] at *11 n.11.

III
Before turning to our review of Plaintiffs'
statutory claim, we first address the
Government's challenge to the preliminary
injunction order on justiciability grounds.
The Government contends both that Plaintiffs
lack standing to pursue this case and that the
case is not yet ripe. The Government further
contends
that
the
consular nonreviewability doctrine bars this
court from reviewing EO2. We address each
contention in turn.

The INA claim was squarely before the
district court and briefed and argued before
this court. Mindful of the Supreme Court's
admonition that "courts should be extremely
careful
not
to
issue
unnecessary
constitutional rulings," "[p]articularly where,
as here, a case implicates the fundamental
relationship between the Branches," we think
it appropriate to turn first to the INA

A
"Article III of the Constitution limits federalcourt
jurisdiction
to
'Cases' and
184

'Controversies.'" Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497, 516, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 167 L. Ed. 2d
248 (2007). "Standing to sue is a doctrine
rooted in the traditional understanding of a
case or controversy" and limits who may
"maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek
redress for a legal wrong." Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L. Ed. 2d
635 (2016). "[T]o satisfy Article III's
standing requirements, a plaintiff must show
(1) it has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a)
concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2)
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable
decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 180-81, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d
610 (2000)(citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119
L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992)). "At this very
preliminary stage of the litigation, [Plaintiffs]
may rely on the allegations in their [amended
complaint] and whatever other evidence they
submitted in support of their [preliminary
injunction]
motion
to
meet
their
burden." Washington,
847
F.3d
at
1159; see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.

to challenge EO2 based on their INA-based
statutory claim and conclude that they do.

The district court determined that both the
State of Hawai'i and Dr. Elshikh have
standing
to
pursue their Establishment
Clause claim. See Hawai'i TRO, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 36935, 2017 WL 1011673, at
*7-10. The Government argues that Plaintiffs
fail to satisfy the requirements of Article III
standing to bring their Establishment
Clause claim. Plaintiffs
must
establish
standing
for
each
of
their
claims. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547
U.S. 332, 352, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 164 L. Ed. 2d
589 (2006). As we do not reach
Plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim, we
address only whether Plaintiffs have standing

This court and the Supreme Court have
reviewed the merits of cases brought by U.S.
residents with a specific interest in the entry
of a foreigner. See, e.g., Kerry v. Din, 135 S.
Ct. 2128, 2131, 192 L. Ed. 2d 183
(2015) (involving a challenge by a U.S.
citizen to the denial of her husband's
visa); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
756-60, 92 S. Ct. 2576, 33 L. Ed. 2d 683
(1972) (addressing a challenge by American
professors to the denial of a visa to a
journalist they had invited to speak at several
academic events); Cardenas v. United States,
826 F.3d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir.
2016) (determining that a U.S. citizen could
challenge the denial of her husband's visa).

1
Dr. Elshikh is an American citizen of
Egyptian descent. He alleges that EO2 will
prevent his mother-in-law from obtaining a
visa to reunite with her family. His motherin-law is a Syrian national currently living in
Syria; she last visited her family in Hawai'i in
2005 and has not yet met two of her five
grandchildren. Dr. Elshikh's wife filed an I130 Petition for Alien Relative on behalf of
her mother in September 2015, and the
petition was approved in February 2016.
After EO1 issued, Dr. Elshikh was told that
his mother-in-law's visa application for an
immigrant visa had been put on hold. After
EO1 was enjoined, he was notified that the
application had progressed to the next stage
of the process, and that her interview would
be scheduled at an embassy overseas.
Dr. Elshikh understandably and reasonably
fears that EO2 will prevent his mother-in-law
from
entering
the
country. Dr. Elshikh asserts that he has
standing based on the barriers EO2 imposes
in preventing him from reuniting his motherin-law with his family.
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Most similar to this case, in Legal Assistance
for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v.
Department of State, Bureau of Consular
Affairs, the D.C. Circuit determined that visa
sponsors had standing to assert that the State
Department's refusal to process visa
applications of Vietnamese citizens living in
Hong Kong violated 8 U.S.C. § 1152. 45 F.3d
469, 471-73, 310 U.S. App. D.C. 168 (D.C.
Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 519
U.S. 1, 117 S. Ct. 378, 136 L. Ed. 2d 1
(1996). The court explained that the State
Department's
actions
prolonged
the
separation of immediate family members,
which resulted in injury to the sponsors. Id.
Dr. Elshikh seeks to reunite his mother-inlaw with his family and similarly experiences
prolonged separation from her. By
suspending the entry of nationals from the six
designated countries, including Syria, EO2
operates to delay or prevent the issuance of
visas to nationals from those countries,
including
Dr. Elshikh's mother-in-law.
Dr. Elshikh has alleged a concrete harm
because EO2, specifically the operation of
Section 2, is a barrier to reunification with his
mother-in-law in light of her stalled visa
process. See id. (holding that U.S. resident
sponsors had standing to challenge the State
Department's refusal to process visa
applications); Int'l
Refugee
Assistance
Project v. Trump, No. 17-1351, 857 F.3d 554,
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9109, 2017 WL
2273306, at *10 (4th Cir. May 25,
2017) (en banc), as amended (May 31, 2017)
(identifying prolonged separation between
plaintiff and his wife as a concrete
harm). That his mother-in-law's visa
application process was placed on hold when
EO1 took effect, but moved forward when
EO1 was enjoined, further shows that
Dr. Elshikh's injury is concrete, real, and
immediate
if
EO2
takes
effect.
Dr. Elshikh has thus alleged a sufficient
injury-in-fact. While not challenged by the
Government, it is also clear that

Dr. Elshikh has established causation and
redressability. His injuries are fairly traceable
to the Order, satisfying causation, and
enjoining EO2 will remove a barrier to
reunification and redress that injury,
satisfying redressability.
Dr. Elshikh has met the requirements for
constitutional standing with respect to the
INA-based statutory claim.
2
The State of Hawai'i alleges two primary
theories of harm in asserting its standing:
harm to its proprietary interests and
impairment of its sovereign interests.
"[L]ike other associations and private
parties, a State is bound to have a variety of
proprietary interests. A State may, for
example, own land or participate in a
business venture." Alfred L. Snapp & Son,
Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S.
592, 601, 102 S. Ct. 3260, 73 L. Ed. 2d 995
(1982). "And like other such proprietors [the
State] may at times need to pursue those
interests in court." Id. at 601-02.
The State asserts that it has standing because
of the injuries inflicted on its university. The
University of Hawai'i ("the University"),
which the State operates, has twenty-three
graduate students, at least twenty-nine
visiting faculty members, and other
permanent faculty members from the six
countries designated in EO2. The State
asserts that EO2 constrains the University's
ability to recruit and enroll undergraduate
and graduate students, and recruit and hire
visiting faculty from the affected countries.
The State also contends that EO2 threatens
the University's ability to fulfill its
educational
mission
by
hampering
recruitment of diverse students, preventing
scholars from considering employment at the
University, dissuading current professors and
scholars from continuing their scholarship at
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the University, hindering the free flow of
ideas, and harming its values of inclusiveness
and tolerance.

cycle—from when the University offers
admissions to when international students
must decide whether to attend—and the
uncertainty of whether EO2 will inhibit their
ability to secure a visa before the fall
semester begins, EO2's deterrent effect is an
injury that is "concrete" and "imminent," as
opposed to merely "speculative." See Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560-61 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Of course, a student who is not
permitted to obtain a visa and enter our
country would not accept an offer of
admission.

Given the timing of the admissions cycle and
this litigation, the State concedes that it is too
soon to determine the full impact on
recruitment, but asserts that individuals who
are not current visa holders or lawful
permanent residents would be precluded
from considering the University. In its
opposition brief, the State gave updated
information, explaining that eleven graduate
students from the countries affected by the
Order have been admitted, and the University
was still considering applications from
twenty-one other affected applicants. After
the case was submitted, Plaintiffs
supplemented the record with further updates
on the University's admissions cycle. At least
three graduate students, each from one of the
six designated countries, have accepted their
offers of admission and have committed to
attending the University. There are
eleven graduate student applicants, each from
one of the six designated countries, with
pending offers of admission for the 2017-18
school year. University classes begin on
August 21, 2017, but at least two of the
students who have accepted their offers of
admission must be present on campus by
August 1, 2017 and August 10, 2017,
respectively, for their graduate programs.
The State further explains that if EO2 takes
effect now, these students' ability to obtain
visas will be impeded.

The Government next contends that Plaintiffs
cannot rely on events that unfolded after the
filing of the complaint to establish standing.
This argument is not persuasive. The State
had previously contended that its recruitment
was constrained by EO2 and its supplemental
declaration merely provides greater detail
regarding the students who may be unable to
join the academic community this fall if EO2
takes effect. We consider the supplemental
information as further evidence that EO2 will
harm the State because students affected by
Section 2(c) may not attend the University,
and the University will lose tuition and
educational benefits.
The State's standing can thus be grounded in
its proprietary interests as an operator of the
University. EO2 harms the State's interests
because (1) students and faculty suspended
from entry are deterred from studying or
teaching at the University; and (2) students
who are unable to attend the University will
not pay tuition or contribute to a diverse
student body. See Washington, 847 F.3d at
1161 (holding that states, as operators of
universities, had Article III standing to
challenge EO1 based on harms to their
proprietary interests); Texas v. United States,
809 F.3d 134, 155-63 (5th Cir. 2015), as
revised (Nov. 25, 2015), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 195 L. Ed. 2d
638 (2016) (holding that the state of Texas

Before Plaintiffs supplemented the record,
the Government argued that the State had not
identified any prospective student or faculty
member who wished to enter the
country during Section 2(c)'s 90-day period.
However, the State's alleged harm is that
EO2 presently constrains their recruitment
efforts for students and faculty, and that EO2
deters prospective students and faculty
members. Given the short admissions
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had standing to challenge the Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful
Permanent Residents ("DAPA") program
based on its alleged injury of subsidizing
driver's licenses to DAPA beneficiaries). We
further conclude that the State has shown that
its injury is fairly traceable to EO2 and that
enjoining EO2 would redress its harm.

entities within the relevant jurisdiction" in
administering OCS, we conclude, at this
preliminary stage, that the State has made
sufficient allegations to support standing to
challenge the refugee-related provisions of
EO2. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at
601; see also Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 269 (4th Cir.
2011) (collecting cases where state was
found to possess sovereign standing based on
state statutes that regulated behavior or
provided for the administration of a state
program).

The State also presents an alternative
standing theory: that the Order impairs its
sovereign interests in carrying out its refugee
policies, among other things. A state has an
interest in its "exercise of sovereign power
over individuals and entities within the
relevant jurisdiction," which "involves the
power to create and enforce a legal
code." Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at
601. The State contends that EO2 hinders the
exercise of its sovereign power to enforce its
laws and policies and this inflicts an injury
sufficient to provide the State standing to
challenge the Order. The State has laws
protecting
equal
rights,
barring
discrimination, and fostering diversity. See,
e.g., Haw. Const. art. 1, §§ 2, 5; Haw. Rev.
Stat. §§ 489-3, 515-3. Specific to refugees,
the State created the Office of Community
Services ("OCS"), which is directed to
"[a]ssist and coordinate the efforts of all
public and private agencies providing
services which affect the disadvantaged,
refugees, and immigrants." Haw. Rev. Stat. §
371K-4. OCS operates multiple programs for
refugees.

Concluding that Dr. Elshikh and the State
have
satisfied
Article
III's standing
requirements, we
turn
to
whether
Plaintiffs are within the "zone of interests"
protected by the INA.
3
Because Plaintiffs allege a statutory claim,
we must determine whether they meet the
requirement of having interests that "fall
within the zone of interests protected by the
law invoked." Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377,
1388, 188 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
We have little trouble determining that
Dr. Elshikh is within the zone of interests of
the INA to challenge EO2 based on this
statutory claim. He asserts that the travel ban
prevents his mother-in-law from reuniting
with his family. See Legal Assistance for
Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, 45 F.3d at 47172 ("The INA authorizes the immigration of
family members of United States citizens and
permanent resident aliens. In originally
enacting the INA, Congress implemented the
underlying intention of our immigration laws
regarding the preservation of the family unit.
Given the nature and purpose of the statute,
the resident appellants fall well within the
zone of interest Congress intended to

The State has resettled three refugees this
fiscal year, and at least twenty since 2010.
EO2 would prevent the State from assisting
with refugee resettlement and thus prevent it
from effectuating its policies aimed at
assisting
refugee
and
immigrant
populations. See id. The State's requested
injunctive relief would permit it to assist in
the resettlement of refugees, at least through
fiscal year 2017. As the State exercises
"sovereign power over individuals and
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protect." (internal quotation marks, citations,
and alterations omitted)).

the United States, as well as "uniform
provisions for the effective resettlement and
absorption of those refugees who are
admitted." Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-212, § 101, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). The State
argues that EO2 upsets this finely-tuned
system devised by Congress.

Likewise, the State's efforts to enroll students
and hire faculty members who are nationals
from the six designated countries fall within
the zone of interests of the INA. The INA
makes clear that a nonimmigrant student may
be admitted into the United States. See 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F) (identifying students
qualified to pursue a full course of study); 8
C.F.R.
§
214.2(f) (providing
the
requirements for nonimmigrant students,
including those in colleges and universities).
The INA also provides that nonimmigrant
scholars and teachers may be admitted into
the United States. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(15)(J) (identifying
students,
scholars, trainees, teachers, professors,
research assistants, specialists, or leaders in
fields of specialized knowledge or skill); id. §
1101(a)(15)(H) (identifying aliens coming to
perform
services
in
a
specialty
occupation); id. §1101(a)(15)(O) (identifyin
g aliens with extraordinary abilities in the
sciences, arts, education, business, or
athletics). International students and visiting
faculty may qualify for F-1 visas, J-1 visas,
H-1B visas, or O-1 visas. See Directory of
Visa
Categories,
U.S.
Dep't
of
State, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/e
n/general/all-visa-categories.html (last
visited June 6, 2017). The INA leaves no
doubt that the State's interests in student-and
employment-based visa petitions for its
students and faculty are related to the basic
purposes of the INA.

We conclude that Plaintiffs' claims of injury
as a result of the alleged statutory violations
are, at the least, "arguably within the zone of
interests" that the INA protects. Bank of Am.
Corp. v. City of Miami, Fla., 137 S. Ct. 1296,
1303,
197
L.
Ed.
2d
678
(2017) (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153,
90 S. Ct. 827, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1970)).
Plaintiffs have standing to assert their INAbased statutory claim that EO2 exceeds the
scope of the President's authority under the
INA and conflicts with various INA
provisions.
B
The Government next argues that Plaintiffs'
claims
are
speculative
and
not
ripe. "Ripeness is peculiarly a question of
timing, designed to prevent the courts,
through avoidance of premature adjudication,
from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements." Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky,
586 F.3d 1109, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotations marks and alteration omitted).
"Our role is neither to issue advisory opinions
nor to declare rights in hypothetical cases, but
to adjudicate live cases or controversies
consistent with the powers granted the
judiciary
in
Article
III
of
the
Constitution." Thomas v. Anchorage Equal
Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th
Cir. 2000).

The State's interest in effectuating its refugee
resettlement policies and programs also falls
within the zone of interests protected by the
INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (defining
"refugees"); id. §
1157 (providing
the
procedure for determining the number of
refugee admissions). These provisions of the
INA were amended to provide a "systematic
procedure" for the admission of refugees into

We are unpersuaded by the Government's
arguments that until a student or faculty
member requests a waiver and it is denied,
or until Dr. Elshikh's mother-in-law requests
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a waiver and she is denied, Plaintiffs injuries
are not ripe because they assume "contingent
future events that may not occur." Texas v.
United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S. Ct.
1257, 140 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1998) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).

Dr. Elshikh's mother-in-law
or
the
University's prospective students and faculty
members might conceivably obtain such a
waiver, they will face substantial hardship if
we were to first require that they try to obtain
a waiver before we will consider their
case. Cf. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 149, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681
(1967). We conclude that the claim is ripe for
review.

Although the waiver may, in theory, provide
students, visiting faculty members, or
Dr. Elshikh's mother-in-law an opportunity
to
obtain
visas,
the
waiver
is
discretionary. Indeed, no one can count on it.
The Order poses hardships to nationals from
the six designated countries by barring
throughout the suspension period their ability
to obtain visas. The waiver provision neither
guarantees that waivers will be granted nor
provides a process for applying for a waiver;
moreover, the ultimate decision is clearly
committed to a consular officer's
discretion. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 13214 ("Caseby-case waivers could be appropriate in
circumstances such as the following . . . .")
(emphasis
added); id. at
13219 (stating
that nothing in the Order provides any
"enforceable" rights). The discretionary
waiver is not "a sufficient safety
valve," Washington, 847 F.3d at 1169, and is
a far cry from the "contingent future" argued
by the Government. Here, nationals from the
six
designated
countries, including
Dr. Elshikh's mother-in-law and students
who have accepted, or been offered,
admission to the University of Hawai'i, are
burdened by EO2 because they are not
permitted entry, and whether they might
obtain a waiver is speculative and at the
discretion of a consular officer or a Customs
and Border Protection official. See 82 Fed.
Reg. at 13214.

C
Finally, the Government renews the
argument
it
made
before
this
court in Washington v. Trump that we may
not
review
EO2
because
the
consular nonreviewability doctrine counsels
that the decision to issue or withhold a visa is
not subject to judicial review. See Li Hing of
Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin, 800 F.2d 970, 971
(9th Cir. 1986) ("[I]t has been consistently
held that the consular official's decision to
issue or withhold a visa is not subject either
to administrative or judicial review."). We
reject this argument.
Plaintiffs do not seek review of an individual
consular officer's decision to grant or to deny
a visa pursuant to valid regulations, which
could
implicate
the
consular nonreviewability doctrine.
Plaintiffs
instead
challenge
"the
President's promulgation of
sweeping
immigration policy." Washington, 847 F.3d
at 1162. Courts can and do review both
constitutional and statutory "challenges to the
substance
and
implementation
of
immigration
policy." Id. at
1163; see,
e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509
U.S. 155, 187-88, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 125 L. Ed.
2d 128 (1993)(addressing the merits of a
challenge that an executive order violated the
INA and the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41, 103 S. Ct.
2764, 77 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1983) (addressing

We decline the Government's invitation to
wait until Plaintiffs identify a visa applicant
who was denied a discretionary waiver to
assess whether Plaintiffs have shown a
likelihood of success on the merits of their
claims.
Regardless
of
whether
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whether a section of the INA that authorized
one House of Congress to invalidate a
decision of the Executive to allow a
deportable alien to remain in the United
States was unconstitutional).

of the appeal of the preliminary injunction
order.
IV
A

This
case
is
justiciable
because
Plaintiffs seek judicial review of EO2,
contending that EO2 exceeds the statutory
authority delegated by Congress and
constitutional boundaries. "This is a familiar
judicial exercise." Zivotofsky ex
rel.
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196, 132
S. Ct. 1421, 182 L. Ed. 2d 423 (2012). We
reject the Government's argument that the
Order is not subject to judicial
review. Although "[t]he Executive has broad
discretion over the admission and exclusion
of aliens, [] that discretion is not boundless.
It extends only as far as the statutory
authority conferred by Congress and may not
transgress constitutional limitations. It is the
duty of the courts, in cases properly before
them, to say where those statutory and
constitutional boundaries lie." Abourezk v.
Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061, 251 U.S. App.
D.C. 355 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 1,
108 S. Ct. 252, 98 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1987).

A
preliminary
injunction
is
"an
extraordinary remedy that may only be
awarded upon a clear showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Winter v.
NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S. Ct. 365,
172 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2008). "A plaintiff
seeking a preliminary injunction must
establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an
injunction is in the public interest." Id. at 20.
We may affirm the district court's entry of the
preliminary injunction "on any ground
supported by the record." Enyart v. Nat'l
Conference of Bar Exam'rs, Inc., 630 F.3d
1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2011).
B
We consider whether Plaintiffs are entitled to
preliminary relief based on the likelihood that
EO2 violates the INA. First, we address
whether the President complied with the
conditions set forth in § 1182(f), which are
necessary for invoking his authority. We next
address the conflicts between EO2 and other
provisions of the INA.

Whatever deference we accord to the
President's immigration and national security
policy judgments does not preclude us from
reviewing the policy at all. See Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70, 101 S. Ct. 2646,
69 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1981) ("[D]eference does
not
mean
abdication."); Holder
v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34,
130 S. Ct. 2705, 177 L. Ed. 2d 355
(2010) ("Our precedents, old and new, make
clear that concerns of national security and
foreign relations do not warrant abdication of
the judicial role.").

1
Under Article I of the Constitution, the power
to make immigration laws "is entrusted
exclusively to Congress." Galvan v. Press,
347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S. Ct. 737, 98 L. Ed.
911 (1954); see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
4 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization .

We do not abdicate the judicial role, and we
affirm our obligation "to say what the law is"
in this case. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). We turn to the merits
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. . ."); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792, 97 S.
Ct. 1473, 52 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1977) ("[O]ver no
conceivable subject is the legislative power
of Congress more complete than it is over the
admission of aliens." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); [**49] id. at 796 ("The
conditions of entry for every alien, the
particular classes of aliens that shall be
denied entry altogether, the basis for
determining such classification . . . have been
recognized as matters solely for the
responsibility of the Congress . . . ." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).

suspend the entry of aliens or classes of
aliens. However, this authority is not
unlimited. Cf. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,
129, 78 S. Ct. 1113, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1204
(1958) ("[I]f that power is delegated, the
standards must be adequate to pass scrutiny
by the accepted tests."); J.W. Hampton, Jr., &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S.
Ct. 348, 72 L. Ed. 624, Treas. Dec. 42706
(1928) ("[L]egislative action is not a
forbidden delegation of legislative power" if
Congress provides an "intelligible principle
to which the person or body authorized . . . is
directed
to
conform."). Section
1182(f) requires that the President find that
the entry of a class of aliens into the United
States would be detrimental to the interests of
the United States. This section requires that
the President's findings support the
conclusion that entry of all nationals from the
six designated countries, all refugees, and
refugees in excess of 50,000 would be
harmful to the national interest. There is no
sufficient finding in EO2 that the entry of the
excluded classes would be detrimental to the
interests of the United States.

In the INA of 1952, Congress delegated some
of its power to the President through Section
212(f), which provides:
Whenever the President finds that the entry
of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the
United States would be detrimental to the
interests of the United States, he may by
proclamation, and for such period as he shall
deem necessary, suspend the entry of all
aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or
nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of
aliens any restrictions he may deem to be
appropriate.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).

i
Section 2(c) declares that "the unrestricted
entry into the United States of nationals of
Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and
Yemen would be detrimental to the interests
of the United States" and directs that the entry
of nationals from those designated countries
be barred for 90 days. 82 Fed. Reg. at 13213.
The provision bans more than 180 million
people from entry based on their national
origin, including nationals who may have
never been physically present in those
countries. See Brief of Former National
Security Officials as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No.
108 at 17. Section 2(c) states:

In Section 2(c) of the Order, the President
invokes this power along with § 1185(a) to
suspend for 90 days the entry of nationals
from the six designated countries. See 82 Fed.
Reg. at 13213. In Section 6(a) of the Order,
the President invokes neither section to
suspend travel of refugees and to suspend
decisions on applications for refugee status
for 120 days, but, in Section 6(b), the
President invokes § 1182(f) to cap refugee
admissions at 50,000 for the 2017 fiscal
year. Id. at 13215-16.
The parties dispute whether EO2 falls clearly
within the President's congressionally
delegated
authority. To
be
sure, §
1182(f) gives the President broad authority to

[1] To temporarily reduce investigative
burdens on relevant agencies during the
review period [of the United States' vetting
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Each of these countries is a state sponsor of
terrorism,
has
been
significantly
compromised by terrorist organizations, or
contains active conflict zones. Any of these
circumstances diminishes the foreign
government's willingness or ability to share
or validate important information about
individuals seeking to travel to the United
States. Moreover, the significant presence in
each
of
these countries of
terrorist
organizations, their members, and others
exposed to those organizations increases the
chance that conditions will be exploited to
enable terrorist operatives or sympathizers to
travel to the United States. Finally, once
foreign nationals from these countries are
admitted to the United States, it is often
difficult to remove them, because many of
these countries typically delay issuing, or
refuse to issue, travel documents.
Id. at 13210 (emphasis added).

procedures], [2] to ensure the proper review
and maximum utilization of available
resources for the screening and vetting of
foreign nationals, [3] to ensure that adequate
standards are established to prevent
infiltration by foreign terrorists, and [4] in
light of the national security concerns
referenced in section 1 of this order, I hereby
proclaim,
pursuant
to sections
212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. [§§]
1182(f) and 1185(a), that the unrestricted
entry into the United States of nationals of
Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and
Yemen would be detrimental to the interests
of the United States. I therefore direct that the
entry into the United States of nationals of
those six countries be suspended.
82 Fed. Reg. at 13213. The Government
explains that the Order's objective "is to
address the risk that potential terrorists might
exploit possible weaknesses in the Nation's
screening and vetting procedures while the
review of those procedures is underway."
We reject the first three reasons provided in
Section 2(c) because they relate to
preservation of government resources to
review existing procedures and ensure
adequate vetting procedures. There is no
finding that present vetting standards are
inadequate, and no finding that absent the
improved vetting procedures there likely will
be harm to our national interests. These
identified reasons do not support the
conclusion that the entry of nationals from
the six designated countries would be
harmful to our national interests.

Because of these country conditions, the
Order concludes that "the risk of erroneously
permitting entry of a national of one of these
countries who intends to commit terrorist acts
or otherwise harm the national security of the
United States is unacceptably high." Id. at
13211. The Order further indicates that
"hundreds of persons born abroad have been
convicted of terrorism-related crimes in the
United States[,]" but does not identify the
number of nationals from the six designated
countries
who
have
been
so
convicted. See id. at 13212.
The Order makes no finding that nationality
alone renders entry of this broad class of
individuals a heightened security risk to the
United States. See Int'l Refugee Assistance
Project, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9109, 2017
WL 2273306, at *31 (Keenan, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment)
("[T]he Second Executive Order does not
state that any nationals of the six identified
countries, by virtue of their nationality,
intend to commit terrorist acts in the United

We turn to the fourth reason—national
security concerns—and examine whether it
confers a legally sufficient basis for the
President's conclusion that the nationalitybased entry restriction is warranted. Section
1(d) of the Order explains that nationals from
Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and
Yemen warrant additional scrutiny because:
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States or otherwise pose a detriment to the
interests of the United States.").

Although the Order explains that country
conditions in the six designated countries
lessen their governments' ability to share
information about nationals seeking to travel
to our country, the Order specifically avoids
making any finding that the current screening
processes are inadequate. As the law stands,
a visa applicant bears the burden of showing
that the applicant is eligible to receive a visa
or other document for entry and is not
inadmissible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The
Government already can exclude individuals
who do not meet that burden. See id. The
Order offers no further reason explaining
how this individualized adjudication process
is flawed such that permitting entry of an
entire class of nationals is injurious to the
interests of the United States.

The Order does not tie these nationals in any
way to terrorist organizations within the six
designated countries. It does not identify
these nationals as contributors to active
conflict or as those responsible for insecure
country conditions. It does not provide any
link between an individual's nationality and
their propensity to commit terrorism or their
inherent dangerousness. In short, the Order
does not provide a rationale explaining why
permitting entry of nationals from the six
designated countries under current protocols
would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States.
The Order's discussion of country conditions
fails to bridge the gap. Indeed, its use of
nationality as the sole basis for suspending
entry means that nationals without significant
ties to the six designated countries, such as
those who left as children or those whose
nationality is based on parentage alone,
should be suspended from entry. Yet,
nationals of other countries who do have
meaningful ties to the six designated
countries—and may be contributing to the
very country conditions discussed—fall
outside the scope of Section 2(c).
Consequently, EO2's focus on nationality
"could have the paradoxical effect of barring
entry by a Syrian national who has lived in
Switzerland for decades, but not a Swiss
national who has immigrated to Syria during
its civil war." Hawai'i TRO, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 36935, 2017 WL 1011673, at
*15 (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted); see also Brief of the Cato
Institute as Amicus Curiae, Dkt. No. 170 at
14-15 (providing statistics on nationals of the
designated countries living in other countries
as migrants, refugees, or asylum seekers and
explaining that Syrian and Iranian nationals
do not gain nationality by virtue of their place
of birth).

Finally, the Order relies on 8 U.S.C. §
1187(a)(12) to explain why the six countries
have been designated. 82 Fed. Reg. at
13210. In § 1187(a)(12), Congress prevented
use of the Visa Waiver Program by dual
nationals of, or those who have visited in the
last six years, (1) Iraq and Syria, (2) any
country designated by the Secretary of State
as a state sponsor of terrorism, and (3) any
other country designated as a country of
concern by the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Secretary of
State and the Director of National
Intelligence. Rather than setting an outright
ban on entry of nationals from these
countries, Congress restricted access to the
tourist Visa Waiver Program and instead
required that persons who are nationals of or
have recently traveled to these countries enter
the United States with a visa. This provision
reflects Congress's considered view on
similar security concerns that the Order seeks
to address. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951,
959 (explaining
that
our
founders
"consciously" chose to place the legislative
process in the hands of a "deliberate and
deliberative" body). The Order identifies no
new information to justify Section 2(c)'s
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blanket
ban
as
contrasted
with §
1187(a)(12)'s restriction from the Visa
Waiver Program. Moreover, relying on §
1187(a)(12) alone, which requires that aliens
from these countries undergo vetting through
visa procedures, does not explain why
their entry would be detrimental to the
interests of the United States. To the contrary,
it effectively negates the Order's statement of
detriment—that the "unrestricted entry into
the United States of nationals [of the six
designated countries] would be detrimental to
the interests of the United States." 82 Fed.
Reg. at 13213 (emphasis added). Section
1187(a)(12) dictates that the entry of
individuals covered by the Order is never
"unrestricted."

Section 6(a) suspends travel of refugees into
the United States under USRAP and
suspends decisions on applications for
refugee status for 120 days but does not
specifically announce that the entry of
refugees would be detrimental to the interests
of the United States. 82 Fed. Reg. at 13215.
Assuming the President also relied on §
1182(f) to suspend USRAP for 120 days,
EO2 provides the following information to
possibly support the conclusion that refugee
admissions would injure the national interest.
First, EO2 explains that the screening and
vetting procedures associated with USRAP
"play a crucial role in detecting foreign
nationals who may commit, aid, or support
acts of terrorism and in preventing those
individuals from entering the United States,"
and that it is the policy of the United States to
improve screening and vetting procedures
associated
with
USRAP. Id. at
13209. Section 1(h) cites two examples of
refugees who have been convicted of
terrorism-related crimes in the United States:
[1] [I]n January 2013, two Iraqi nationals
admitted to the United States as refugees in
2009 were sentenced to 40 years and to life in
prison, respectively, for multiple terrorismrelated offenses. [2] [I]n October 2014, a
native of Somalia who had been brought to
the United States as a child refugee and later
became a naturalized United States citizen
was sentenced to 30 years in prison for
attempting to use a weapon of mass
destruction . . . .

In conclusion, the Order does not offer a
sufficient justification to suspend the entry of
more than 180 million people on the basis of
nationality. National security is not a
"talismanic incantation" that, once invoked,
can support any and all exercise of executive
power under § 1182(f). United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-64, 88 S. Ct. 419,
19 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1967); see also Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235, 65 S. Ct.
193, 89 L. Ed. 194 (1944) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting)
("[T]he
exclusion
order
necessarily must rely for its reasonableness
upon the assumption that all persons of
Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous
tendency to commit sabotage and espionage
and to aid our Japanese enemy in other ways.
It is difficult to believe that reason, logic or
experience could be marshalled in support of
such
an
assumption."). Section
1182(f) requires that the President exercise
his authority only after meeting the
precondition of finding that entry of an alien
or class of aliens would be detrimental to the
interests of the United States. Here, the
President has not done so.

82 Fed. Reg. at 13212. Section 1(h) also
explains that there are "more than 300
persons who entered the United States as
refugees [who] are currently the subjects of
counterterrorism investigations by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation." Id.
EO2 does not reveal any threat or harm to
warrant suspension of USRAP for 120 days
and does not support the conclusion that the
entry of refugees in the interim time period

ii
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would be harmful. Nor does it provide any
indication that present vetting and screening
procedures are inadequate. Instead, EO2
justifies the 120-day suspension as a review
period of USRAP application and
adjudication processes. 82 Fed. Reg. at
13215. The Government reiterates that the
President directed the suspension "in order to
allow the Secretary of State to review
application and adjudication processes."
These explanations do not support a finding
that the travel and admission of refugees
would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States.

previous target admission of 110,000
refugees this fiscal year was justified by
humanitarian concerns or otherwise in the
national interest, see 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2),
but that the entry of more than 50,000
refugees this same fiscal year would be
detrimental to the national interest. Here too,
the President did not meet the statutory
precondition of exercising his authority
under § 1182(f) to cap refugee admissions.
The actions taken in Sections 2 and 6 require
the President first to make sufficient findings
that the entry of nationals from the six
designated countries and the entry of all
refugees would be detrimental to the interests
of the United States. We conclude that the
President did not satisfy this precondition
before exercising his delegated authority.
Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success
on the merits of their claim that the President
exceeded
his
authority
under §§
1182(f) and 1185(a).

iii
Section 6(b) of EO2 restricts entry of
refugees to no more than 50,000 in the 2017
fiscal year because entry in excess of 50,000
"would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States." 82 Fed. Reg. at 13216. But in
accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1157, President
Obama previously determined that the
admission of 110,000 refugees to the United
States during fiscal year 2017 was justified
by humanitarian concerns or otherwise in the
national
interest. See Presidential
Determination on Refugee Admissions for
Fiscal Year 2017, Presidential Determination
No. 2016-13, 81 Fed. Reg. 70315 (Sept. 28,
2016); see
also Proposed
Refugee
Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017: Report to
the
Congress, https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/262168.pdf .

2
Plaintiffs contend that Section 2(c) of the
Order violates the INA because it
discriminates on the basis of nationality, thus
violating the non-discrimination mandate
of § 1152(a)(1)(A) of the INA. They argue
that although the President is given broad
authority under § 1182(f), this authority is
restrained by § 1152(a)(1)(A).
Contemporaneous to enacting the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, Congress passed the INA of 1965 to
eliminate the "national origins system as the
basis for the selection of immigrants to the
United States." H.R. Rep. No. 89-745, at 8
(1965). Section 1152(a)(1)(A) was enacted as
part of that act, and provides:

To the extent that 60,000 additional refugees
can be considered a class of aliens, EO2
makes no findings to justify barring entry in
excess of 50,000 as detrimental to the
interests of the United States. EO2 gives no
explanation for why the 50,001st to the
110,000th refugee would be harmful to the
national interest, nor does it specify any
further threat to national security. And there
is not any rationale explaining why the

[N]o person shall receive any preference or
priority or be discriminated against in the
issuance of an immigrant visa because of the
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person's race, sex, nationality, place of birth,
or place of residence.
8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (emphasis
added). Section
1152(a)(1)(A) contains
specific exemptions, and § 1182(f) is not
among them.

*52 (Thacker, J., concurring) (explaining that
the Government's "own arguments and the
text and operation of [EO2] belie [the]
notion" that the visa issuance process is a
different activity than suspension of entry).
We cannot blind ourselves to the fact that, for
nationals of the six designated countries, EO2
is effectively a ban on the issuance of
immigrant visas. If allowed to stand, EO2
would bar issuance of visas based on
nationality
in
violation
of §
1152(a)(1)(A). The Government did not
dispute this point at oral argument, and it
stands to reason that the whole system of the
visa issuance would grind to a halt for
nationals
of
the
six
designated
countries whose entry is barred from the
United States. Issuance of visas will
automatically stop for those who are banned
based on nationality. Yet Congress could not
have used "more explicit language" in
"unambiguously
direct[ing]
that
no
nationality-based
discrimination
shall
occur." Legal Assistance for Vietnamese
Asylum Seekers, 45 F.3d at 473.

The Government tries to reconcile the Order's
Section 2(c) with § 1152(a)(1)(A) by arguing
that Section 2(c) bars entry of nationals from
the six designated countries but does not deny
the issuance of immigrant visas based on
nationality. EO2's suspension of entry on the
basis of nationality, however, in substance
operates as a ban on visa issuance on the basis
of nationality. The Order's text confirms as
much. Its primary purpose is to evaluate
screening and vetting procedures associated
with the visa issuance process. 82 Fed. Reg.
at 13209. EO2 affects nationals of the six
designated countries who were outside of the
United States on the effective date of the
Order but did not have a valid visa at specific
times, such as the effective date of EO1. 82
Fed. Reg. at 13213. Further, it provides for a
waiver so consular officers or Customs and
Border Protection officials may authorize the
issuance of visas during the suspension
period. Id. at 13214. The Government also
stresses that it should not be required to issue
visas for aliens who are validly barred from
entry, explaining that "[r]equiring that such
aliens be issued visas permitting them to
travel to this country, only to be denied entry
upon arrival, would create needless
difficulties and confusion." Indeed, the
Government clarified at oral argument that as
a practical matter, the entry ban would be
implemented through visa denials. Moreover,
the statute makes clear that aliens deemed
inadmissible under § 1182, including under §
1182(f) "are ineligible to receive visas," thus
confirming the substantial overlap between a
denial of entry under § 1182(f) and a visa
denial. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a); see also Int'l
Refugee Assistance Project, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 9109, 2017 WL 2273306, at

The Government additionally argues that §
1152(a)(1)(A) does
not
displace
the
President's preexisting authority under §
1182(f), because the President may validly
bar entry and the non-discrimination mandate
applies strictly to the issuance of visas. Based
on the plain statutory text, the Government
contends that the non-discrimination
mandate of § 1152(a)(1)(A) does not reach
the President's suspension of entry under §
1182(f).
This argument, however, presents a clear
conflict between § 1152(a)(1)(A) and § 1182,
because it would enable the President to
restore discrimination on the basis of
nationality that Congress sought to
eliminate. It is our duty, if possible, to
reconcile the President's statutory authority
under § 1182(f) with the non-discrimination
197

mandate of § 1152(a)(1)(A). We begin with
the instruction that "all parts of a statute, if at
all
possible,
are
to
be
given
effect." Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott &
Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 633, 93 S. Ct.
2469, 37 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1973); accord Food
& Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133, 120 S. Ct.
1291, 146 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2000) ("A court
must . . . fit, if possible, all parts into an
harmonious whole." (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted)). We also look "to
the design of the statute as a whole and to its
object and policy." Gozlon-Peretz v. United
States, 498 U.S. 395, 407, 111 S. Ct. 840, 112
L. Ed. 2d 919 (1991) (quoting Crandon v.
United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158, 110 S. Ct.
997, 108 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1990)).

Brief of Technology Companies as Amici
Curiae, Dkt. No. 180 at 20. We do not
suggest that visa holders must gain automatic
entry into the United States, but rather, that
visa holders cannot be discriminated against
on the basis of "race, sex, nationality, place
of birth, or place of residence" throughout the
visa process, whether during the issuance of
a visa or at the port of entry.
Our conclusion that § 1152(a)(1)(A)'s nondiscrimination mandate cabins the President's
authority under § 1182(f) is reinforced by
other canons of statutory construction.
First, a later enacted, more specific statute
generally governs over an earlier, more
general one. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal
Texts 183-87
(2012). Here, §
1152(a)(1)(A) was enacted in 1965, after §
1182(f) was enacted in 1952. Section
1152(a)(1)(A) is also more specific, and sets
a limitation on the President's broad authority
to exclude aliens—he may do so, but not in a
way
that
discriminates
based
on
nationality. See RadLAX Gateway
Hotel,
LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639,
132 S. Ct. 2065, 2071, 182 L. Ed. 2d 967
(2012) ("The general/specific canon is
perhaps most frequently applied to statutes in
which a general permission or prohibition is
contradicted by a specific prohibition or
permission. To eliminate the contradiction,
the specific provision is construed as an
exception to the general one.").

Under the Government's argument, the
President could circumvent the limitations set
by § 1152(a)(1)(A) by permitting the
issuance of visas to nationals of the six
designated countries, but then deny them
entry. Congress could not have intended to
permit the President to flout § 1152(a) so
easily. See Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 16,
128 S. Ct. 2307, 171 L. Ed. 2d 178
(2008) (courts should not read statutes in
such a way that renders them a "nullity" or is
"unsustainable").
To avoid this result, and to give effect to §
1152(a)(1)(A), the section "is best read to
prohibit discrimination throughout the visa
process, which must include the decision
whether to admit a visa holder upon
presenting the visa." Brief of Former
Immigration and Homeland Security
Officials as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 176 at 9.
In
prohibiting
nationality-based
discrimination in the issuance of immigrant
visas, Congress also in effect prohibited
nationality-based discrimination in the
admission of aliens. "Congress could not
have intended to prohibit discrimination at
the embassy, but permit it at the airport gate."

Second, §
1152(a)(1)(A) specifically
identifies exemptions from the nondiscrimination mandate, implying that
unmentioned
sections
are
not
exempted. See United Dominion Indus., Inc.
v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 836, 121 S.
Ct. 1934, 150 L. Ed. 2d 45 (2001) ("The logic
that invests the omission with significance is
familiar: the mention of some implies the
exclusion of others not mentioned."). Section
1152(a)(1)(A) explicitly exempts
three
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different INA provisions from its
application—8
U.S.C.
§§
1101(a)(27), 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), and 1153—all
of which deal with giving preference to
certain immigrants, such as family members
of current citizens and permanent
residents. Had Congress likewise intended to
permit §
1182(f) to
override §
1152(a)(1)(A)'s
non-discrimination
requirement, it would have done so in the
same way it did for the other provisions.

1986). The proclamation did not exclude all
foreign nationals, as exceptions were
provided, and the proclamation was in
response to Cuba's decision "'to suspend all
types of procedures regarding the execution'
of the December 14, 1984, immigration
agreement between the United States and
Cuba." Id. To be clear, Presidents have
invoked §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) to restrict
certain aliens or classes of aliens from
entering the United States, but EO2 is
unprecedented in its scope, purpose, and
breadth.

The
Government
contends
that §§
1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) "have long been
understood to permit the president to draw
nationality-based distinctions." However, as
discussed above, supra note 13, prior
executive orders and proclamations did not
suspend classes of aliens on the basis of
national origin, but instead on the basis of
affiliation or culpable conduct. See Kate M.
Manuel, Executive Authority to Exclude
Aliens: In Brief 6-10, Congressional
Research Service (2017). The other instances
cited
by
the
Government
are
distinguishable. The executive order at issue
in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509
U.S. 155, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 125 L. Ed. 2d 128
(1993),
made
no
nationality-based
distinctions and concerned "suspend[ing] the
entry of aliens coming by sea to the United
States
without
necessary
documentation." Exec. Order No. 12807, 57
Fed. Reg. 23133 (May 24, 1992). President
Carter's executive orders in response to the
Iranian hostage crisis delegated authority to
the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General to prescribe limitations governing
the entry of Iranian nationals and did not ban
Iranian immigrants outright. See Exec. Order
12172, 44 Fed. Reg. 67947 (Nov. 26,
1979), amended by Exec. Order 12206, 45
Fed. Reg. 24101 (Apr. 7, 1980). Finally,
President Reagan's Proclamation 5517
suspended the entry of Cuban nationals
coming as immigrants, with some
exceptions. 51 Fed. Reg. 30470 (Aug. 22,

The Government also argues that the
President may engage in discrimination on
the basis of nationality because of the
exception
provided
in §
1152(a)(1)(B). Section
1152(a)(1)(B) provides,
"[n]othing in [§
1152(a)(1)(A)] shall be construed to limit the
authority of the Secretary of State to
determine the procedures for the processing
of immigrant visa applications or the
locations where such applications will be
processed." However, this provision governs
the Secretary of State's manner and place for
processing applications, not the President's
asserted ability to deny immigrant visas on
the basis of nationality.
Having considered the President's authority
under § 1182(f) and the non-discrimination
mandate of § 1152(a)(1)(A), we also
conclude that Plaintiffs have shown a
likelihood of success on the merits of their
claim that Section 2(c) of the Order, in
suspending the issuance of immigrant visas
and denying entry based on nationality,
exceeds
the
restriction
of §
1152(a)(1)(A) and the overall statutory
scheme intended by Congress.
3
Aside from the President's failure to make the
requisite findings to justify reducing the entry
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before the start of the new fiscal year, and (2)
after appropriate consultation with Congress.
The Government responds that § 1157 only
refers to a ceiling—not the floor—for the
number of refugees who may be admitted,
and that §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) permit the
President to lower the number of refugees
permitted to enter.

of refugees in fiscal year 2017 as an exercise
of authority under § 1182(f), Plaintiffs
contend that 8 U.S.C. § 1157 circumscribes
the President's actions in setting the number
of refugees to be admitted this fiscal year. We
agree.
The Refugee Act of 1980 amended the INA
"to provide a permanent and systematic
procedure for the admission to this country of
refugees of special humanitarian concern to
the United States, and to provide
comprehensive and uniform provisions for
the effective resettlement and absorption of
those refugees who are admitted." Pub. L.
No. 96-212, § 101, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
The Act requires that the President, after
consulting with Congress, set the annual
admission of refugees before the beginning
of every fiscal year:

We disagree. This interpretation reads out the
language that the number of refugees who
may be admitted shall be the number
determined by the President. See 8 U.S.C. §
1157(a)(2). The Government's argument
would require us to conclude that Congress
set forth very specific requirements for the
President to provide the number and
allocation of the refugees to be admitted as
justified by humanitarian concerns or the
national
interest,
after
appropriate
consultation, only to permit the President to
order a midyear reduction in the level of
refugee admissions, and to do so without
consulting
Congress. Section
1157 contemplates that the President, after
consultation with Congress, may increase the
number of refugees admitted in the middle of
the fiscal year, but does not provide a
mechanism for the President to decrease the
number of refugees to be admitted midyear. See id. § 1157(b) (describing how, after
appropriate consultation, the President may
fix a number of additional refugees to be
admitted to the United States).

[T]he number of refugees who may be
admitted under this section in any fiscal year
. . . shall be such number as the President
determines, before the beginning of the fiscal
year and after appropriate consultation, is
justified by humanitarian concerns or is
otherwise in the national interest.
8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2). "Appropriate
consultation" is defined as "discussions in
person
by
designated
Cabinet-level
representatives of the President with
members of the Committees on the Judiciary
of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives." Id. §
1157(e).
After
undergoing this process in 2016, President
Obama determined that the admission of
110,000 refugees to the United States during
fiscal year 2017 was justified by
humanitarian concerns or otherwise in the
national interest. See 81 Fed. Reg. at
70315. Section 6(b) of EO2 reduced the
refugee admission cap for the same year to
50,000. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 13216.

Well-settled interpretive canons further
explain why § 1182(f) does not give the
President authority to override the
requirements of § 1157. First, applying the
"later in time" canon, § 1182(f) was adopted
in 1952, and § 1157 was adopted in 1980,
indicating that this subsequent statute shapes
the
scope
of
the
President's
authority. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. at 143 ("The 'classic judicial
task of reconciling many laws enacted over
time, and getting them to 'make sense' in

The statute requires the President to set the
number of annual refugee admissions (1)
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combination, necessarily assumes that the
implications of a statute may be altered by the
implications
of
a
later
statute.'"
(quoting United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S.
439, 453, 108 S. Ct. 668, 98 L. Ed. 2d 830
(1988))).

(4) An analysis of the anticipated social,
economic, and demographic impact of their
admission to the United States.
(5) A description of the extent to which other
countries will admit and assist in the
resettlement of such refugees.
(6) An analysis of the impact of the
participation of the United States in the
resettlement of such refugees on the foreign
policy interests of the United States.
(7) Such additional information as may be
appropriate or requested by such members.
Id. According to the statute, this information
would ideally be provided at least two weeks
in advance of the discussions. Id.

Second, § 1157, the more specific provision,
controls
the
more
general §
1182(f). See id. ("This is particularly so
where the scope of the earlier statute is broad
but the subsequent statutes more specifically
address
the
topic
at
hand."); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.,
426 U.S. 148, 153, 96 S. Ct. 1989, 48 L. Ed.
2d 540 (1976). Section 1157 provides a very
specific
process
for
"appropriate
consultation" that the President must follow
before setting the number of refugees to be
admitted to the United States that is justified
by humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in
the
national
interest.
"Appropriate
consultation" requires in-person discussions
between cabinet-level representatives and
members of Congress "to review the refugee
situation or emergency refugee situation, to
project the extent of possible participation of
the United States therein, [and] to discuss the
reasons for believing that the proposed
admission of refugees is justified by
humanitarian concerns or grave humanitarian
concerns or is otherwise in the national
interest . . . ." 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e). As part of
the consultation, the Executive also must
present the following information:

Congress prescribed specific actions the
President must take before setting the number
of refugees who may be admitted as justified
by humanitarian concerns or as otherwise in
the national interest. See generally 8 U.S.C. §
1157. The President relied on § 1182(f)—an
earlier and more general provision—to
conclude that admission of refugees above
50,000 is detrimental to the interest of the
United States. But § 1157, a "narrow, precise,
and specific" statutory provision, may not be
overridden by § 1182(f), a provision
"covering a more generalized spectrum" of
issues. Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 153-54; see
also Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568
U.S. 17, 133 S. Ct. 500, 504, 184 L. Ed. 2d
328 (2012) (explaining that the interpretive
principle generalia specialibus non derogant
means that "the specific governs the general"
and applies to conflict between "laws of
equivalent dignity").

(1) A description of the nature of the refugee
situation.
(2) A description of the number and
allocation of the refugees to be admitted and
an analysis of conditions within the countries
from which they came.
(3) A description of the proposed plans for
their movement and resettlement and the
estimated cost of their movement and
resettlement.

As a result, Plaintiffs have also shown a
likelihood of success on the merits for their
argument that Section 6(b) of EO2 conflicts
with 8 U.S.C. § 1157.
4
Plaintiffs additionally argue that EO2
conflicts with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B),
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which sets forth detailed and "specific criteria
for
determining
terrorism-related
inadmissibility." Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2140.

that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate." Id. at 635. However,
given the express will of Congress through §
1152(a)(1)(A)'s
non-discrimination
mandate, § 1157's procedure for refugee
admissions to this country, and §
1182(a)(3)(B)'s criteria for determining
terrorism-related
inadmissibility,
the
President took measures that were
incompatible with the expressed will of
Congress, placing his power "at its lowest
ebb." Id. at 637. In this zone, "Presidential
claim to a power at once so conclusive and
preclusive must be scrutinized with caution,
for what is at stake is the equilibrium
established
by
our
constitutional
system." Id. at 638. We have based our
decision holding the entry ban unlawful on
statutory considerations, and nothing said
herein precludes Congress and the President
from reaching a new understanding and
confirming it by statute. If there were such
consensus between Congress and the
President, then we would view Presidential
power at its maximum, and not in the
weakened state based on conflict with
statutory law. See id. at 635-38.

EO2 attempts to eliminate the marginal risk
of "erroneously permitting entry of a national
of one of these countries who intends to
commit terrorist acts," 82 Fed. Reg. at 13211,
by suspending entry of all nationals from the
six designated countries. We need not decide
the precise scope of § 1182(f) authority in
relation to § 1182(a)(3)(B) because the
President has not met the precondition to
exercising his power under § 1182(f), that is,
of making a detrimentality finding. We note,
however, that executive action should not
render superfluous Congress's requirement
that there be a "reasonable ground to believe"
that an alien "is likely to engage after entry in
any [specifically defined] terrorist activity," 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(II), and other
specific grounds for terrorism-related
admissibility. Cf. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1049
n.2 ("The President's sweeping proclamation
power [under § 1182(f)] provides a safeguard
against the danger posed by any particular
case or class of cases that is not covered by
one of the categories in section 1182(a)."
(emphasis added)); Allende v. Shultz, 845
F.2d 1111, 1118 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Each
subsection [of § 1182(a)] creates a different
and distinct ground for exclusion.").

***
In sum, we conclude that Plaintiffs have
shown a likelihood of success on the merits
at least as to their arguments that EO2
contravenes the INA by exceeding the
President's authority under § 1182(f),
discriminating on the basis of nationality, and
disregarding the procedures for setting
annual admissions of refugees.

5
Finally, we note that in considering the
President's authority, we are cognizant of
Justice Jackson's tripartite framework
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer. See 343 U.S. 579, 635-38, 72 S. Ct.
863, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 417
(1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Section
1182(f) ordinarily places the President's
authority at its maximum. "When the
President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization of Congress, his
authority is at its maximum, for it includes all

C
The current record is sufficient to permit the
court's evaluation of the irreparable harms
threatening Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs identify
harms, such as prolonged separation from
family members, constraints to recruiting and
attracting students and faculty members to
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the University of Hawai'i, decreased tuition
revenue, and the State's inability to assist in
refugee resettlement. Many of these harms
are not compensable with monetary damages
and therefore weigh in favor of finding
irreparable harm. See, e.g., Washington, 847
F.3d at 1169 (identifying harms such as
harms to States' university employees and
students, separated families, and stranded
States' residents abroad); Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 747 F.2d 511,
520 (9th Cir. 1984) (crediting intangible
harms such as the "impairment of their
ongoing recruitment programs [and] the
dissipation of alumni and community
goodwill and support garnered over
the years"); cf. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,
Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04, 97 S. Ct. 1932,
52 L. Ed. 2d 531 (1977) (explaining that "the
Constitution protects the sanctity of the
family precisely because the institution of the
family is deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition").

findings justifying that entry of certain
classes of aliens would be detrimental to the
national interest and ensuring that such
exercise does not conflict with other INA
provisions. Because the President has not
done so, we cannot conclude that
national security interests outweigh the
harms to Plaintiffs. See Int'l Refugee
Assistance Project, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS
9109, 2017 WL 2273306, at *32 (Keenan, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
Further, the Government has not put forth
evidence of injuries resulting from the
preliminary injunction, or how the screening
and vetting procedures in place before the
Order was enjoined were inadequate such
that the Order should take immediate effect.
Continuing to enjoin portions of EO2 restores
immigration procedures and programs to the
position they were in prior to its
issuance. See Washington, 847 F.3d at
1168; see also Brief of Former National
Security Officials as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No.
108 at 9 (explaining that a number of amici
officials, in office on January 20, 2017 and
current on active intelligence, knew of no
"credible terrorist threat streams directed
against the United States" at that time).
In weighing the harms, the equities tip in
Plaintiffs' favor.

We conclude Plaintiffs are likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief.
D
In considering the equities of a preliminary
injunction, we next "balance the competing
claims of injury" and "consider the effect on
each party of the granting or withholding of
the requested relief." Winter, 555 U.S. at 24.
The district court did not abuse its discretion
in finding that the balance of hardships tipped
in Plaintiffs' favor. The Government argues
that the injunction causes direct, irreparable
injury by constraining the Executive's
authority in "protect[ing] national security on
behalf of the entire United States." "[T]he
Government's interest in combating terrorism
is an urgent objective of the highest
order." Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S.
at 28. Nonetheless, the President must
exercise
his
authority
under §
1182(f) lawfully by making sufficient

E
Plaintiffs must finally show that preliminary
injunctive relief is in the public interest.
National security is undoubtedly a paramount
public interest. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
280, 307, 101 S. Ct. 2766, 69 L. Ed. 2d 640
(1981) ("[N]o governmental interest is more
compelling than the security of the Nation.").
Although we recognize that "sensitive and
weighty interests of national security and
foreign affairs" are implicated, Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 U.S. at 33-34, the President
must nonetheless exercise his executive
power under § 1182(f) lawfully. The public
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interest is served by "curtailing unlawful
executive action." Texas, 809 F.3d at 187.

vitality of entire refugee assistance programs
and resettlement efforts, see Brief of
Interfaith Group of Religions and
Interreligious Organizations as Amici
Curiae, Dkt. No. 121, Brief of Oxfam
America as Amicus Curiae, Dkt. No. 149,
Brief of HIAS, IRC, and USCRI as Amici
Curiae, Dkt. No. 155, Brief of Doe Plaintiffs
as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 276; uniquely
exclude Muslim family members, scholars,
religious leaders, and professionals from
entry, see Brief
of
Muslim
Rights,
Professional,
and
Public
Health
Organizations as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No.
124, Brief of Muslim Justice League et al. as
Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 207; inflict
proprietary harms on the states by harming
state colleges, disrupting staffing and
research at state medical institutions, and
reducing tax revenues and reinvestment of
refugee
funding
into
local
economies, seeBrief of Illinois et al. as Amici
Curiae, Dkt. No. 125; undermine trust
between law enforcement and immigrant
communities and inflict financial and social
costs,
such
as
loss
of
tourism
dollars, see Brief of Chicago et al. as Amici
Curiae, Dkt. No. 137; interfere with union
members' ability to do their work and serve
the American public, see Brief of Service
Employees International Union et al. as
Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 166; harm American
competitiveness by disrupting ongoing
business
operations
and
inhibiting
technology companies' abilities to attract
talent, business, and investment to the United
States, see Brief of Technology Companies
as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 180, Brief of
Massachusetts
Technology Leadership
Council as Amicus Curiae, Dkt. No. 194;
place victims of gender-based violence at
particular risk, see Tahirih Justice Center et
al. as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 185; interrupt
foreign artists' exhibitions and performances
in the United States, see Brief of the
Association of Art Museum Directors et al. as

The public interests in uniting families and
supporting humanitarian efforts in refugee
resettlement support the conclusion that the
public interest is served by preliminarily
enjoining EO2 and maintaining the status
quo. Cf. Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 401
F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Public
policy supports recognition and maintenance
of a family unit. The [INA] was intended to
keep families together. It should be construed
in favor of family units and the acceptance of
responsibility
by
family
members."); Kaliski v. Dist. Dir. of INS, 620
F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir. 1980) (explaining that
"the humane purpose" of the INA is to reunite
families).
Amici also have identified specific harms
that will result if EO2 takes effect, bolstering
the conclusion that the injunction is in the
public interest. They explain that EO2
would, inter alia: curtail children's ability to
travel to the United States to obtain lifesaving medical care, see Brief of the
Foundation for the Children of Iran and
Iranian Alliances Across Borders as Amici
Curiae, Dkt. No. 77; undermine the efforts of
religious organizations in the United States
rendering humanitarian aid, see Brief of
Episcopal Bishops as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No.
87; compromise the diversity interests that
are central to universities, see Brief of New
York University as Amicus Curiae, Dkt. No.
95; deter international students, faculty, and
scholars from studying at American
universities and harm the research mission of
universities, see Brief of Colleges and
Universities as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 97;
impose additional hardship for child refugees
already
facing
violence
and
trauma, seeBrief of Professional Society on
the Abuse of Children as Amicus
Curiae, Dkt. No. 107; immediately harm
refugees who will be denied entry and risk the
204

Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 204; and prevent
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents
from receiving visits from or reuniting with
family members, see Brief of Human Rights
First et al. as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 222.
The public interest favors affirming the
preliminary injunction. See Winter, 555 U.S.
at 24 ("In exercising their sound discretion,
courts of equity should pay particular regard
for the public consequences in employing the
extraordinary remedy of injunction.").

is an abuse of discretion." Stormans, 586 F.3d
at 1140.

***

Portions of Section 2 require various
agencies to conduct a review of worldwide
vetting procedures to determine what
additional information, if any, is needed from
each foreign country to adjudicate a visa
application, prepare a report on the results of
the worldwide review, submit a list of
countries that do not provide requested
information to the President, and recommend
other lawful restrictions or limitations
deemed necessary for the security of the
United States. 82 Fed. Reg. at 13212-13.
Likewise, during the interim period when
refugee admissions is suspended, Section 6
directs the Secretary of State, in conjunction
with the Secretary of Homeland Security and
the Director of National Intelligence, to
conduct an internal review and implement
additional procedures identified by the
review. Id. at 13215. Section 6 also requires
the Secretary of State to review the "existing
law" to determine how State and local
jurisdictions could have greater involvement
in the process of determining refugee
placement. Id. at 13216.

A
The Government first argues that the
injunction improperly enjoins enforcement of
parts of Sections 2 and 6 that are unrelated to
any alleged harm to Plaintiffs—specifically,
the provisions that pertain to internal
government operations and procedures.

Plaintiffs have satisfied all four factors to
warrant
entry
of
the
preliminary
injunction. See id. at 20. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in granting an
injunction.
V
With respect to the injunction's scope, the
Government contends that the district court
erred by enjoining internal government
procedures, giving nationwide relief, and
entering an order against the President.
We review the scope of a preliminary
injunction
for
abuse
of
discretion. McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694
F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2012). Although
the district court has "considerable discretion
in fashioning suitable relief and defining the
terms of an injunction," Lamb-Weston, Inc. v.
McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 974 (9th
Cir. 1991), there are limitations on
this discretion. Injunctive relief must be
tailored to remedy the specific harms shown
by the plaintiffs. See id. ("Injunctive relief . .
. must be tailored to remedy the specific harm
alleged."); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S.
682, 702, 99 S. Ct. 2545, 61 L. Ed. 2d 176
(1979) ("[T]he scope of injunctive relief is
dictated by the extent of the violation
established . . . ."). "An overbroad injunction

Although other unenjoined sections of EO2
permit interagency coordination to review
vetting procedures, the district court
nonetheless abused its discretion in enjoining
the inward-facing tasks of Sections 2 and
6. Enjoining the entirety of Sections 2 and 6
was not narrowly tailored to addressing only
the harms alleged. For example, internal
determinations regarding the necessary
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information
for
visa
application
adjudications do not have an obvious
relationship to the constitutional rights at
stake or statutory conflicts at issue here.
Plaintiffs have not shown how the
Government's internal review of its vetting
procedures will harm them. We vacate the
preliminary injunction to the extent it enjoins
internal review procedures that do not burden
individuals outside of the executive branch of
the
federal
government. See Bresgal v.
Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir.
1987) ("An injunction against a government
agency must be structured to take into
account 'the well-established rule that the
government has traditionally been granted
the widest latitude in the "dispatch of its own
internal affairs."'" (quoting Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362, 378-79, 96 S. Ct. 598, 46 L.
Ed. 2d 561 (1976))); cf. Bowen v. Roy, 476
U.S. 693, 700, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 90 L. Ed. 2d
735 (1986) (explaining that the Free Exercise
Clause "affords an individual protection from
certain forms of governmental compulsion
[but] does not afford an individual a right to
dictate the conduct of the Government's
internal procedures").

services which affect the disadvantaged,
refugees, and immigrants." Haw. Rev. Stat. §
371K-4(5). OCS also operates the Refugee
Social Services Program and the Refugee
Cash
and
Medical
Assistance
Program. See Department of Labor and
Industrial Relations, Office of Community
Services, 2017 Hawaii State Plan for Refugee
Assistance
and
Services
(2016); https://labor.hawaii.gov/ocs/files/20
13/02/FY17-State-Plan-for-Hawaii.pdf (last
visited June 6, 2017). The State further
highlights that aiding refugees is central to
the mission of private organizations, like
Catholic Charities Hawai'i and Pacific
Gateway Center.
Since fiscal year 2010, at least twenty
refugees have arrived and resettled in
Hawai'i, and in fiscal year 2017 to date, three
have resettled there. While this is a small
number of refugees, it does not diminish
Hawai'i's interest in effectuating its refugee
programs and investments. Enjoining the
suspension and cap would protect the State's
programs and efforts in resettling refugees.
Although the Government is correct in
pointing out that most of Plaintiffs' alleged
injuries center on the implementation of
Section 2(c), at this preliminary stage of
litigation, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by enjoining Section 6's operative
provisions suspending refugee admission on
the basis of the current record. We therefore
reject the Government's challenge on this
point.

B
The Government next argues that the district
court erred in enjoining Section 6's refugee
provisions, specifically the suspension of
refugees and adoption of the 50,000 refugee
cap.
The State alleges that Section 6 will force it
to abandon the refugee program that
embodies the State's traditions of openness
and diversity. The State has several policies
that aid and resettle refugees, and has a "long
history of welcoming refugees impacted by
war and oppression." As discussed earlier,
OCS, a division of the Department of Labor
and Industrial Relations, is directed to
"[a]ssist and coordinate the efforts of all
public and private agencies providing

C
The Government next contends that the
district court erred by enjoining Section 2(c)
as to all persons everywhere, rather than
redressing only Plaintiffs' injuries. The
Government requests that the nationwide
injunction be limited to Plaintiffs only.
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The district court identified two reasons to
support a nationwide injunction. First, the
district court emphasized that in certain
circumstances, it is appropriate for courts to
issue nationwide injunctions. Hawai'i PI,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47042, 2017 WL
1167383, at *8. As the Fifth Circuit observed
in Texas v. United States, nationwide
injunctions are particularly appropriate in the
immigration context because "immigration
laws of the United States should be enforced
vigorously and uniformly." 809 F.3d at 18788; see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("The
Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o establish
an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . .")
(emphasis added). Enjoining the conduct as
to Plaintiffs may result in "fragmented
immigration policy [that] would run afoul of
the constitutional and statutory requirement
for uniform immigration law and
policy." Washington, 847 F.3d at 116667 (citing to Texas, 809 F.3d at 187-88)).

Narrowing the injunction to apply only to
Plaintiffs would not cure the statutory
violations identified, which in all
applications would violate provisions of the
INA. See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project,
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9109, 2017 WL
2273306, at *27 (affirming the nationwide
injunction because Section 2(c) of EO2 likely
violates the Establishment Clause, and its
constitutional deficiency "would endure" in
all applications); cf. Nat'l Mining Ass'n v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399,
1409, 330 U.S. App. D.C. 329 (D.C. Cir.
1998) ("[W]hen a reviewing court determines
that agency regulations are unlawful, the
ordinary result is that the rules are vacated—
not that their application to the individual
petitioners is proscribed." (quoting Harmon
v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 495 n.21, 278
U.S. App. D.C. 382 (D.C. Cir. 1989))).
The district court did not abuse its
discretion in
entering
a
nationwide
preliminary injunction.

Second, the district court made clear that the
Government did not provide a workable
framework for narrowing the geographic
scope
of
the
injunction. See id. at
1167 ("[E]ven if limiting the geographic
scope of the injunction would be desirable,
the Government has not proposed a
workable alternative form of the TRO that
accounts for the nation's multiple ports of
entry and interconnected transit system and
that would protect the proprietary interests of
the States at issue here while nevertheless
applying only within the States' borders.").
On appeal, the Government has not offered
any new workable method of limiting the
geographic scope of the injunction.

D
Finally, the Government argues that the
district court erred by issuing an injunction
that runs against the President himself. This
position of the Government is well
taken. Generally, we lack "jurisdiction of a
bill to enjoin the President in the performance
of his official duties." Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 802-03, 112 S.
Ct. 2767, 120 L. Ed. 2d 636
(1992) (quoting Mississippi v. Johnson, 71
U.S. 475, 501, 18 L. Ed. 437 (1866)); see id.
at 802 ("[I]njunctive relief against the
President himself is extraordinary, and
should
.
.
.
raise[] judicial
eyebrows."). Injunctive relief, however, may
run against executive officials, including the
Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Secretary of State. See, e.g., Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 58889 (holding that President Truman did not act

An "injunction is not necessarily made overbroad by extending benefit or protection to
persons other than prevailing parties in the
lawsuit—even if it is not a class action—if
such breadth is necessary to give prevailing
parties the relief to which they are
entitled." Bresgal, 843 F.2d at 1170-71.
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within his constitutional power in seizing
steel mills and affirming the district court's
decision enjoining the Secretary of
Commerce from carrying out the
order); Franklin, 505 U.S. at 802-03.
We conclude that Plaintiffs' injuries can be
redressed fully by injunctive relief against the
remaining Defendants, and that the
extraordinary remedy of enjoining the
President
is
not
appropriate
here. See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 803. We
therefore vacate the district court's injunction
to the extent the order runs against the
President, but affirm to the extent that it runs
against the remaining "Defendants and all
their respective officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, and persons in
active concert or participation with them."

VI
We affirm in part and vacate in part the
district court's preliminary injunction order.
As to the remaining Defendants, we affirm
the injunction as to Section 2(c), suspending
entry of nationals from the six designated
countries for 90 days; Section 6(a),
suspending USRAP for 120 days; and
Section 6(b), capping the entry of refugees to
50,000 in the fiscal year 2017. We vacate the
portions of the injunction that prevent the
Government from conducting internal
reviews, as otherwise directed in Sections 2
and 6, and the injunction to the extent that it
runs against the President. We remand the
case to the district court with instructions to
re-issue a preliminary injunction consistent
with this opinion.

E

AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part;
and REMANDED with instructions. Each
party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

The district court did err in enjoining the
entirety of Sections 2 and 6, particularly the
portions that pertain to interagency review,
despite the Government's requests for
clarification and requests to narrow the
injunction to enjoin conduct that actually
harms Plaintiffs. The district court abused its
discretion in enjoining inward-facing agency
conduct because enjoining this conduct
would not remedy the harms asserted by
Plaintiffs. Further, the district court abused
its discretion in enjoining the President. We
would not be able to affirm in full the
preliminary injunction even if Plaintiffs were
also likely to succeed on their constitutional
claims, for reasons that enjoining internal
review procedures does not remedy harms to
Plaintiffs and because it is improper to enjoin
the President without necessity. As we have
affirmed the injunction in part on statutory
grounds, and vacated certain parts on the
basis of considerations governing the proper
scope of an injunction, we need not consider
the
constitutional
claims
here.
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Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project
16-436
Ruling Below: Int’l Refugee Assistance Program v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017).
President Trump issued Executive Order 13780, section 2(c) of which suspends entry of foreign
nationals from six countries. Six individuals challenge Executive Order 13780; four of these
individuals claim that the Order will prolong their separation from loved ones, and two claim that
the Order spreads anti-Muslim sentiment that harms them.
The District Court enjoined enforcement of Section 2(c). The government appealed. The Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed.
Question Presented: Whether respondents' challenge to the temporary suspension of entry of
aliens abroad under Section 2(c) of Executive Order No. 13,780 is justiciable?
Whether Section 2(c)'s temporary suspension of entry violates the Establishment Clause?
Whether the global injunction, which rests on alleged injury to a single individual plaintiff, is
impermissibly overbroad?
Whether the challenges to Section 2(c) became moot on June 14, 2017?

International Refugee Assistance Project,
v.
Donald J. Trump.
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
May 25, 2017
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
GREGORY, Chief Judge:

Clause of the First Amendment yet stands as
an untiring sentinel for the protection of one
of our most cherished founding principles—
that government shall not establish any
religious orthodoxy, or favor or disfavor one
religion over another. Congress granted the
President broad power to deny entry to aliens,
but that power is not absolute. It cannot go
unchecked when, as here, the President
wields it through an executive edict that
stands to cause irreparable harm to
individuals across this nation. Therefore, for

The question for this Court, distilled
to its essential form, is whether the
Constitution, as the Supreme Court declared
in Ex parte Milligan, remains “a law for
rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace.” And if so, whether it protects
Plaintiffs’ right to challenge an Executive
Order that in text speaks with vague words of
national security, but in context drips with
religious
intolerance,
animus,
and
discrimination. Surely the Establishment
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the reasons that follow, we affirm in
substantial part the district court’s issuance of
a nationwide preliminary injunction as to
Section 2(c) of the challenged Executive
Order.

The First Executive Order also placed several
constraints on the admission of refugees into
the country. It reduced the number of
refugees to be admitted in fiscal year 2017
from 110,000 to 50,000 and barred
indefinitely the admission of Syrian
refugees. It further ordered the Secretary of
State to suspend for 120 days the United
States Refugee Admissions Program
(“USRAP”). Upon resumption of USRAP,
EO-1 directed the Secretary of State to
“prioritize refugee claims made by
individuals on the basis of religious-based
persecution, provided that the religion of the
individual is a minority religion in the
individual’s country of nationality.”

I.
A.
In the early evening of January 27, 2017—
seven days after taking the oath of office—
President Donald J. Trump signed Executive
Order 13769, “Protecting the Nation From
Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United
States” (“EO-1” or “First Executive Order”).
Referencing the past and present failings of
the visa-issuance process, the First Executive
Order had the stated purpose of “protect[ing]
the American people from terrorist attacks by
foreign nationals.” EO-1, Preamble. To
protect Americans, EO-1 explained, the
United States must ensure that it does not
admit foreign nationals who “bear hostile
attitudes” toward our nation and our
Constitution, who would “place violent
ideologies over American law,” or who
“engage in acts of bigotry or hatred” (such as
“‘honor’ killings”). Id. § 1.

Individuals, organizations, and states across
the nation challenged the First Executive
Order in federal court. A judge in the Western
District of Washington granted a Temporary
Restraining Order (“TRO”), enjoining
enforcement nationwide of Sections 3(c),
5(a)–(c), and 5(e). The Ninth Circuit
subsequently denied the Government’s
request to stay the TRO pending appeal and
declined to “rewrite” EO-1 by narrowing the
TRO’s scope, noting that the “political
branches are far better equipped” for that
task. At the Ninth Circuit’s invitation, and in
an effort to avoid further litigation
concerning the First Executive Order, the
President enacted a second order (“EO-2” or
“Second Executive Order”) on March 6,
2017. The Second Executive Order revoked
and replaced the First Executive Order.

To that end, the President invoked his
authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and
immediately suspended for ninety days the
immigrant and nonimmigrant entry of foreign
aliens from seven predominantly Muslim
countries: Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan,
Syria, and Yemen. See EO-1, § 3(c). During
the ninety-day period, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, Secretary of State, and
Director of National Intelligence were to
“immediately conduct a review to determine
the information needed from any country” to
assess whether individuals seeking entry
from those countries posed a national
security threat. Those cabinet officers were to
deliver a series of reports updating the
President as to that review and the
implementation of EO-1.

Section 2(c) of
EO-2—“Temporary
Suspension of Entry for Nationals of
Countries of Particular Concern During
Review Period”—is at the heart of the dispute
in this case. This section reinstated the
ninety-day suspension of entry for nationals
from six countries, eliminating Iraq from the
list, but retaining Iran, Libya, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (the “Designated
Countries”). EO-2, § 2(c). The President,
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again invoking 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and also
citing 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a), declared that the
“unrestricted entry” of nationals from these
countries “would be detrimental to the
interests of the United States.”

does not include any examples of individuals
from Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, or Yemen
committing terrorism-related offenses in the
United States.
The Second Executive Order clarifies that the
suspension of entry applies to foreign
nationals who (1) are outside the United
States on its effective date of March 16, 2017,
(2) do not have a valid visa on that date, and
(3) did not have a valid visa on the effective
date of EO-1—January 27, 2017. Section
2(c) does not bar entry of lawful permanent
residents, dual citizens traveling under a
passport issued by a nonbanned country,
asylees, or refugees already admitted to the
United States. The Second Executive Order
also includes a provision that permits
consular officers, in their discretion, to issue
waivers on a case-by-case basis to
individuals barred from entering the United
States.

The Second Executive Order, unlike its
predecessor, states that nationals from the
Designated Countries warrant “additional
scrutiny” because “the conditions in these
countries present heightened threats.” In
justifying the selection of the Designated
Countries, EO-2 explains, “Each of these
countries is a state sponsor of terrorism, has
been significantly compromised by terrorist
organizations, or contains active conflict
zones.” The Second Executive Order states
that “until the assessment of current
screening and vetting procedures required by
section 2 of this order is completed, the risk
of erroneously permitting entry of a national
of one of these countries who intends to
commit terrorist acts or otherwise harm the
national security of the United States is
unacceptably high.”

The Second Executive Order retains some—
but not all—of the First Executive Order’s
refugee provisions. It again suspends USRAP
for 120 days and decreases the number of
refugee admissions for fiscal year 2017 by
more than half, but it does not include the
indefinite ban on Syrian refugees. The
Second Executive Order also eliminates the
provision contained in EO-1 that mandated
preferential treatment of religious minorities
seeking refugee status. It explains that this
provision “applied to refugees from every
nation, including those in which Islam is a
minority religion, and it applied to minority
sects within a religion.” It further explains
that EO-1 was “not motivated by animus
toward any religion,” but rather was designed
to protect religious minorities.

The Second Executive Order also provides
brief descriptions of the conditions in each of
the Designated Countries. It notes, for
instance, that “Sudan has been designated as
a state sponsor of terrorism since 1993
because of its support for international
terrorist groups, including Hizballah and
Hamas[, and] . . . elements of core alQa’ida and ISISlinked terrorist
groups
remain active in the country.” The Second
Executive Order further states that
“[s]ince 2001, hundreds of persons born
abroad have been convicted of terrorismrelated crimes in the United States.” It
provides the following examples: two Iraqi
refugees who were convicted of terrorismrelated offenses in January 2013, and a
naturalized citizen who came to this country
as a child refugee from Somalia and who was
sentenced for terrorism-related offenses in
October 2014. The Second Executive Order

Shortly before the President signed EO-2, an
unclassified, internal report from the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
Office of Intelligence and Analysis dated
March 2017 was released to the public. The
report found that most foreign-born, U.S.211

based violent extremists became radicalized
many years after entering the United States,
and concluded that increased screening and
vetting was therefore unlikely to significantly
reduce terrorism-related activity in the
United States. According to a news article, a
separate DHS report indicated that
citizenship in any country is likely an
unreliable indicator of whether a particular
individual poses a terrorist threat. In a
declaration considered by the district court,
ten former national security, foreign policy,
and intelligence officials who previously
served in the White House, State Department,
DHS, and Central Intelligence Agency—four
of whom were aware of intelligence related
to terrorist threats as of January 20, 2017—
advised that “[t]here is no national security
purpose for a total ban on entry for aliens
from the [Designated Countries].” J.A. 91.

Muslims. They are great people—but they
know we have a problem.”
In an interview with CNN on March 9, 2016,
Trump professed, “I think Islam hates us,”
J.A. 516, and “[W]e can’t allow people
coming into the country who have this
hatred,” J.A. 517. Katrina Pierson, a Trump
spokeswoman,
told
CNN
that
“[w]e’ve allowed this propaganda to spread
all through the country that [Islam] is a
religion of peace.” J.A. 518. In a March 22,
2016 interview with Fox Business television,
Trump reiterated his call for a ban on Muslim
immigration, claiming that this proposed ban
had received “tremendous support” and
stating, “we’re having problems with the
Muslims, and we’re having problems with
Muslims coming into the country.” J.A. 522.
“You need surveillance,” Trump explained,
and “you have to deal with the mosques
whether you like it or not.” J.A. 522.

B.
The First and Second Executive Orders were
issued against a backdrop of public
statements by the President and his advisors
and representatives at different points in time,
both before and after the election and
President Trump’s assumption of office. We
now recount certain of those statements.

Candidate Trump later recharacterized his
call to ban Muslims as a ban on nationals
from certain countries or territories. On July
17, 2016, when asked about a tweet that said,
“Calls to ban Muslims from entering the U.S.
are offensive and unconstitutional,” thencandidate Trump responded, “So you call it
territories. OK? We’re gonna do territories.”
J.A. 798. He echoed this statement a week
later in an interview with NBC’s Meet the
Press. When asked whether he had “pulled
back” on his “Muslim ban,” Trump replied,
“We must immediately suspend immigration
from any nation that has been compromised
by terrorism until such time as proven vetting
mechanisms have been put in place.” J.A.
480. Trump added, “I actually don’t think it’s
a rollback. In fact, you could say it’s an
expansion. I’m looking now at territories.
People were so upset when I used the word
Muslim. Oh, you can’t use the word Muslim.
Remember this. And I’m okay with that,
because I’m talking territory instead of
Muslim.”
Trump
continued,
“Our

On December 7, 2015, then-candidate Trump
published a “Statement on Preventing
Muslim Immigration” on his campaign
website, which proposed “a total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the
United States until our country’s
representatives can figure out what is going
on.” J.A. 346. That same day, he highlighted
the statement on Twitter, “Just put out a very
important policy statement on the
extraordinary influx of hatred & danger
coming into our country. We must be
vigilant!” And Trump read from the
statement at a campaign rally in Mount
Pleasant, South Carolina, that evening, where
he remarked, “I have friends that are
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Constitution is great. . . . Now, we have a
religious, you know, everybody wants to be
protected. And that’s great. And that’s the
wonderful part of our Constitution. I view it
differently.”

commission together. Show me the right way
to do it legally.’” J.A. 508. Giuliani said he
assembled a group of “expert lawyers” that
“focused on, instead of religion, danger—the
areas of the world that create danger for us. .
. . It’s based on places where there [is]
substantial evidence that people are sending
terrorists into our country.”

On December 19, 2016, following a terrorist
attack in Germany, President-Elect Trump
lamented the attack on people who were
“prepared to celebrate the Christmas holiday”
by “ISIS and other Islamic terrorists [who]
continually slaughter Christians in their
communities and places of worship as part of
their global jihad.” Two days later, when
asked whether recent violence in Europe had
affected his plans to bar Muslims from
immigrating to the United States, PresidentElect Trump commented, “You know my
plans. All along, I’ve been proven to be right.
100% correct. What’s happening is
disgraceful.”

In response to the Ninth Circuit’s decision
not to stay enforcement of the nationwide
injunction, the President stated at a news
conference on February 16, 2017, that he
intended to issue a new executive order
tailored to that court’s decision—despite his
belief that the First Executive Order was
lawful. In discussing the Ninth Circuit’s
decision and his “[e]xtreme vetting”
proposal, the President stated, “I got elected
on defense of our country. I keep my
campaign promises, and our citizens will be
very happy when they see the result.” A few
days later Stephen Miller, Senior Policy
Advisor to the President, explained that the
new order would reflect “mostly minor
technical differences,” emphasizing that it
would produce the “same basic policy
outcome for the country.” J.A. 339. White
House Press Secretary Sean Spicer stated,
“The principles of the executive order remain
the same.” J.A. 379. And President Trump, in
a speech at a rally in Nashville, Tennessee,
described EO-2 as “a watered down version
of the first order.”

The President gave an interview to the
Christian Broadcasting News on January 27,
2017, the same day he issued the First
Executive Order. In that interview, the
President explained that EO-1 would give
preference to Christian refugees: “They’ve
been horribly treated. Do you know if you
were a Christian in Syria it was impossible,
at least very tough to get into the United
States? If you were a Muslim you could come
in, but if you were a Christian, it was almost
impossible . . . .” He found that situation
“very, very unfair.” Just before signing EO1, President Trump stated, “This is the
‘Protection
of
the
Nation
from
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United
States.’ We all know what that means.” The
following day, former New York City Mayor
and presidential advisor Rudolph Giuliani
appeared on Fox News and was asked, “How
did the President decide the seven
countries?” Giuliani answered, “I’ll tell you
the whole history of it. So when [the
President] first announced it, he said ‘Muslim
ban.’ He called me up. He said, ‘Put a

At the March 6, 2017 press conference
announcing the Second Executive Order,
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said, “This
executive order is a vital measure for
strengthening our national security.” That
same day, Attorney General Jefferson
Sessions and Secretary of Homeland Security
John Kelly submitted a letter to the President
detailing how weaknesses in our immigration
system compromise our nation’s security and
recommending a temporary pause on entry of
nationals from the Designated Countries. In a
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CNN interview the next day, Secretary Kelly
specified that there are probably “13 or 14
countries” that have “questionable vetting
procedures,” not all of which are Muslim
countries or in the Middle East. He noted that
there are “51 overwhelmingly Muslim
countries” and rejected the characterization
of EO-2 as a “Muslim ban.”

Ahmed Mohomed—allege that EO-2 would
delay or deny the admission of their family
members as refugees.
Beyond claiming injury to their family
relationships, several of the individual
Plaintiffs allege that the anti-Muslim
message animating EO-2 has caused them
feelings of disparagement and exclusion. Doe
#1, a scientist who obtained permanent
resident status through the National Interest
Waiver
program
for
people
with
extraordinary abilities, references these "antiMuslim views," worries about his safety in
this country, and contemplates whether he
should return to Iran to be with his wife.
Plaintiff Meteab relays that the "anti-Muslim
sentiment" motivating EO-2 had led him to
feel "isolated and disparaged in [his]
community." He explains that when he is in
public with his wife, who wears a hijab, he
"sense[s] a lot of hostility from people" and
recounts that his nieces, who both wear a
hijab, "say that people make mean comments
and stare at them for being Muslim." A
classmate "pulled the hijab off" one of his
nieces in class.

C.
This action was brought by six individuals,
all American citizens or lawful permanent
residents who have at least one family
member seeking entry into the United States
from one of the Designated Countries, and
three organizations that serve or represent
Muslim clients or members.
Four of the individual Plaintiffs—John Doe
#1, Jane Doe #2, John Doe #3, and Paul
Harrison—allege that EO-2 would impact
their immediate family members' ability to
obtain visas. Collectively, they claim that
Section 2(c) of EO-2, the provision that
suspends entry for certain foreign nationals
for ninety days, will prolong their separation
from their loved ones. John Doe #1 has
applied for a spousal immigration visa so that
his wife, an Iranian national, can join him in
the United States; the application was
approved, and she is currently awaiting her
visa interview. J.A. 305. Jane Doe #2, a
college student in the United States, has a
pending I-130 visa application on behalf of
her sister, a Syrian refugee living in Saudi
Arabia. Since the filing of the operative
Complaint on March 10, 2017, two of
Plaintiffs' family members have obtained
immigrant visas. The Government informed
the district court that Paul Harrison's fiancé
secured and collected a visa on March 15,
2017, the day before EO-2 was to take effect.
Doe #3's wife secured an immigrant visa on
May 1, 2017, and Plaintiffs anticipate that she
will arrive in the United States within the next
eight weeks. The remaining two individual
Plaintiffs—Muhammed Meteab and Ibrahim

Two of the organizational Plaintiffs, the
International Refugee Assistance Project and
the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society,
primarily assist refugees with the
resettlement process. These organizations
claim that they have already diverted
significant resources to dealing with EO-2's
fallout, and that they will suffer direct
financial injury from the anticipated
reduction in refugee cases. They further
claim that their clients, who are located in the
United States and the Middle East, will be
injured by the delayed reunification with
their loved ones. The final Plaintiff, the
Middle East Studies Association, an umbrella
organization
dedicated
to
fostering
awareness of the Middle East, asserts that
EO-2 will, among other injuries, reduce
attendance at its annual conference and cause
214

the organization
registration fees.

to

lose

$18,000

in

After finding Plaintiffs' claims justiciable, the
district court turned to the merits of their
claims. The court determined that Plaintiffs
are likely to succeed only in part on the merits
of their INA claim. It found that Section 2(c)
likely violates § 1152(a)(1)(A), but only as to
its effective bar on the issuance
of immigrant visas,
because §
1152(a)(1)(A) explicitly applies solely to
immigrant visas. To the extent that Section
2(c) prohibits the issuance of nonimmigrant
visas and bars entry on the basis of
nationality, the court found that it was not
likely to violate § 1152(a)(1)(A). The court
did not discuss this claim in addressing the
remaining preliminary injunction factors.

D.
Plaintiffs initiated this suit on February 7,
2017, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief against enforcement of the First
Executive Order. Plaintiffs claimed that EO1 violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment; the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment; the Immigration and
Nationality Act ("INA"); the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act; the Refugee Act;
and the Administrative Procedure Act. They
named as Defendants the President, DHS, the
Department of State, the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Secretary of State, and the Director of
National Intelligence.

The district court next found that Plaintiffs
are likely to succeed on the merits of
their Establishment Clause claim. It then
considered the remaining preliminary
injunction requirements, but only as to
the Establishment Clause claim: it found that
Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury if
EO-2 were to take effect, that the balance of
the equities weighed in Plaintiffs' favor, and
that a preliminary injunction was in the
public interest. The district court concluded
that a preliminary injunction was therefore
proper as to Section 2(c) of EO-2 because
Plaintiffs' claims centered primarily on that
provision's suspension of entry. The court
accordingly issued a nationwide injunction
barring enforcement of Section 2(c).

On March 10, 2017, four days after the
President issued EO-2, Plaintiffs filed the
operative Complaint, along with a motion for
a TRO and/or preliminary injunction.
Plaintiffs sought to enjoin implementation of
EO-2 in its entirety, prior to its effective date.
In quick succession, the Government
responded to the motion, Plaintiffs filed a
reply, and the parties appeared for a hearing.
The district court construed the motion as a
request for a preliminary injunction, and on
March 16, 2017, it granted in part and denied
in
part
that
motion.
In
its
Memorandum Opinion, the district court first
found that three individual Plaintiffs (Doe #1,
Doe #2, and Doe #3) had standing to bring
the claim that Section 2(c) violates the INA's
provision prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of nationality in the issuance of
immigrant visas. The court also determined
that at least three individual Plaintiffs
(Meteab, Doe #1, and Doe #3) had standing
to pursue the claim that EO-2 violates
the Establishment Clause.

Defendants timely noted this appeal, and we
possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1292(a)(1).
II.
Because the district court enjoined Section
2(c) in its entirety based solely on
Plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim, we
need not reach the merits of Plaintiffs'
statutory claim under the INA.
In Section 2(c) of EO-2, the President
suspended the entry of nationals from the six
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Designated Countries, pursuant to his power
to exclude aliens under Section 212(f) of the
INA,
codified
at 8
U.S.C.
§
1182(f), and Section 215(a)(1) of the INA,
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1). The
Government contends that Section 2(c)'s
suspension of entry falls squarely within the
"expansive authority" granted to the
President
by §
1182(f) and §
1185(a)(1). Appellants' Br. 28. Plaintiffs, on
the other hand, argue that Section 2(c)
violates a separate provision of the INA,
Section 202(a)(1)(A), codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1152(a)(1)(A), prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of nationality "in the issuance of
immigrant visas.”

They have not shown a likelihood of success
on the merits of the claim that §
1152(a) prevents the President from barring
entry to the United States pursuant to §
1182(f), or the issuance of non-immigrant
visas, on the basis of nationality.
This narrow statutory ruling is not the basis
for the district court's broad preliminary
injunction enjoining Section 2(c) of EO-2 in
all of its applications. Rather, Plaintiffs'
constitutional claim, the district court
determined, was what justified a nationwide
preliminary
injunction
against
any
enforcement of Section 2(c). If we were to
disagree with the district court that §
1152(a)(1)(A) partially
restrains
the President's
authority
under §
1182(f) and § 1185(a)(1), then we would be
obliged
to
consider
Plaintiffs'
alternative Establishment Clause claim. And,
importantly, even if we were to agree with
the district court's statutory analysis, we still
would be faced with the question of whether
the scope of the preliminary injunction,
which goes beyond the issuance of immigrant
visas governed by § 1152(a)(1)(A) to enjoin
Section 2(c) in its entirety, can be sustained
on the basis of Plaintiffs' Establishment
Clause claim.

The district court determined that Plaintiffs
are likely to succeed on their claim under §
1152(a)(1)(A) only in limited part. Because
Section 2(c) has the practical effect of halting
the issuance of immigrant visas on the basis
of nationality, the court reasoned, it is
inconsistent with § 1152(a)(1)(A). To that
extent—and contrary to the Government's
position—the court found that Presidential
authority under § 1182(f) and § 1185(a)(1) is
cabined by the INA's prohibition on
nationality-based discrimination in visa
issuance. But the district court's ruling was
limited in two important respects. First,
because § 1152(a)(1)(A) applies only to the
issuance of immigrant visas, the district court
discerned no conflict between that provision
and the application of Section 2(c) to persons
seeking non-immigrant visas. And second,
the district court found that because §
1152(a)(1)(A) governs the issuance of visas
rather than actual entry into the United States,
it poses no obstacle to enforcement of Section
2(c)'s nationality-based entry bar. The district
court summarized as follows:

In light of this posture, we need not address
the merits of the district court's statutory
ruling. We recognize, of course, the doctrine
of constitutional avoidance, which counsels
against the issuance of "unnecessary
constitutional rulings." But as we have
explained, the district court's constitutional
ruling was necessary to its decision, and
review of that ruling is necessary to ours.
Accordingly, we decline to reach the merits
of
Plaintiffs'
claim
under §
1152(a)(1)(A). The
breadth
of
the
preliminary injunction issued by the district
court may be justified if and only if Plaintiffs
can satisfy the requirements for a preliminary
injunction based on their Establishment

Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success
on the merits of their claim that the Second
Executive Order violates § 1152(a), but only
as to the issuance of immigrant visas . . . .
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Clause claim. We therefore turn to consider
that claim.

plaintiffs would be successful in their
claims." This means, for purposes of
standing, we must assume that Section 2(c)
violates the First Amendment's prohibition
against governmental "establishment of
religion."

III.
The Government first asks us to reverse the
preliminary injunction on the grounds that
Plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim is nonjusticiable. In its view, Plaintiffs have not
satisfied the foundational Article III
requirements of standing and ripeness, and in
any
event,
the
doctrine
of
consular nonreviewability bars
judicial
review of their claim. We consider these
threshold challenges in turn.

"Standing in Establishment Clause cases may
be shown in various ways," though as oftrepeated, "the concept of injury for standing
purposes is particularly elusive" in this
context. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
and this Circuit have developed a set of rules
that guide our review.
To establish standing for an Establishment
Clause claim, a plaintiff must have "personal
contact with the alleged establishment of
religion." A "mere abstract objection to
unconstitutional conduct is not sufficient to
confer standing." The Supreme Court has
reinforced this principle in recent years:
"plaintiffs may demonstrate standing based
on the direct harm of what is claimed to be an
establishment of religion." This "direct harm"
can
resemble
injuries
in
other
contexts. Merchants who suffered economic
injury, for instance, had standing to challenge
Sunday closing laws as violative of
the Establishment
Clause.
But
because Establishment
Clause violations
seldom lead to "physical injury or pecuniary
loss," the standing inquiry has been adapted
to
also
include
"the
kind
of
injuries Establishment Clause plaintiffs" are
more "likely to suffer." As such,
"noneconomic or intangible injury may
suffice
to
make
an Establishment
Clause claim
justiciable." "Feelings
of
marginalization and exclusion are cognizable
forms of injury," we recently explained,
"particularly
in
the Establishment
Clause context, because one of the core
objectives
of
modern Establishment
Clause jurisprudence has been to prevent the
State from sending a message to nonadherents of a particular religion 'that they

A.
The district court found that at least three
individual Plaintiffs—Muhammed Meteab,
Doe #1, and Doe #3—have standing to assert
the
claim
that
EO-2
violates
the Establishment Clause. We review this
legal determination de novo.
The Constitution's gatekeeping requirement
that federal courts may only adjudicate
"Cases" or "Controversies," U.S. Const. art.
III, § 2, obligates courts to determine whether
litigants have standing to bring suit. To
demonstrate standing and thus invoke federal
jurisdiction, a party must establish that "(1) it
has suffered an injury in fact, (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the defendants' actions, and
(3) it is likely, and not merely speculative,
that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision." The parties' core dispute
is whether Plaintiffs have suffered a
cognizable injury. To establish a cognizable
injury, "a plaintiff must show that he or she
suffered 'an invasion of a legally protected
interest' that is 'concrete and particularized'
and 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.'"
In evaluating standing, "the court must be
careful not to decide the question on the
merits for or against the plaintiff, and must
therefore assume that on the merits the
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are outsiders, not full members of the
political community.'"

purposes—that
the
'certainly impending.'"

Doe #1—who is a lawful permanent resident
of the United States, Muslim, and originally
from Iran—filed a visa application on behalf
of his wife, an Iranian national. Her
application has been approved, and she is
currently awaiting her consular interview. If
it took effect, EO-2 would bar the entry of
Doe #1's wife. Doe #1 explains that because
EO-2 bars his wife's entry, it "forces [him] to
choose between [his] career and being with
[his] wife," and he is unsure "whether to keep
working here" as a scientist or to return to
Iran. Doe #1 adds that EO-2 has "created
significant fear, anxiety, and insecurity" for
him and his wife. He highlights the
"statements that have been made about
banning Muslims from entering, and the
broader context," and states, "I worry that I
may not be safe in this country." J.A. 306; see
also J.A. 314 (Plaintiff Meteab describing
how the "anti-Muslim sentiment motivating"
EO-2 has led him to feel "isolated and
disparaged in [his] community").

The Government does not contest that, in
some
circumstances,
the
prolonged
separation of family members can constitute
an injury-in-fact. The Government instead
argues that Doe #1's claimed injury is
speculative and non-imminent, Appellants'
Br. 19, such that it is not "legally and
judicially cognizable." According to the
Government, Doe #1 has failed to show that
his threatened injury—prolonged separation
from his wife—is imminent. It asserts that
Doe #1 has offered no reason to believe that
Section 2(c)'s "short pause" on entry "will
delay the issuance of [his wife's] visa."

injury

is

But this ignores that Section 2(c) appears to
operate by design to delay the issuance of
visas to foreign nationals. Section 2(c)'s
"short pause" on entry effectively halts the
issuance of visas for ninety days—as the
Government acknowledges, it "would be
pointless to issue a visa to an alien who the
consular officer already knows is barred from
entering the country." The Government also
cites 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g), which provides in
relevant part that "[n]o visa or other
documentation shall be issued to an alien if []
it appears to the consular officer . . . that such
alien is ineligible to receive a visa or other
documentation under section 1182 of this
title." A ninety-day pause on issuing visas
would seem to necessarily inject at least some
delay into any pending application's timeline.
And in fact, the Government suggests that
pending visa applications might not be
delayed,
but denied.
A
denial
on
such grounds would mean that once the entry
suspension period concludes, an alien would
have to restart from the beginning the lengthy
visa application process. What is more,
Section 2(c) is designed to "reduce
investigative burdens on relevant agencies"
to facilitate worldwide review of the current
procedures for "screening and vetting of

Doe #1 has therefore asserted two distinct
injuries stemming from his "personal
contact" with the alleged establishment of
religion—EO-2. First, EO-2 will bar his
wife's entry into the United States and
prolong their separation. And second, EO-2
sends
a
state-sanctioned
message
condemning his religion and causing him to
feel excluded and marginalized in his
community.
We begin with Doe #1's allegation that EO-2
will prolong his separation from his wife.
This Court has found that standing can be
premised on a "threatened rather than actual
injury," as long as this "threat of injury [is]
both real and immediate.” The purpose of the
longstanding "imminence" requirement,
which is admittedly "a somewhat elastic
concept," is "to ensure that the alleged injury
is not too speculative for Article III
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foreign nationals." Logically, dedicating time
and resources to a global review process will
further slow the adjudication of pending
applications.

issuance of Doe #3's wife's visa. This cuts
directly against the Government's assertion
that it is uncertain whether or how Section
2(c) would affect visa applicants. Clearly
Section 2(c) will delay and disrupt pending
visa applications.

Here, Doe #1 has a pending visa application
on behalf of his wife, seeking her admission
to the United States from one of the
Designated Countries. Prior to EO-2's
issuance, Doe #1 and his wife were nearing
the end of the lengthy immigrant visa
process, as they were waiting for her consular
interview to be scheduled. J.A. 305. They had
already submitted a petition, received
approval of that petition, begun National Visa
Center ("NVC") Processing, submitted the
visa application form, collected and
submitted the requisite financial and
supporting documentation to NVC, and paid
the appropriate fees. If Section 2(c) were in
force—restricting the issuance of visas to
nationals in the Designated Countries for
ninety days and initiating the worldwide
review of existing visa standards—we find a
"real and immediate" threat that it would
prolong Doe #1's separation from his wife,
either by delaying the issuance of her visa or
denying her visa and forcing her to restart the
application process.

Even more, flowing from EO-2 is the alleged
state-sanctioned message that foreign-born
Muslims, a group to which Doe #1 belongs,
are "outsiders, not full members of the
political community." Doe #1 explains how
the Second Executive Order has caused him
to fear for his personal safety in this country
and wonder whether he should give up his
career in the United States and return to Iran
to be with his wife. This harm is consistent
with the "[f]eelings of marginalization and
exclusion" injury we recognized in Moss.
In light of these two injuries, we find that Doe
#1 has had "personal contact with the alleged
establishment of religion." Regardless of
whether
EO-2
actually
violates
the Establishment Clause's command not to
disfavor a particular religion, a merits inquiry
explored in Section IV.A, his injuries are on
par with, if not greater than, injuries we
previously deemed sufficient in this context.
The Government attempts to undercut these
injuries in several ways. It first frames
Plaintiffs' injuries as "stress." That minimizes
the psychological harm that flows from
confronting official action preferring or
disfavoring a particular religion and, in any
event, does not account for the impact on
families. The Government next argues that
because the Second Executive Order
"directly applies only to aliens abroad from
the specified countries," it is "not directly
targeted at plaintiffs," who are based in the
United States, "in the way that local- or stategovernment messages are." An executive
order is of course different than a local
Sunday closing law or a Ten Commandments
display in a state courthouse, but that does not
mean its impact is any less direct. Indeed,

This prolonged family separation is not, as
the Government asserts, a remote or
speculative possibility. Unlike threatened
injuries that rest on hypothetical actions a
plaintiff may take "some day," or on a "highly
attenuated chain of possibilities," the
threatened injury here is imminent,
sufficiently "real" and concrete, and would
harm Doe #1 in a personal and
"particularized" way. The progression of Doe
#3's wife's visa application illustrates this.
Doe #3's wife received a visa on May 1, 2017,
while Section 2(c) was enjoined. If Section
2(c) had been in effect, she would have been
ineligible to receive a visa until after the
expiration of the ninety-day period. Put
simply, Section 2(c) would have delayed the
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because it emanates from the highest elected
office in the nation, its impact is arguably felt
even more directly by the individuals it
affects. From Doe #1's perspective, the
Second Executive Order does not apply to
arbitrary or anonymous "aliens abroad." It
applies to his wife.

organizational Plaintiffs have standing with
respect to this claim.
Lastly, the Government asserts that
Plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim is
unripe. It argues that under EO-2, Plaintiffs'
relatives can apply for a waiver, and unless
and until those waiver requests are denied,
Plaintiffs' claims are dependent on future
uncertainties. When evaluating ripeness, we
consider "(1) the fitness of the issues for
judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the
parties of withholding court consideration."
An action is fit for resolution "when the
issues are purely legal and when the action in
controversy is final and not dependent on
future uncertainties." The "hardship prong is
measured by the immediacy of the threat and
the burden imposed on the [plaintiff]."

More than abstractly disagreeing with the
wisdom or legality of the President's policy
decision, Plaintiffs show how EO-2 impacted
(and continues to impact) them personally.
Doe #1 is not simply "roam[ing] the country
in search of governmental wrongdoing."
Rather, he is feeling the direct, painful effects
of the Second Executive Order—both its
alleged
message
of
religious
condemnation and the prolonged separation
it causes between him and his wife—in his
everyday life. This case thus bears little
resemblance to Valley Forge.

Our ripeness doctrine is clearly not
implicated here. Plaintiffs have brought a
facial challenge, alleging that EO-2 violates
the Establishment
Clause regardless
of
whether their relatives secure waivers. This
legal question is squarely presented for our
review and is not dependent on the factual
uncertainties of the waiver process. What is
more, Plaintiffs will suffer undue hardship, as
explained above, were we to require their
family members to attempt to secure a waiver
before permitting Plaintiffs to challenge
Section 2(c). We accordingly find the claim
ripe for judicial decision.

We likewise reject the Government's
suggestion that Plaintiffs are seeking to
vindicate the legal rights of third parties. The
prudential standing doctrine includes a
"general prohibition on a litigant's raising
another person's legal rights." This "general
prohibition" is not implicated here, however,
as Doe #1 has shown that he himself suffered
injuries as a result of the challenged Order.
For all of these reasons, we find that Doe #1
has met his burden to establish an Article III
injury. We further find that Doe #1 has made
the requisite showing that his claimed
injuries are causally related to the challenged
conduct—the
Second
Executive Orderas opposed to
"the
independent action of some third party not
before the court." Enjoining enforcement of
Section 2(c) therefore will likely redress
those injuries. Doe #1 has thus met
the constitutional standing requirements with
respect to the Establishment Clause claim.
And because we find that at least one Plaintiff
possesses standing, we need not decide
whether the other individual Plaintiffs or the

B.
In one final justiciability challenge, the
Government
asserts
that
consular nonreviewability bars any review of
Plaintiffs' claim. This Court has scarcely
discussed the doctrine, so the Government
turns to the District of Columbia Circuit,
which has stated that "a consular official's
decision to issue or withhold a visa is not
subject to judicial review, at least unless
Congress says otherwise." But in the same
opinion, the court explained that judicial
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review was proper in cases involving "claims
by United States citizens rather than by aliens
. . . and statutory claims that are accompanied
by constitutional ones." This is precisely
such a case. More fundamentally, the
doctrine of consular nonreviewability does
not bar judicial review of constitutional
claims. The Government's reliance on the
doctrine is therefore misplaced.

injunction is in the public interest.'" The
district court found that Plaintiffs satisfied all
four requirements as to their Establishment
Clause claim, and it enjoined Section 2(c) of
EO-2. We evaluate the court's findings for
abuse of discretion, reviewing its factual
findings for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo.
A.

Behind
the
casual
assertion
of
consular nonreviewability lies a dangerous
idea—that this Court lacks the authority to
review high-level government policy of the
sort here. Although the Supreme Court has
certainly encouraged deference in our review
of immigration matters that implicate
national security interests, see infra Section
IV.A, it has not countenanced judicial
abdication, especially where constitutional
rights, values, and principles are at stake. To
the contrary, the Supreme Court has affirmed
time and again that "it is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is." This "duty will
sometimes involve the 'resolution of
litigation challenging the constitutional
authority of one of the three branches,' but
courts cannot avoid their responsibility." In
light of this duty, and having determined that
the present case is justiciable, we now
proceed to consider whether the district court
properly enjoined Section 2(c) of the Second
Executive Order.

The district court determined that Plaintiffs
are likely to succeed on the merits of their
claim that EO-2 violates the Establishment
Clause. It found that because EO-2 is
"facially neutral in terms of religion," the test
outlined in Lemon v. Kurtzman, governs the
constitutional
inquiry. And
applying
the Lemon test, the court found that EO-2
likely violates the Establishment Clause. The
Government argues that the court
erroneously applied the Lemon test instead of
the more deferential test set forth
in Kleindienst v. Mandel. And under Mandel,
the Government contends, Plaintiffs' claim
fails.
1.
We begin by addressing the Government's
argument that the district court applied the
wrong test in evaluating Plaintiffs'
constitutional
claim. The
Government
contends
that Mandel sets
forth
the
appropriate test because it recognizes the
limited scope of judicial review of executive
action in the immigration context. We agree
that Mandel is the starting point for our
analysis, but for the reasons that follow, we
find that its test contemplates the application
of settled Establishment Clause doctrine in
this case.

IV.
A
preliminary
injunction
is
an
"extraordinary remed[y]
involving
the
exercise of very far-reaching power" and is
"to be granted only sparingly and in limited
circumstances." For a district court to grant a
preliminary injunction, "a plaintiff 'must
establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an

In Mandel, American university professors
had invited Mandel, a Belgian citizen and
revolutionary Marxist and professional
journalist, to speak at a number of
conferences in the United States. But
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in Kleindienst
v.
Mandel,
a First
Amendment case." And in a case where
plaintiffs brought a constitutional challenge
to an immigration law, this Court has found
that "we must apply the same standard as
the Fiallo court and uphold the statute if a
'facially legitimate and bona fide reason'
supports [it]." Mandel is therefore the
starting point for our review.

Mandel's application for a nonimmigrant visa
was denied under a then-existing INA
provision that barred the entry of aliens "who
advocate the economic, international, and
governmental
doctrines
of
world
communism." The Attorney General had
discretion to waive § 1182(a)(28)(D)'s bar
and grant Mandel an individual exception,
but declined to do so on the grounds that
Mandel had violated the terms of his visas
during prior visits to the United States. The
American professors sued, alleging, among
other things, that the denial of Mandel's visa
violated their First Amendment rights to
"hear his views and engage him in a free and
open academic exchange."

But in another more recent line of cases, the
Supreme Court has made clear that despite
the political branches' plenary power over
immigration, that power is still "subject to
important constitutional limitations," and that
it is the judiciary's responsibility to uphold
those limitations. These cases instruct that the
political branches' power over immigration is
not tantamount to a constitutional blank
check, and that vigorous judicial review is
required when an immigration action's
constitutionality is in question.

The Supreme Court, citing "Congress'
'plenary power to make rules for the
admission of aliens and to exclude those who
possess those characteristics which Congress
has forbidden,'" found that the longstanding
principle of deference to the political
branches in the immigration context limited
its review of plaintiffs' challenge. The Court
held that "when the Executive exercises this
power [to exclude an alien] on the basis of a
facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the
courts will neither look behind the exercise of
that discretion, nor test it by balancing its
justification against the [plaintiffs'] First
Amendment interests." The Court concluded
that the Attorney General's stated reason for
denying Mandel's visa—that he had violated
the terms of prior visas—satisfied this test. It
therefore did not review plaintiffs' First
Amendment claim.

We are bound to give effect to both lines of
cases, meaning that we must enforce
constitutional limitations on immigration
actions while also applying Mandel's
deferential test to those actions as the
Supreme Court has instructed. For the
reasons that follow, however, we find that
these tasks are not mutually exclusive, and
that Mandel's test
still
contemplates
meaningful judicial review of constitutional
challenges in certain, narrow circumstances,
as we have here.
To begin, Mandel's test undoubtedly imposes
a heavy burden on plaintiffs, consistent with
the significant deference we afford the
political branches in the immigration context.
The government need only show that the
challenged action is "facially legitimate and
bona fide" to defeat a constitutional
challenge. These are separate and quite
distinct requirements. To be "facially
legitimate," there must be a valid reason for
the challenged action stated on the face of the
action.

Courts have continuously applied Mandel's
"facially legitimate and bona fide" test to
challenges to individual visa denials.
Subsequently, in Fiallo v. Bell, the Supreme
Court applied Mandel's test to a facial
challenge to an immigration law, finding "no
reason to review the broad congressional
policy choice at issue here under a more
exacting standard than was applied
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We start with Mandel's requirement that the
challenged government action be "facially
legitimate." EO-2's stated purpose is "to
protect the Nation from terrorist activities by
foreign nationals admitted to the United
States." EO-2, Preamble. We find that this
stated national security interest is, on its face,
a valid reason for Section 2(c)'s suspension of
entry. EO-2 therefore satisfies Mandel's first
requirement. Absent allegations of bad faith,
our analysis would end here in favor of the
Government. But in this case, Plaintiffs have
alleged that EO-2's stated purpose was given
in bad faith. We therefore must consider
whether they have made the requisite
showing of bad faith.

And as the name suggests, the "bona fide"
requirement
concerns
whether
the
government issued the challenged action in
good faith. In Kerry v. Din, Justice Kennedy,
joined by Justice Alito, elaborated on this
requirement. Here, the burden is on the
plaintiff. Justice Kennedy explained that
where a plaintiff makes "an affirmative
showing of bad faith" that is "plausibly
alleged with sufficient particularity," courts
may "look behind" the challenged action to
assess its "facially legitimate" justification.
In the typical case, it will be difficult for a
plaintiff to make an affirmative showing of
bad
faith
with
plausibility
and
particularity. And absent this affirmative
showing, courts must defer to the
government's "facially legitimate" reason for
the action.

As noted, Plaintiffs must "plausibly allege[]
with sufficient particularity" that the reason
for the government action was provided in
bad faith. Plaintiffs here claim that EO-2
invokes national security in bad faith, as a
pretext for what really is an anti-Muslim
religious purpose. Plaintiffs point to ample
evidence that national security is not the true
reason for EO-2, including, among other
things, then-candidate Trump's numerous
campaign statements expressing animus
towards the Islamic faith; his proposal to ban
Muslims from entering the United States; his
subsequent explanation that he would
effectuate this ban by targeting "territories"
instead of Muslims directly; the issuance of
EO-1, which targeted certain majorityMuslim nations and included a preference for
religious minorities; an advisor's statement
that the President had asked him to find a way
to ban Muslims in a legal way; and the
issuance of EO-2, which resembles EO-1 and
which President Trump and his advisors
described as having the same policy goals as
EO-1. Plaintiffs also point to the
comparably weak evidence that EO-2 is
meant to address national security interests,
including the exclusion of national security
agencies from the decisionmaking process,
the post hoc nature of the national security

Mandel therefore clearly sets a high bar for
plaintiffs seeking judicial review of a
constitutional challenge to an immigration
action. But although Mandel's "facially
legitimate and bona fide" test affords
significant deference to the political
branches' decisions in this area, it does not
completely
insulate
those
decisions
from any meaningful
review.
Where
plaintiffs have seriously called into question
whether the stated reason for the challenged
action was provided in good faith, we
understand Mandel, as construed by Justice
Kennedy in his controlling concurrence
in Din, to require that we step away from our
deferential posture and look behind the stated
reason for the challenged action. In other
words, Mandel's requirement that an
immigration action be "bona fide" may in
some instances compel more searching
judicial review. Plaintiffs ask this Court to
engage in such searching review here under
the traditional Establishment Clause test, and
we therefore turn to consider whether such a
test is warranted.
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rationale, and evidence from DHS that EO-2
would not operate to diminish the threat of
potential terrorist activity.

Court's duty to uphold the Constitution even
in the context of a presidential immigration
action counsels in favor of applying our
standard constitutional tool. Second, that
Plaintiffs have satisfied Mandel's heavy
burden to plausibly show that the reason for
the challenged action was proffered in bad
faith further supports the application of our
established constitutional doctrine. The
deferential framework set forth in Mandel is
based in part on general respect for the
political branches' power in the immigration
realm. Once plaintiffs credibly call into
question the political branches' motives for
exercising that power, our reason for
deferring is severely undermined. In the rare
case where plaintiffs plausibly allege bad
faith with particularity, more meaningful
review—in the form of constitutional
scrutiny—is proper. And third, in the context
of this case, there is an obvious symmetry
between Mandel's "bona fide" prong and the
constitutional inquiry established in Lemon.
Both tests ask courts to evaluate the
government's purpose for acting.

Based on this evidence, we find that Plaintiffs
have more than plausibly alleged that EO-2's
stated national security interest was provided
in bad faith, as a pretext for its religious
purpose. And having concluded that the
"facially legitimate" reason proffered by the
government is not "bona fide," we no longer
defer to that reason and instead may "look
behind" EO-2.
Since Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Din,
no court has confronted a scenario where, as
here, plaintiffs have plausibly alleged with
particularity that an immigration action was
taken in bad faith. We therefore have minimal
guidance on what "look[ing] behind" a
challenged immigration action entails. See
id. In addressing this issue of first impression,
the Government does not propose a
framework for this inquiry. Rather, the
Government summarily asserts that because
EO-2 states that it is motivated by national
security
interests,
it
therefore
satisfies Mandel's test. But this only responds
to Mandel's
"facially
legitimate"
requirement—it reads out Mandel's "bona
fide" test altogether. Plaintiffs, for their part,
suggest that we review their claim using our
normal constitutional tools. And in
the Establishment
Clause context,
our
normal constitutional tool for reviewing
facially neutral government actions is the test
in Lemon v. Kurtzman.

Because Plaintiffs have made a substantial
and affirmative showing that the
government's national security purpose was
proffered in bad faith, we find it appropriate
to apply our longstanding Establishment
Clause doctrine. Applying this doctrine
harmonizes our duty to engage in the
substantial deference required by Mandel and
its progeny with our responsibility to ensure
that the political branches choose
constitutionally permissible means of
exercising their immigration power. We
therefore proceed to "look behind" EO-2
using the framework developed in Lemon to
determine if EO-2 was motivated by a
primarily religious purpose, rather than its
stated reason of promoting national security.

We find for several reasons that because
Plaintiffs have made an affirmative showing
of bad faith, applying the Lemon test to
analyze
EO-2's
constitutionality
is
appropriate. First, as detailed above, the
Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that
the political branches' immigration actions
are still "subject to important constitutional
limitations." The constitutional limitation in
this case is the Establishment Clause, and this

2.
To prevail under the Lemon test, the
Government must show that the challenged
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action (1) "ha[s] a secular legislative
purpose," (2) that "its principal or primary
effect [is] one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion," and (3) that it does "not
foster
'an
excessive
government
entanglement
with
religion.'"
The
Government must satisfy all three prongs
of Lemon to
defeat
an Establishment
Clause challenge. The dispute here centers
on Lemon's first prong.

campaign statements reveal that on numerous
occasions, he expressed anti-Muslim
sentiment, as well as his intent, if elected, to
ban Muslims from the United States. For
instance, on December 7, 2015, Trump
posted on his campaign website a "Statement
on Preventing Muslim Immigration," in
which he "call[ed] for a total and complete
shutdown of Muslims entering the United
States until our representatives can figure out
what is going on" and remarked, "[I]t is
obvious to anybody that the hatred is beyond
comprehension. . . . [O]ur country cannot be
the victims of horrendous attacks by people
that believe only in Jihad, and have no sense
of reason or respect for human life." In a
March 9, 2016 interview, Trump stated that
"Islam hates us," and that "[w]e can't allow
people coming into this country who have
this hatred.” Less than two weeks later, in a
March 22 interview, Trump again called for
excluding Muslims, because "we're having
problems with the Muslims, and we're having
problems with Muslims coming into the
country." And on December 21, 2016, when
asked whether recent attacks in Europe
affected his proposed Muslim ban, PresidentElect Trump replied, "You know my plans.
All along, I've proven to be right. 100%
correct."

In
the Establishment
Clause context,
"purpose matters." Under the Lemon test's
first prong, the Government must show that
the challenged action "ha[s] a secular
legislative purpose." Accordingly, the
Government must show that the challenged
action has a secular purpose that is "genuine,
not a sham, and not merely secondary to a
religious objective." The government cannot
meet
this
requirement
by
identifying any secular purpose for the
challenged action. Rather, the government
must
show
that
the
challenged
action's primary purpose is secular.
When a court considers whether a challenged
government action's primary purpose is
secular, it attempts to discern the "official
objective . . . from readily discoverable fact,
without any judicial psychoanalysis of a
drafter's heart of hearts." The court acts as a
reasonable, "objective observer," taking into
account "the traditional external signs that
show up in the 'text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute,' or comparable
official act." It also considers the action's
"historical context" and "the specific
sequence of events leading to [its]
passage." And as a reasonable observer, a
court has a "reasonable memor[y]," and it
cannot "'turn a blind eye to the context in
which [the action] arose.'"

As a candidate, Trump also suggested that he
would attempt to circumvent scrutiny of the
Muslim ban by formulating it in terms of
nationality, rather than religion. On July 17,
2016, in response to a tweet stating, "Calls to
ban Muslims from entering the U.S. are
offensive and unconstitutional," Trump said,
"So you call it territories. OK?
We're gonna do territories." One week later,
Trump asserted that entry should be
"immediately suspended[ed] . . . from any
nation that has been compromised by
terrorism." When asked whether this meant
he was "roll[ing ]back" his call for a Muslim
ban, he said his plan was an "expansion" and
explained that "[p]eople were so upset when

The evidence in the record, viewed from the
standpoint of the reasonable observer, creates
a compelling case that EO-2's primary
purpose is religious. Then-candidate Trump's
225

I used the word Muslim," so he was instead
"talking territory instead of Muslim."

avoid targeting Muslims for exclusion from
the United States.

Significantly, the First Executive Order
appeared to take this exact form, barring
citizens of seven predominantly Muslim
countries from entering the United States.
And just before President Trump signed EO1 on January 27, 2017, he stated, "This is the
'Protection of the Nation from Foreign
Terrorist Entry into the United States.' We all
know what that means." The next day,
presidential advisor and former New York
City Mayor Giuliani appeared on Fox News
and asserted that "when [Trump] first
announced it, he said, 'Muslim ban.' He called
me up. He said, 'Put a commission together.
Show me the right way to do it legally.'"

These statements, taken together, provide
direct, specific evidence of what motivated
both EO-1 and EO-2: President Trump's
desire to exclude Muslims from the United
States. The statements also reveal President
Trump's intended means of effectuating the
ban: by targeting majority-Muslim nations
instead of Muslims explicitly. And after
courts enjoined EO-1, the statements show
how President Trump attempted to preserve
its core mission: by issuing EO-2a "watered
down" version with "the same basic policy
outcomes." These statements are the exact
type of "readily discoverable fact[s]" that we
use in determining a government action's
primary purpose. They are explicit
statements of purpose and are attributable
either to President Trump directly or to his
advisors. We need not probe anyone's heart
of hearts to discover the purpose of EO-2, for
President Trump and his aides have
explained it on numerous occasions and in no
uncertain terms. EO-2 cannot be read in
isolation from the statements of planning and
purpose that accompanied it, particularly in
light of the sheer number of statements, their
nearly singular source, and the close
connection they draw between the proposed
Muslim ban and EO-2 itself. The reasonable
observer could easily connect these
statements to EO-2 and understand that its
primary purpose appears to be religious,
rather than secular.

Shortly after courts enjoined the First
Executive Order, President Trump issued
EO-2, which the President and members of
his team characterized as being substantially
similar to EO-1. EO-2 has the same name and
basic structure as EO-1, but it does not
include a preference for religious-minority
refugees and excludes Iraq from its list of
Designated Countries. EO-2, § 1(e). It also
exempts certain categories of nationals from
the Designated Countries and institutes a
waiver process for qualifying individuals.
EO-2, § 3(b), (c). Senior Policy Advisor
Miller described the changes to EO-2 as
"mostly minor technical differences," and
said that there would be "the same basic
policy outcomes for the country." White
House Press Secretary Spicer stated
that "[t]he principles of the [second]
executive order remain the same." And
President Trump, in a speech at a rally,
described EO-2 as "a watered down version
of the first order." These statements suggest
that like EO-1, EO-2's purpose is to
effectuate the promised Muslim ban, and that
its changes from EO-1 reflect an effort to help
it survive judicial scrutiny, rather than to

The
Government
argues,
without
meaningfully addressing Plaintiffs' proffered
evidence, that EO-2's primary purpose is in
fact secular because it is facially neutral and
operates to address the risks of potential
terrorism without targeting any particular
religious group. That EO-2's stated objective
is religiously neutral is not dispositive; the
entire premise of our review under Lemon is
that even facially neutral government actions
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can violate the Establishment Clause. We
therefore reject the Government's suggestion
that EO-2's facial neutrality might somehow
fully answer the question of EO-2's primary
purpose.

convincing as applied to EO-2 than it was to
EO-1.
Relatedly, the Government argues that EO2's operation "confirms its stated purpose."
"[I]t applies to six countries based on risk, not
religion; and in those six countries, the
suspension applies irrespective of any alien's
religion." In support of its argument that EO2 does not single out Muslims, the
Government notes that these six countries are
either places where ISIS has a heavy presence
(Syria), state sponsors of terrorism (Iran,
Sudan, and Syria), or safe havens for
terrorists (Libya, Somalia, and Yemen). The
Government also points out that the six
Designated Countries represent only a small
proportion of the world's majority-Muslim
nations, and EO-2 applies to everyone in
those countries, even non-Muslims. This
shows, the Government argues, that EO-2's
primary purpose is secular. The trouble with
this argument is that EO-2's practical
operation is not severable from the myriad
statements explaining its operation as
intended to bar Muslims from the United
States. And that EO-2 is underinclusive by
targeting only a small percentage of the
world's
majority-Muslim
nations
and overinclusive for targeting all citizens,
even non-Muslims, in the Designated
Countries, is not responsive to the purpose
inquiry. This evidence might be relevant to
our analysis under Lemon's second prong,
which asks whether a government act has the
primary effect of endorsing or disapproving
of religion, but it does not answer whether the
government acted with a primarily religious
purpose to begin with. If we limited our
purpose inquiry to review of the operation of
a facially neutral order, we would be caught
in an analytical loop, where the order would
always survive scrutiny. It is for this precise
reason that when we attempt to discern
purpose, we look to more than just the
challenged action itself. And here, when we
consider the full context of EO-2, it is evident

The Government's argument that EO-2's
primary purpose is related to national
security, is belied by evidence in the record
that President Trump issued the First
Executive Order without consulting the
relevant national security agencies, and that
those agencies only offered a national
security rationale after EO-1 was enjoined.
Furthermore, internal reports from DHS
contradict this national security rationale,
with one report stating that "most foreignborn, US-based violent extremists likely
radicalized several years after their entry to
the United States, limiting the ability of
screening and vetting officials to prevent
their entry because of national security
concerns." According to former National
Security Officials, Section 2(c) serves "no
legitimate national security purpose," given
that "not a single American has died in a
terrorist attack on U.S. soil at the hands of
citizens of these six nations in the last forty
years" and that there is no evidence of any
new security risks emanating from these
countries. Like the district court, we think
this strong evidence that any national security
justification for EO-2 was secondary to its
primary religious purpose and was offered as
more of a "litigating position" than as the
actual purpose of EO-2. And EO-2's text
does little to bolster any national security
rationale: the only examples it provides of
immigrants born abroad and convicted of
terrorism-related crimes in the United States
include two Iraqis—Iraq is not a designated
country in EO-2—and a Somalian refugee
who entered the United States as a child and
was radicalized here as an adult. EO-2, §
1(h). The Government's asserted national
security purpose is therefore no more
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that it is likely motivated primarily by
religion. We do not discount that there may
be
a
national
security
concern
motivating EO-2; we merely find it likely that
any such purpose is secondary to EO-2's
religious purpose.

statements, we should not rely on campaign
statements. Those statements predate
President
Trump's
constitutionally
significant "transition from private life to the
Nation's highest public office," and as such,
they are less probative than official
statements, the Government contends. We
recognize that in many cases, campaign
statements may not reveal all that much about
a government actor's purpose. But we decline
to impose a bright-line rule against
considering campaign statements, because as
with any evidence, we must make an
individualized determination as to a
statement's relevancy and probative value in
light of all the circumstances. The campaign
statements here are probative of purpose
because they are closely related in time,
attributable to the primary decisionmaker,
and specific and easily connected to the
challenged action.

The Government separately contends that our
purpose inquiry should not extend to
"extrinsic evidence" that is beyond EO-2's
relevant context. The Government first
argues that we should not look beyond EO2's "text and operation." But this is clearly
incorrect, as the Supreme Court has explicitly
stated that we review more than just the face
of a challenged action.
The Government next argues that even if we
do look beyond EO-2 itself, under McCreary,
we are limited to considering only "the
operative terms of governmental action and
official pronouncements," Appellants' Br. 46,
which we understand to mean only EO-2
itself and a letter signed by the Attorney
General and the Secretary of State that
largely echoes EO-2's text. We find no
support
for
this
view
in McCreary. The McCreary Court
considered "the traditional external signs that
show up in the 'text, legislative history, and
implementation
of
the
[challenged
action],'"but it did not limit other courts'
review to those particular terms. Id. Nor did it
make such an artificial distinction between
"official" and "unofficial" context. Rather, it
relied on principles of "common sense" and
the "reasonable observer[']s . . .
reasonable memor[y]" to cull the relevant
context
surrounding
the
challenged
action. The Government would have us
abandon this approach in favor of an
unworkable standard that is contrary to the
well-established framework for considering
the context of a challenged government
action.

Just as the reasonable observer's "world is not
made brand new every morning," nor are we
able to awake without the vivid memory of
these statements. We cannot shut our eyes to
such evidence when it stares us in the face,
for "there's none so blind as they that won't
see." If and when future courts are confronted
with campaign or other statements proffered
as evidence of governmental purpose, those
courts must similarly determine, on a caseby-case basis, whether such statements are
probative evidence of governmental
purpose. Our holding today neither limits nor
expands their review.
The Government argues that reviewing
campaign statements here would encourage
scrutiny of all religious statements ever made
by elected officials, even remarks from
before they assumed office. Appellants' Br.
49-50. But our review creates no such
sweeping implications, because as the
Supreme Court has counseled, our purpose
analysis "demands a sensitive inquiry into
such circumstantial and direct evidence of

And finally, the Government argues that even
if we could consider unofficial acts and
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intent as may be available." Just as a
reasonable observer would not understand
general statements of religious conviction to
inform later government action, nor would
we look to such statements as evidence of
purpose. A person's particular religious
beliefs, her college essay on religious
freedom, a speech she gave on the Free
Exercise Clause—rarely, if ever, will such
evidence reveal anything about that person's
actions once in office. For a past statement to
be relevant to the government's purpose,
there must be a substantial, specific
connection between it and the challenged
government action. And here, in this highly
unique set of circumstances, there is a direct
link between the President's numerous
campaign statements promising a Muslim
ban that targets territories, the discrete action
he took only one week into office executing
that exact plan, and EO-2, the "watered
down" version of that plan that "get[s] just
about everything," and "in some ways,
more."

us] to wrestle with intractable questions,"
such as "the level of generality at which a
statement must be made, by whom, and how
long after its utterance the statement remains
probative." But discerning
the
motives
behind a challenged government action is a
well-established part of our purpose
inquiry. As part of this inquiry, courts
regularly
evaluate
decisionmakers'
statements that show their purpose for acting.
And the purpose inquiry is not limited
to Establishment Clause challenges; we
conduct this analysis in a variety of
contexts. We
therefore
see
nothing
"intractable" about evaluating a statement's
probative value based on the identity of the
speaker and how specifically the statement
relates to the challenged government action,
for this is surely a routine part of
constitutional analysis. And this analysis is
even more straightforward here, because we
are not attempting to discern motive from
many legislators' statements, as in Brown, but
rather are looking primarily to one person's
statements to discern that person's motive for
taking a particular action once in office.

For similar reasons, we reject the
Government's argument that our review of
these campaign statements will "inevitably
'chill political debate during campaigns.'"
Not all—not even most—political debate will
have any relevance to a challenged
government action. Indeed, this case is
unique not because we are considering
campaign statements, but because we have
such directly relevant and probative
statements of government purpose at all. To
the extent that our review chills campaign
promises to condemn and exclude entire
religious groups, we think that a welcome
restraint.

The Government has repeatedly asked this
Court to ignore evidence, circumscribe our
own review, and blindly defer to executive
action, all in the name of the Constitution's
separation of powers. We decline to do so,
not only because it is the particular province
of the judicial branch to say what the law is,
but also because we would do a disservice to
our constitutional structure were we to let its
mere invocation silence the call for
meaningful judicial review. The deference
we give the coordinate branches is surely
powerful, but even it must yield in certain
circumstances, lest we abdicate our own
duties to uphold the Constitution.

Lastly, the Government contends that we are
ill-equipped to "attempt[] to assess what
campaign statements reveal about the
motivation for later action." The Government
argues that to do so would "mire [us] in a
swamp of unworkable litigation," and "forc[e

EO-2 cannot be divorced from the cohesive
narrative linking it to the animus that inspired
it. In light of this, we find that the reasonable
observer would likely conclude that EO-2's
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primary purpose is to exclude persons from
the United States on the basis of their
religious beliefs. We therefore find that EO2 likely fails Lemon's purpose prong in
violation
of
the Establishment
Clause. Accordingly, we hold that the district
court did not err in concluding that Plaintiffs
are likely to succeed on the merits of
their Establishment Clause claim.

C.
Even if Plaintiffs are likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of a
preliminary injunction, we still must
determine that the balance of the equities tips
in their favor, "pay[ing] particular regard for
the public consequences in employing the
extraordinary remedy of injunction." This is
because "courts of equity may go to greater
lengths to give 'relief in furtherance of the
public interest than they are accustomed to go
when only private interests are involved.'" As
the district court did, we consider the balance
of the equities and the public interest factors
together.

B.
Because we uphold the district court's
conclusion that Plaintiffs are likely to
succeed on the merits of their Establishment
Clause claim, we next consider whether
Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of a preliminary injunction. As we
have previously recognized, "in the context
of
an
alleged
violation
of First
Amendment rights, a plaintiff's claimed
irreparable harm is inseparably linked to the
likelihood of success on the merits."
Accordingly, our finding that Plaintiffs are
likely to succeed on the merits of their
constitutional claim counsels in favor of
finding that in the absence of an injunction,
they will suffer irreparable harm.

The Government first contends that "the
injunction causes [it] direct, irreparable
injury" that outweighs the irreparable harm to
Plaintiffs because "'no governmental interest
is more compelling than the security of the
Nation.'" When it comes to national security,
the Government argues, the judicial branch
"should not second-guess" the President's
"'[p]redictive judgment[s].'"
The
Government further argues that the
injunction causes institutional injury, because
according to two single-Justice opinions,
"[a]ny time a State is enjoined by a court
from effectuating statutes enacted by
representatives of its people, it suffers a form
of irreparable injury." The Government
contends that this principle applies here
because the President "represents the people
of all 50 states."

Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated in no
uncertain terms that "loss of First
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury." Though the Elrod Court
was addressing freedom of speech and
association, our sister circuits have
interpreted
it
to
apply
equally
to Establishment Clause violations.
We
agree with these courts that because of "the
inchoate, one-way nature of Establishment
Clause violations," they create the same type
of immediate, irreparable injury as do other
types of First Amendment violations. We
therefore find that Plaintiffs are likely to
suffer irreparable harm if Section 2(c) of EO2 takes effect.

At the outset, we reject the notion that the
President, because he or she represents the
entire nation, suffers irreparable harm
whenever an executive action is enjoined.
This Court has held that the Government is
"in no way harmed by issuance of a
preliminary injunction which prevents [it]
from enforcing restrictions likely to be found
unconstitutional." "If anything," we said, "the
system is improved by such an injunction."
Because Section 2(c) of EO-2 is likely
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unconstitutional, allowing it to take effect
would therefore inflict the greater
institutional injury. And we are not persuaded
that the general deference we afford the
political branches ought to nevertheless tip
the equities in the Government's favor, for
even the President's actions are not above
judicial scrutiny, and especially not where
those actions are likely unconstitutional.

that the Government's asserted national
security interest outweighs the competing
harm to Plaintiffs of the likely Establishment
Clause violation.
For similar reasons, we find that the public
interest counsels in favor of upholding the
preliminary injunction. As this and other
courts have recognized, upholding the
Constitution undeniably promotes the public
interest. These cases recognize that when we
protect the constitutional rights of the few, it
inures to the benefit of all. And even more so
here, where the constitutional violation
injures Plaintiffs and in the process
permeates and ripples across entire religious
groups, communities, and society at large.

We are likewise unmoved by the
Government's rote invocation of harm to
"national security interests" as the silver
bullet that defeats all other asserted injuries.
National security may be the most
compelling of government interests, but this
does not mean it will always tip the balance
of the equities in favor of the government. A
claim of harm to national security must still
outweigh the competing claim of injury. Here
and elsewhere, the Government would have
us end our inquiry without scrutinizing either
Section 2(c)'s stated purpose or the
Government's asserted interests, but
"unconditional
deference
to
a
government agent's
invocation
of
'emergency' . . . has a lamentable place in our
history," and is incompatible with our duty to
evaluate the evidence before us.

When the government chooses sides on
religious issues, the "inevitable result" is
"hatred, disrespect and even contempt"
towards those who fall on the wrong side of
the line. Improper government involvement
with religion "tends to destroy government
and to degrade religion," encourage
persecution of religious minorities and
nonbelievers, and foster hostility and division
in our pluralistic society. The risk of these
harms is particularly acute here, where from
the highest elected office in the nation has
come an Executive Order steeped in animus
and directed at a single religious group. "The
fullest realization of true religious liberty
requires that government neither engage in
nor compel religious practices, that it effect
no favoritism among sects or between
religion and nonreligion, and that it work
deterrence of no religious belief." We
therefore conclude that enjoining Section
2(c) promotes the public interest of the
highest order. And because Plaintiffs have
satisfied all the requirements for securing a
preliminary injunction, we find that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in
enjoining Section 2(c) of EO-2.

As we previously determined, the
Government's asserted national security
interest in enforcing Section 2(c) appears to
be a post hoc, secondary justification for an
executive action rooted in religious animus
and intended to bar Muslims from this
country. We remain unconvinced that
Section 2(c) has more to do with national
security than it does with effectuating the
President's promised Muslim ban. We do not
discount that EO-2 may have some national
security purpose, nor do we disclaim that the
injunction may have some impact on the
Government. But our inquiry, whether for
determining Section 2(c)'s primary purpose
or for weighing the harm to the parties, is one
of balance, and on balance, we cannot say

V.
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Lastly, having concluded that Plaintiffs are
entitled to a preliminary injunction, we
address the scope of that injunction. The
Government first argues that the district court
erred by enjoining Section 2(c) nationwide,
and that any injunctive relief should be
limited solely to Plaintiffs.

Finally, the Government argues that the
district court erred by issuing the injunction
against the President himself. We recognize
that "in general, 'this court has no jurisdiction
of a bill to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties,'" and that
a "grant of injunctive relief against the
President himself is extraordinary, and
should . . . raise[] judicial eyebrows.” In light
of the Supreme Court's clear warning that
such relief should be ordered only in the
rarest of circumstances we find that the
district court erred in issuing an injunction
against the President himself. We therefore
lift the injunction as to the President only.
The court's preliminary injunction shall
otherwise remain fully intact.

It is well-established that "district courts have
broad discretion when fashioning injunctive
relief." Nevertheless, "their powers are not
boundless." The district court's choice of
relief "should be carefully addressed to the
circumstances of the case," and "should be no
more burdensome to the defendant than
necessary to provide complete relief to the
plaintiffs.” Courts may issue nationwide
injunctions consistent with these principles.

To be clear, our conclusion does not "in any
way suggest[] that Presidential action
is unreviewable. Review of the legality of
Presidential action can ordinarily be obtained
in a suit seeking to enjoin the officers who
attempt to enforce the President's directive."
Even though the President is not "directly
bound" by the injunction, we "assume it is
substantially likely that the President . .
. would abide by an authoritative
interpretation" of Section 2(c) of the Second
Executive Order.

The district court here found that a number of
factors weighed in favor of a nationwide
injunction, and we see no error. First,
Plaintiffs are dispersed throughout the United
States. Second, nationwide injunctions are
especially appropriate in the immigration
context, as Congress has made clear that "the
immigration laws of the United States should
be enforced vigorously and uniformly." And
third, because Section 2(c) likely violates
the Establishment Clause, enjoining it only as
to Plaintiffs would not cure the constitutional
deficiency, which would endure in all Section
2(c)'s applications. Its continued enforcement
against similarly situated individuals would
only serve to reinforce the "message" that
Plaintiffs "are outsiders, not full members of
the political community." For these reasons,
we find that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that a nationwide
injunction was "necessary to provide
complete relief."

VI.
For all of these reasons, we affirm in part and
vacate in part the preliminary injunction
awarded by the district court. We also deny
as moot Defendants' motion for a stay
pending appeal.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART
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“Supreme Court finds a compromise in reviving Trump's travel ban”
The Los Angeles Times
David G Savage, Laura King, Noah Bierman
June 26, 2017

The Supreme Court on Monday took a
pragmatic approach to resolving the dispute
over President Trump’s foreign travel ban
with a middle-ground ruling that may defuse
the controversy — for now.

The justices also strongly hinted that they
may never need to settle the larger
constitutional issues because the case could
be moot by the time they hear it in the fall.
The administration argued it needed the 90day pause to review and revise its vetting
procedures for travelers from Iran, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria, Libya and Yemen. Assuming
the order takes effect now, the ban will have
expired by October when the court
reconvenes.

The decision, the first from the high court to
review Trump’s exercise of presidential
power, allowed much of the ban to take
effect, but it also applied significant
restrictions that will narrow the order’s
impact.
In a short, unsigned but unanimous opinion,
the justices avoided taking a stance on the
larger constitutional questions concerning
religious discrimination or presidential
authority. Instead, they agreed to hear those
arguments in the fall.

Trump had long voiced confidence he would
prevail when the travel ban case reached the
high court and on Monday he called the
decision a “clear victory” for his
administration.
“Today’s ruling allows me to use an
important tool for protecting our nation’s
homeland,” the president said.

But they also largely rejected the lower court
rulings that had blocked Trump’s order as
unconstitutional, handing a partial victory to
the president and his lawyers after a string of
rebukes in federal courts from Hawaii to
Maryland.

The administration did not provide
immediate specifics on how the decision
would change existing policy, leaving
attorneys at the Justice Department to review
the court’s language before working with
other federal agencies to draft temporary
rules.

The ruling clears the way for Trump’s 90-day
ban on foreign arrivals from six Muslimmajority countries to take effect, but it also
carved out exemptions for those with “bona
fide relationships” with Americans or U.S.
entities, including spouses, other close family
members, employers and universities.

Trump officials also acknowledged that their
optimism may be subject to change,
depending on how far the government’s
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to the U.S.,” including those with urgent
medical conditions.

lawyers are willing to push the ruling and
how lower courts interpret the high court’s
language.

All nine justices apparently agreed with the
outcome Monday. Three of the court’s
conservatives — Justices Clarence Thomas,
Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Neil M. Gorsuch —
said they would have gone further and
allowed the entire order to take effect
immediately.

That
caution
contrasted
with
the
administration’s earlier handling of the issue,
when Trump signed a hastily drafted travel
ban just days after taking office. The result
was a chaotic execution, with uncertainty at
airports around the world over who would be
allowed to enter the country.

Under the compromise crafted by the
court,“foreign nationals who have a credible
claim of a bona fide relationship with a
person or entity in the United States” are
exempted from the ban.

Immigrant rights lawyers who sued to block
Trump’s order were disappointed with
Monday’s ruling, but downplayed its impact.
The order “will take effect in a very limited
way,” said Karen Tumlin, legal director for
the National Immigration Law Center in Los
Angeles. The ban will apply “only to a small
subset of people who lack any relationship”
with a person in this country or an institution
such as a school or a hospital.

"The students from the designated countries
who have been admitted to the University of
Hawaii have such a relationship with an
American entity," the court said. "So too
would a worker who accepted an offer of
employment from an American company or
a lecturer invited to address an American
audience."

Some welcomed what they described as an
implicit rebuke of the White House’s
assertion that Trump has unfettered powers to
exclude arrivals based on purported national
security concerns.

Since many visitors from the six affected
countries have such a relationship, the impact
of the order may be narrow.

But others worried about the message it may
send. It “ignores the anti-Muslim bigotry that
is at the heart of the travel ban executive
orders and will inevitably embolden
Islamphobes in the administration,” said
Nihad Awad, executive director of the
Council on American-Islamic Relations.

But in his dissent, Thomas predicted the
court’s approach would fail and lead to a
“flood of litigation” to determine which
visitors are exempt.
“I fear that the court’s remedy will prove
unworkable,” Thomas said. “Today’s
compromise will burden executive officials
with the task of deciding — on peril of
contempt — whether individuals from the six
affected countries who wish to enter the
United States have a sufficient connection to
a person or entity in this country.”

David Miliband, president of the
International Rescue Committee, said the
partial reinstatement of the ban particularly
threatens “vulnerable people waiting to come
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Last month, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals
in Virginia upheld a district judge’s ruling in
Maryland blocking Trump’s order. The
appeals court, in a 10-3 decision, said the
executive order reflected an unconstitutional
discrimination based on religion. Its opinion
cited Trump’s campaign pledge to enact a
“Muslim ban.”

of Sec. 2c," the court said, referring to the key
clause in the travel ban order.
The case decided Monday was named Trump
vs. International Refugee Assistance Project
and Trump vs. Hawaii.

Shortly afterward, the 9th Circuit Court in
California upheld a district judge’s ruling in
Hawaii and ruled Trump’s order was illegal
because the president did not demonstrate a
threat to national security.
Trump's lawyers argued both decisions were
fundamentally mistaken. They said the
Constitution and immigration laws give the
president the power to temporarily “suspend”
the entry of foreigners, either individuals or
groups. And they argued that the high court
has made clear judges have no authority to
“second-guess” the president’s determination
that national security was in danger.
Without hearing arguments in the two cases,
the justices agreed the lower courts had gone
too far. The outcome suggests that many of
the justices were as troubled by the bold
intervention of the judges who blocked
Trump’s order as they were by the bold action
of the new president.
The court’s opinion noted the government is
free to work on the new vetting procedures
for immigrants from the six countries. This
was the ostensible purpose of the order in the
first place.
"We fully expect that the relief we grant
today will permit the executive to conclude
its internal work and provide adequate notice
to foreign governments within the 90-day life
235

“Trump Refugee Restrictions Allowed for Now; Ban on Grandparents Is
Rejected”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
July 19, 2017

The Supreme Court on Wednesday
temporarily upheld broad restrictions against
refugees entering the United States but
allowed grandparents and other relatives of
American residents to come while legal
challenges to the Trump administration’s
travel ban move forward.

Last month, the Supreme Court agreed to
decide whether the travel ban was lawful, and
it scheduled arguments for October. In the
meantime, the justices temporarily reinstated
the travel ban — but only for people without
“a credible claim of a bona fide relationship
with a person or entity in the United States.”
The court did not specify who qualified as a
close relative, though it did say that spouses
and mothers-in-law “clearly” counted.

The justices, in a brief unsigned order, let
stand part of a ruling from a federal judge in
Hawaii
that
had
narrowed
the
administration’s efforts to limit travel from
six predominantly Muslim countries, an
effort that has prompted confusion at the
nation’s airports, a global outcry and much
litigation since President Trump announced it
a week into his presidency.

The Trump administration interpreted the
Supreme Court’s decision as excluding most
refugees and entry only of American
residents’ parents, children, spouses, parentsin-law, sons- and daughters-in-law, people
engaged to be married and siblings.

But the justices suspended a second part of
the lower court’s ruling, standing firm for
now against allowing an estimated 24,000
refugees from across the world to resettle in
the United States.

Last week, Judge Derrick K. Watson of
Federal District Court in Honolulu ruled that
the
administration’s
approach
had
disregarded the language and logic of the
Supreme Court’s ruling, fairness and the
conventional understanding of who counts as
a close family member.

In the terse order, Justices Clarence Thomas,
Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Neil M. Gorsuch said
they would have blocked the judge’s entire
order while the case proceeds — including
the part that allowed American residents’
grandparents and other relatives to travel to
the United States from the six countries: Iran,
Libya, Syria, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen.

“Common sense, for instance, dictates that
close family members be defined to include
grandparents,” Judge Watson wrote. “Indeed,
grandparents are the epitome of close family
members. The government’s definition
excludes them. That simply cannot be.”
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The next day, Attorney General Jeff Sessions
criticized the ruling as undermining national
security, creating confusion and violating
respect for separation of powers.

Lawyers for Hawaii who are challenging the
travel ban disputed that assertion. They said
about 24,000 refugees had a formal assurance
of help from a settlement agency, while
another 175,000 in the pipeline did not.

“The district court has improperly substituted
its policy preferences for the national security
judgments of the executive branch in a time
of grave threats, defying both the lawful
prerogatives of the executive branch and the
directive of the Supreme Court,” Mr.
Sessions said in a statement.

“Many of those refugees — as well as
countless visa applicants from the targeted
nations — will be unable to demonstrate any
other form of bona fide relationship with an
American party, meaning that they will be
absolutely barred from entering the country
in the next several months,” the Hawaii
lawyers wrote.

Later that day, the administration filed a
motion asking the Supreme Court to clarify
its decision. It said the justices should act
immediately, without waiting for a ruling
from the appeals court.

They also said Judge Watson’s order did
nothing to stop the administration from
enforcing its travel ban against an estimated
85 percent of refugees, or to exclude
extended family members “who indisputably
lack close relationships with American
individuals and entities.”

The administration said it was entitled to
exclude refugees whom resettlement
agencies had planned to help move to the
United States. Judge Watson disagreed,
writing that the Supreme Court had meant to
allow such people to enter the country.

On Wednesday, the Supreme Court rejected
the administration’s request for clarity on the
scope of last month’s decision. The justices
said that the appeal in the case should follow
the ordinary course and that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San
Francisco, should first address the question.

“An assurance from a United States refugee
resettlement agency, in fact, meets each of
the Supreme Court’s touchstones,” he wrote.
“It is formal, it is a documented contract, it is
binding, it triggers responsibilities and
obligations, including compensation, it is
issued specific to an individual refugee only
when that refugee has been approved for
entry by the Department of Homeland
Security.”

In temporarily blocking the part of Judge
Watson’s order concerning refugees, the
Supreme Court indicated that the
government’s arguments had weight. In
declining to disturb the part of the order that
allowed relatives to enter, the Supreme Court
suggested that the administration might have
overreached.

In its Supreme Court brief, the Justice
Department said that Judge Watson’s ruling
“would render the refugee portion of this
court’s decision effectively meaningless.”

Challenges to Mr. Trump’s travel bans have
been ricocheting around the federal courts for
almost as long as he has been president.
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His first ban, issued in January, caused chaos
at the nation’s airports until it was blocked by
the courts. Rather than appealing to the
Supreme Court, the administration issued a
revised executive order in March. But that
order, too, was blocked by federal appeals
courts, which ruled that it violated the
Constitution by discriminating based on
religion and that it exceeded Mr. Trump’s
authority.
The Supreme Court is scheduled to hear
arguments on October 10.
In a partial dissent from the Supreme Court’s
decision last month, Justice Thomas said the
line the court had drawn, allowing those with
“bona fide relationships” to enter the country,
was unworkable. He predicted — accurately
— that the court’s compromise would “invite
a flood of litigation until this case is finally
resolved on the merits, as parties and courts
struggle to determine what exactly
constitutes a ‘bona fide relationship.’”
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“Hawaii Challenges Trump Administration Again As Travel Ban Takes
Effect”
Associated Press
June 29, 2017

The state of Hawaii has filed a court
challenge to the Trump administration’s
definition of a close U.S. relationship needed
to avoid the new travel ban.

citizen or entity. The Trump administration
had said the exemption would apply to
citizens with a parent, spouse, child, adult son
or daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law or
sibling already in the U.S.

Hawaii Attorney General Doug Chin says
he’s concerned the administration may be
violating the U.S. Supreme Court’s travel ban
ruling.

Chin says many of the people that the federal
government decided to exclude are
considered “close family” in Hawaii.

The travel ban temporarily barring some
citizens of six majority-Muslim countries
from coming into the United States went into
effect Thursday. The new rules stop people
from Syria, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Iran and
Libya from getting a visa to the United States
unless they have a “bona fide” relationship
with a close relative, school or business in the
U.S.

At a press conference Monday, Chin said he
welcomed
the
Supreme
Court’s
announcement that it will hear challenges to
the travel ban this fall, even though it allowed
part of the ban to temporarily take effect.
Hawaii has been on the front line of the battle
against Trump’s travel ban and other policies.
Oral arguments in the case are scheduled for
October. Chin said he would attend, but that
he expected Neal Katyal, the lead attorney for
the state in Hawaii v. Trump, would conduct
arguments before the court.

Based on a schedule set by U.S. District
Judge Derrick Watson, the administration has
until Monday to respond to Hawaii’s motion,
Chin said at a Friday press conference. The
state will then have until Thursday to respond
to the federal government, he said.

Hawaii filed its lawsuit Feb. 3, one week after
the president issued the original travel ban. It
called for suspending the U.S. refugee
program for 120 days, banned Syrian
refugees indefinitely and barred citizens of
seven Muslim-majority countries from
entering the United States for 90 days.

Watson will issue a decision after that, Chin
said, adding there are no plans for a hearing
at this time.
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday
exempted people from the ban if they can
prove a “bone fide” relationship with a U.S.

That suit was suspended by Judge Watson in
Honolulu after a federal judge in Seattle
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issued a nationwide injunction against the
plan.
In March, Trump modified his ban, removing
Iraq from the list of seven banned nations
(Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and
Yemen) and not singling Syrian refugees for
an indefinite ban or giving preferential
treatment to the refugee claims of religious
minorities.
Watson then allowed Hawaii to modify its
suit to challenge the second ban, and
ultimately issued a nationwide injunction
against it.
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“Trump Takes Travel Ban Dispute to U.S. Supreme Court Again”
Bloomberg Law
Greg Stohr
July 14, 2017

President Donald Trump’s administration
took the dispute over his temporary travel ban
to the Supreme Court again, asking the
justices to let the government bar entry into
the U.S. by people with grandparents and
cousins in the country.

fide relationship with a person or entity in the
United States” to enter.
The limited travel ban took effect June 30.
The Trump administration announced it
would let people enter the U.S. who had a
parent, spouse, fiance, child, sibling, son- or
daughter-in-law, or a parent-in-law in the
country. The standard excluded those whose
closest connections were grandparents,
grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces,
nephews, cousins, and brothers- or sisters-inlaw.

The administration filed papers late Friday
asking the court to clarify a June 26 decision
that said the government had to admit at least
some close relatives, including spouses and
parents-in-law. A federal trial judge in
Hawaii this week said the government
couldn’t exclude several other types of
family
members
either,
and
the
administration is seeking to free itself from
that ruling.

U.S. District Judge Derrick Watson ruled
Thursday that the government’s exemption
from the ban was too narrow. “Common
sense, for instance, dictates that close family
members
be
defined
to
include
grandparents,” Watson wrote.

That ruling “distorts this court’s decision and
upends the equitable balance this court
struck,” acting U.S. Solicitor General Jeffrey
Wall said in court papers.

The Supreme Court had said people with a
“bona fide relationship” included those
visiting a close family member, students who
have been admitted to a university, or
workers who have accepted an employment
offer.

The Supreme Court told the challengers to
the ban to file a response by noon
Washington time on July 18.
The Supreme Court already has agreed to
hear arguments in the fall on Trump’s 90-day
ban, which applies to people entering the
U.S. from six mostly Muslim countries. The
June 26 ruling said a limited form of the ban
could take effect in the meantime, allowing
only people with a “credible claim of a bona

In announcing the administration would
immediately take the matter to the Supreme
Court, Attorney General Jeff Sessions said in
a statement Friday, “Once again, we are faced
with a situation in which a single federal
district court has undertaken by a nationwide
241

injunction to micromanage decisions of the
co-equal executive branch related to our
national security.”

executive order. Watson said the government
couldn’t exclude refugees once a resettlement
agency has provided a formal assurance that
it will provide basic services for the person.

Trump’s March 6 executive order said the 90day travel ban would give officials time to
assess U.S. vetting procedures and would
address an “unacceptably high” risk that
terrorists could slip into the country. Lower
courts blocked the ban, saying Trump
overstepped
his
authority
and
unconstitutionally targeted Muslims.

In a separate filing Saturday, the Trump
administration also asked a San Franciscobased federal appeals court to put Watson’s
decision on hold. The two filings overlap, and
the appeals court could defer action until it
sees what the Supreme Court does.

When the Supreme Court partially revived
the travel ban in June, Justices Clarence
Thomas, Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch said
they would have let the entire ban take effect
immediately. Thomas warned that the
definition of bona fide relationships would
open the door to a “flood of litigation” as U.S.
customs and border officials wrestle with
whether travelers from the six countries have
sufficient ties.
In its new court filing, the Trump
administration asked the court to block
Watson’s order temporarily while the justices
consider the motion to clarify.
The administration also said Watson was
wrong to permit more refugees to be admitted
under a separate provision in Trump’s
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“Challengers file briefs in Supreme Court on travel ban, while 9th
Circuit leaves freeze on ban in place”
SCOTUSblog
Amy Howe
June 12, 2017

It was a busy day for litigation in the
challenges to President Donald Trump’s
March 6 executive order, often known as the
“travel ban.” Citing national security
concerns, the order imposed a temporary hold
on new visas for travelers from six Muslimmajority countries (Iran, Libya, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria and Yemen) and suspended
travel by refugees into the United States. The
order was the second of its kind; an earlier
version, issued in late January, was blocked
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th
Circuit. The March order didn’t fare much
better in the lower courts, and on June 1 the
Trump administration asked the Supreme
Court to enter the fray. Today the challengers
submitted
their
responses
to
the
government’s filings in the Supreme Court.
However, those briefs were partly
overshadowed by another development: a 9th
Circuit decision that largely upheld a Hawaii
district court’s ruling barring the government
from enforcing the ban.

prohibiting the implementation of the travel
ban. In that case, the appeals court relied
heavily on the Constitution’s bar against
favoring one religion over another, known as
the establishment clause: Although the
executive order indicates that it was intended
to protect the United States from foreign
terrorists, the court concluded, statements by
the president reveal that the order was
actually intended to exclude Muslims from
the country.
The government’s June 1 filings asked the
justices both to review the 4th Circuit’s ruling
and to freeze the Maryland court’s order
barring the government from putting the ban
into effect. But it also asked the government
to step into a second challenge, which hails
from Hawaii. Like the Maryland judge, a
federal district court in Hawaii also blocked
the government from implementing the travel
ban, but the 9th Circuit had not yet issued its
decision in that case when the government
went to the Supreme Court at the beginning
of this month.

There are two different sets of challenges to
the travel ban involved in today’s Supreme
Court filings. The first comes via the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, which in
late May rejected the federal government’s
plea to set aside an order by a Maryland judge

The 9th Circuit’s ruling came today. Like the
4th Circuit, the Hawaii district court had
ruled that the challengers had shown that they
were likely to win (part of the legal test for
243

obtaining temporary relief) on their claim
that the travel ban violated the establishment
clause, and it entered a nationwide order
barring the government from enforcing the
ban.

goal. The 9th Circuit observed that the ban
would bar “more than 180 million people
from entry based on their national origin,
including nationals who may have never been
physically present in those countries.” But at
the same time, the court added, it would allow
nationals of other countries who do have ties
to the six covered countries to come to the
United States. As the Hawaii district court
put it, the ban “could have the paradoxical
effect of barring entry by a Syrian national
who has lived in Switzerland for decades, but
not a Swiss national who has immigrated to
Syria during its civil war.”

The 9th Circuit also ruled for the challengers,
but on a different ground. In an unsigned and
apparently unanimous opinion, it explained
that courts should try whenever possible not
to reach constitutional questions if they can
decide the case on another ground. In this
case, the court continued, it did not need to
rule on whether the ban violates the
establishment clause because the ban also
exceeds the power that Congress has given to
the president to regulate immigration.

The president also did not find that current
standards for vetting visa applicants or
refugees are inadequate before issuing the
executive order, nor did he find that the
United States would be harmed if the current
standards weren’t changed. Indeed, the court
of appeals pointed out, the government
already can deny a visa application if the
individual seeking the visa cannot show that
he is eligible. This case-by-case tool allows
the government to screen visa applicants and
deny applications from individuals who
might pose a threat to the United States, and
the executive order does not explain why the
individual visa process is so “flawed” that the
government must instead exclude “an entire
class of nationals” from the country.

The 9th Circuit acknowledged that the
Immigration and Nationality Act “gives the
President broad powers to control the entry
of” immigrants into the country, and it also
allows him to “take actions to protect the
American public.” But, the court of appeals
explained, the president cannot simply
invoke “national security” as a “talismanic
incantation” to justify an exercise of
executive power. Rather, the INA allows the
president to act only after he finds that
allowing an immigrant or group of
immigrants to enter the country “would be
detrimental” to U.S. interests, and the
government has not made that showing.

The 9th Circuit did hand the Trump
administration one minor victory: It agreed
that the Hawaii district court should not have
blocked the government from carrying out
some internal government procedures – for
example, reviewing the vetting process to
determine what information foreign

For example, the court stressed, the
government did not find that allowing
refugees or any citizens from the six covered
Muslim-majority countries would harm the
national interest. And the court perceived a
disconnect between the government’s
announced desire to protect national security
and the way that it wanted to accomplish that
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governments need to provide – that don’t
affect anyone outside the executive branch.

revised order for nearly a month – “with some
of that delay,” Hawaii suggests, “motivated
by a desire to take advantage of a favorable
news cycle.” And when the Hawaii district
court blocked the second order, the state
notes, the government spent “weeks litigating
the issues” in the district court before it went
to the court of appeals. “These are not the
actions,” Hawaii contends, “of a Government
that believes the immediate implementation
of its order is necessary to avoid irreparable
harm.”

The 9th Circuit issued its opinion just a few
hours before the deadline for the challengers
to file their briefs in the Supreme Court.
Several themes emerged in the three filings.
The American Civil Liberties Union (which
represents the challengers in the Maryland
case) told the justices that it would be
“pointless” for them to grant review because
the executive order specifically provides that
nationals of the six Muslim-majority
countries may not enter the United States for
90 days after the order became effective. The
challengers maintain that the 90-day period
ends in two days, on Wednesday, June 14 –
at which point, they argue, the government’s
appeal will no longer matter.

But in any event, the challengers add, the
Supreme Court should not grant review of the
4th Circuit’s decision because the court of
appeals “carefully and correctly applied this
Court’s precedents to this unique situation.”
Accepting the government’s argument, the
challengers maintain, would allow “the
executive branch to act in open bad faith,
even though there is plenty of evidence that
the order was intended “to disfavor
Muslims.”

In a separate filing opposing the
government’s request to allow the ban to go
into effect until the Supreme Court can weigh
in, the ACLU contended that if the travel ban
doesn’t expire on Wednesday, allowing it to
go into effect would effectively enable the
government to run out the clock, because the
Justice Department has asked the court to
review the case next fall, “more than 90 days
from now.” Moreover, the ACLU tells the
justices, if the ban is implemented it will
create “enormous confusion” while causing
“immediate and widespread harm to” the
challengers and “others like them.”

Today’s ruling by the 9th Circuit could add a
procedural wrinkle to the proceedings in the
Supreme Court. The justices may, for
example, want additional briefing on the
effect of the 9th Circuit’s ruling, or the
government could ask the court to weigh in
on the 9th Circuit’s ruling as well. But with
the end of the court’s term less than three
weeks away, the next steps – whatever they
may be – are likely to come quickly.

Hawaii adds that despite the government’s
protests that time is of the essence, the
government itself is responsible for the slow
pace of litigation over the travel ban. For
example, although the 9th Circuit put the first
ban on hold on February 9, the Trump
administration did not issue the second,
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“Trump’s New Travel Ban Blocks Migrants From Six Nations, Sparing
Iraq”
The New York Times
Glenn Thrush
March 6, 2017

President Trump signed an executive order
on Monday blocking citizens of six
predominantly Muslim countries from
entering the United States, the most
significant hardening of immigration policy
in generations, even with changes intended to
blunt legal and political opposition.

But the heart of the sweeping executive
action is still intact, reflecting Mr. Trump’s
“America first” pledge to safeguard against
what he has portrayed as a hidden influx of
terrorists and criminals — a hard-line
campaign promise that resonated deeply with
white working-class voters.

The order was revised to avoid the tumult and
protests that engulfed the nation’s airports
after Mr. Trump signed his first immigration
directive on Jan. 27. That order was
ultimately blocked by a federal appeals court.

The new order retains central elements of the
old one, cutting the number of refugees
admitted to the United States each year to
50,000 from about 110,000. Mr. Trump is
also leaving open the possibility of
expanding the ban to other countries, or even
putting Iraq back on the banned list if the
country’s leaders fail to comply with a
requirement that they increase intelligence
sharing, officials said.

The new order continued to impose a 90-day
ban on travelers, but it removed Iraq, a
redaction requested by Defense Secretary Jim
Mattis, who feared it would hamper
coordination to defeat the Islamic State,
according to administration officials.

“Unregulated, unvetted travel is not a
universal privilege, especially when national
security is at stake,” said John F. Kelly, the
homeland security secretary, appearing
alongside Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson
and Attorney General Jeff Sessions at the
Ronald Reagan Federal Building in
Washington on Monday.

It also exempts permanent residents and
current visa holders, and drops language
offering preferential status to persecuted
religious minorities, a provision widely
interpreted as favoring other religious groups
over Muslims. In addition, it reversed an
indefinite ban on refugees from Syria,
replacing it with a 120-day freeze that
requires review and renewal.

Mr. Kelly said the order was now
“prospective” and applied “only to foreign
nationals outside of the United States” who
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do not have a valid visa. None of the men
took questions.

more sanguine about the second order,
arguing that the new, multiagency review
process could be used in the future to bend
Mr. Trump’s uncompromising messages
toward Washington’s bureaucratic realities.

The Trump administration quickly tried to
break the legal logjam, filing papers in
United States District Court in Washington
late on Monday seeking to lift an order
blocking the fulfillment of the initial ban.

Mr. Trump signed the first ban with great
fanfare, in front of reporters, at the Pentagon.
“We don’t want them here,” Mr. Trump said
of Islamist terrorists. “We want to ensure that
we are not admitting into our country the very
threats our soldiers are fighting overseas. We
only want to admit those into our country
who will support our country, and love
deeply our people.”

But the president’s revisions did little to halt
criticism from Democrats and immigrant
rights advocates, who predicted a renewed
fight in the courts.
The Senate Democratic leader, Chuck
Schumer of New York, described the new
order as a “watered-down ban” that was still
“meanspirited and un-American.”

This time, the White House issued a
photograph of the president signing the order
alone at his desk in the Oval Office.

Margaret Huang, the executive director of
Amnesty International USA, said in a
statement that the new order would “cause
extreme fear and uncertainty for thousands of
families by, once again, putting anti-Muslim
hatred into policy.”

Justice Department lawyers said the revisions
rendered moot legal cases against the original
travel ban. But opponents said the removal of
a section that had granted preferential
treatment to victims of religious persecution
was a cosmetic change that did nothing to
alter the order’s prejudicial purpose.
Immigrant rights lawyers had argued that the
provision was intended to discriminate
against Muslims, pointing to recent
statements by Mr. Trump.

The new measure will be phased in over the
next two weeks to avoid the frenetic, sameday execution of the order in January, which
prompted protests across the country and left
tearful families stranded at airports abroad
and in the United States.

“This is a retreat, but let’s be clear — it’s just
another run at a Muslim ban,” said Omar
Jadwat, the director of the Immigrants’
Rights Project at the American Civil
Liberties Union, one of the groups that sued
to stop the first order. “They can’t unring the
bell.”

The redrafted order, delayed by a week so it
would not overshadow Mr. Trump’s address
to a joint session of Congress last Tuesday,
represented a recognition that the rushed first
attempt at the ban did not pass muster legally
or politically.
Administration officials privately conceded
that the initial version of the order was a
political debacle that damaged Mr. Trump’s
nascent presidency. But they were much

Eric T. Schneiderman, the attorney general of
New York and a plaintiff in a suit seeking to
block the first order, said his office was
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reviewing the new ban, adding, “I stand ready
to litigate — again — in order to protect New
York’s families, institutions and economy.”

unsupported accusation that President Barack
Obama tapped Mr. Trump’s phones during
the 2016 campaign.

Congressional Republicans, who were split
over the first travel ban, had a more muted
reaction. But Speaker Paul D. Ryan, who
backed the first order, issued a statement
saying the revised order “advances our
shared goal of protecting the homeland.”

Critics say that Mr. Trump’s vow to impose
“extreme vetting” on migrants, especially
those fleeing the war in Syria, disregards
already stringent screening measures, and the
fact that none of the recent terrorist attacks or
mass shootings on American soil were
perpetrated by people from the nations listed
in the ban.

Citizens of Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen,
Syria and Libya will face a 90-day
suspension of visa processing as the
administration analyzes how to strengthen
vetting procedures, according to a homeland
security summary of the order.

Last week, The Associated Press reported
that it had obtained a draft homeland security
assessment concluding that citizenship was
an “unlikely indicator” of a threat.

The removal of Iraq from the list came after
talks with security officials in Baghdad and at
the urging of Mr. Mattis and State
Department officials, who have been in
communication with Iraqi officials alarmed
that the ban will turn public sentiment in their
country against the United States.

Homeland security officials, speaking to
reporters by telephone on Monday, pushed
back against that news report, arguing that it
was culled from public sources and excluded
classified information that paints a more
dangerous picture.
An official speaking on the call said the
Justice Department had identified 300
“refugees” who were being investigated for
their links to Islamist terrorist groups or for
holding pro-Islamic State positions. Some of
those people already have permanent resident
status, the official said.

“On the basis of negotiations that have taken
place between the government of Iraq and the
U.S. Department of State in the last month,
Iraq will increase cooperation with the U.S.
government on the vetting of its citizens
applying for a visa to travel to the United
States,” homeland security officials wrote in
a fact sheet given to reporters.

But homeland security and Justice
Department officials declined to provide
further details, and would not say how many
of the 300 people being investigated came
from the countries covered by the revised
travel ban.

The timing of the ban seemed intended to
reset the White House political narrative,
after a turbulent week that began with Mr.
Trump’s well-received address to Congress.
That success was quickly overshadowed by
the controversies over Mr. Sessions’s failure
to inform the Senate of his contacts with the
Russian ambassador and Mr. Trump’s
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“Trump Concedes Defeat on Travel Ban—for Now”
The Atlantic
Matt Ford
February 17, 2017

the new president’s first month in office. The
order’s sudden, haphazard rollout on January
27, one week after President Trump’s
inauguration, stranded travelers in airports
and sparked protests at major U.S. airports as
demonstrators and lawyers demanded their
release from custody. Federal judges in
multiple states eventually intervened at the
request of the ACLU and immigrant-rights
groups, blunting the order’s impact in a
patchwork archipelago of temporary
restraining orders.

The Trump administration told a federal
appeals court Thursday it would rewrite its
controversial travel ban targeting several
Muslim-majority countries, effectively
conceding defeat for now in the new
president’s first major confrontation with the
federal judiciary.
In a 61-page filing in the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, Justice Department lawyers
strongly disagreed with a three-judge
appellate panel’s decision to keep blocking
the order’s enforcement while proceedings
continue in a federal district court in Seattle.
But the lawyers declined to ask the Ninth
Circuit to convene a broader panel to
reconsider the three judges’ decision.

The setback came despite sustained criticism
from the Trump administration of the rulings;
of federal district court judge James Robart,
who issued the broadest nationwide
injunction against the ruling; of the threejudge panel that upheld Robart’s injunction;
of the Ninth Circuit as a whole; and of the
federal judiciary. Those critiques ranged
from challenges to the courts’ legitimacy to
insinuations the judiciary would bear
responsibility for future terrorist attacks.

“Rather than continuing this litigation, the
President intends in the near future to rescind
the Order and replace it with a new,
substantially revised Executive Order to
eliminate what the panel erroneously thought
were constitutional concerns,” the Justice
Department told the court. “In so doing, the
President will clear the way for immediately
protecting the country rather than pursuing
further,
potentially
time-consuming
litigation.”

“Just cannot believe a judge would put our
country in such peril,” Trump tweeted at one
point. “If something bad happens blame him
and court system.”

It was a sterile, formalistic admission of
defeat—at least for now—in a separation-ofpowers standoff that had consumed most of

The president echoed those themes during his
lengthy Thursday press conference, in which
he insisted his presidency was operating like
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a “fine-tuned machine” and instead claimed
it was the Ninth Circuit that was actually
adrift. “That circuit is in chaos, and frankly
that circuit is in turmoil,” Trump told
reporters. He said he had heard the circuit
was overturned 80 percent of the time by the
Supreme Court—a highly misleading way to
measure a court’s performance. (The
Supreme Court, by design, reviews lowercourt decisions for error or incongruity, not
general quality; it also accepts only a handful
of the thousands of cases decided by the
Ninth Circuit each year.)

on February 3 that temporarily barred the
federal government from enforcing the order
pending further hearings.
Justice Department lawyers quickly sought
an emergency stay of Robart’s order from a
three-judge appeals panel in the Ninth
Circuit. The panel unanimously rejected that
request on February 9, ruling that the states
of Washington and Minnesota, which filed
the lawsuit, had standing to challenge the
order on behalf of students and faculty in
their public-university systems.
The three judges also indicated the states’
contention that the order violated the
Constitution’s due-process protections had a
chance of success in the lower courts,
although it declined to rule on the merits of
those arguments itself. The panel also
declined to consider whether the order
violated the First Amendment’s religiousfreedom protections by targeting Muslimmajority countries.

The White House did not reveal its plans until
its filing Thursday, as it spent a week
weighing whether it should continue to
defend the order in the courts or start anew.
Neither of its options for appeal seemed
likely to succeed. The Trump administration
could have asked a broader panel of the Ninth
Circuit to reconsider the ruling, but twothirds of the court’s judges were nominated
by Democratic presidents—not a definitive
measure of a court’s ideology, but not a
heartening one for a Republican president,
either. And if the administration asked the
U.S. Supreme Court to intervene, five votes
from the eight justices would be needed to
overturn the panel’s decision. Even if the four
justices on the Court’s conservative wing
sided with the administration, a fifth vote
from its liberal wing could have been difficult
to find.

The federal government, for its part, strongly
defended the order’s legality and
constitutionality since it was issued on
January 27. Administration officials and
Justice Department lawyers pointed to the
executive branch’s traditionally broad
discretion in immigration and nationalsecurity matters, as well as a federal statute
authorizing the president to suspend the entry
of visa holders from certain countries. They
also rejected the states’ claims of religious
discrimination by noting the order didn’t
mention explicitly mention Muslims.

The Ninth Circuit case, Washington v.
Trump, is one of more than a dozen lawsuits
challenging the ban’s legality across the
country. But it quickly became the highest
profile case after federal district judge James
Robart issued a broad nationwide injunction

But those arguments made little headway
among the federal judiciary. Making the
president’s executive order unreviewable by
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comments. The states’ invocation of them
was “profoundly misguided” because it could
impose additional judicial constraints on
presidents for statements made as private
citizens. “That approach, under which the
powers of the Presidency would vary based
on the identity of the individual duly elected
by the people to hold that Office, has no
sound basis in precedent and would raise
significant separation-of-powers concerns,”
they wrote.

federal courts, the Ninth Circuit panel said,
“runs contrary to the fundamental structure of
our constitutional democracy.” And in an
order-related lawsuit in Virginia, federal
judge Leonie Brinkema extensively cited
Trump’s previous comments on Muslim
immigration when issuing a preliminary
injunction against the ban’s enforcement.
The administration hasn’t offered details yet
on its next executive order, which President
Trump said would be released sometime next
week. But the Justice Department did
reiterate some arguments in its Thursday
filing that will likely resurface in the next
generation of legal battles over it.

But their warnings could be too late. As
Vox’s Dara Lind noted last week, those
comments could haunt the travel ban’s
constitutionality in any iteration. The states
cited Supreme Court religious-freedom
precedents in which government officials’
statements could be used as evidence of
discrimination when reviewing ostensibly
neutral laws. And at least one federal judge
has shown a willingness to use those
precedents against the Trump administration.

Central to their brief was the president’s
statutory power to exclude classes of foreign
nationals from entry, which they cautioned
against limiting. “Among other things, it
would disable the President from suspending
the entry of immigrants from a country with
which the United States is on the verge of
war,” That provision’s scope went
unaddressed by the Ninth Circuit panel’s
ruling, even in passing.

Many of the executive order’s flaws can be
ironed out with more thorough review by the
Justice Department. The president’s own
words, however, could be a stain that may be
impossible to wash away.

But the most interesting portion of the filing
dealt with something beyond the order itself.
President Trump’s campaign comments on
Muslim immigration shaped the public
debate of the travel ban, even as he publicly
downsized his call for a “total and complete
shutdown of Muslims entering the United
States” to the opaquer term “extreme vetting”
and other euphemisms. The order makes no
specific reference to Muslims, of course, but
its genealogy is unmistakeable.
The Justice Department, however, urged the
Ninth Circuit to look away from those
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“Travel ban 2.0 in effect, court challenges begin”
CNN
Laura Jarrett, Elise Labott
June 30, 2017

After months of winding through the courts,
the so-called "watered-down," revised
version of President Donald Trump's fiercely
litigated travel ban finally went into effect at
8 p.m. ET Thursday.

Yemen and Sudan, and 120 days if you are a
refugee from any country.
The new guidelines provide that applicants
must prove a relationship with a parent,
spouse, finacee, child, adult son or daughter,
son-in-law, daughter-in-law or sibling in the
US in order to enter the country.

Less than an hour before the ban was slated
to begin, an emergency motion was filed in
federal court by the state of Hawaii, which
contests the Trump administration's plan to
exclude certain categories of foreign
nationals that the state believes are allowed to
enter the country under existing court rulings.

Other family members -- including
grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles,
nieces, nephews, cousins, brothers-in-law,
sisters-in-law, and any other "extended"
family members will not be considered "close
family" under the executive order.

Here's what to expect for the implementation
of version 2.0 of the travel ban:

For several hours on Thursday -- prior to the
executive order going into effect -administration officials had provided
guidance that fiancees would not be
considered "bona fide" relationships, but later
reversed course, and fiancees are now exempt
just like spouses.

Who can't enter the US?
The test for foreign nationals under the
Supreme Court's ruling is whether one has a
"credible claim of bona fide relationship"
with either an entity (like a school or a job) or
a person living in the US (such as a spouse).

The State Department criteria applies not
only to visa applicants, but also to all
refugees currently awaiting approval for
admission to the US.

A hotel reservation, for example, will not
constitute a bona fide relationship under the
executive order, but an academic lecturer
invited to speak in the US will be exempt
from the travel ban.

Senior administration officials further
confirmed despite any ambiguity in the
Supreme Court's decision, a refugee
resettlement organization's "assurance" or
relationship to a prospective refugee will not

If you can't sufficiently establish such a close
relationship, you are banned for 90 days if
you are from Libya, Syria, Iran, Somalia,
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be considered sufficiently close or bona fide
for protection under the administration's
interpretation of the revised executive order.

The executive order also permits the issuance
of a visa to anyone who would otherwise be
excluded on a case-by-case basis at the
discretion of DHS and the State Department.

Advocacy groups such as Amnesty
International plan to send researchers to US
airports, such as Dulles International Airport
and John F. Kennedy Airport on Thursday, to
monitor
developments
and
observe
implementation of the ban in case any
disputes arise.

Senior administration officials expressed
confidence to reporters Thursday that the
pandemonium seen at airports would not
occur this time around and that consular
officers and border agents are "well-versed"
in how the process works.
"We expect business as usual," said one
official. "We expect things to run smoothly - our people are well-prepared for this."

Who is exempt from the ban?
The following categories of travelers are
excluded from the travel ban:
•US citizens

Why is this happening?

•Legal permanent residents (aka
green card holders)

The intent behind the executive order was
hotly debated for the past several months.

•Current visa holders

On the campaign trail, then-candidate Trump
called for a "total and complete shutdown of
Muslims" entering the US.

•Any visa applicant who was in the
US as of June 26

But the text of the executive order states that
"additional scrutiny" is required for foreign
nationals traveling from the six identified
nations because "the conditions in these
countries present heightened threats. Each of
these countries is a state sponsor of terrorism,
has been significantly compromised by
terrorist organizations, or contains active
conflict zones."

•Dual nationals
•Anyone granted asylum
•Any refugee already admitted to the
US (or cleared for travel by the State
Department through July 6)
•Foreign nationals with "bona fide"
family, educational or business tie to
the US.

More lawsuits on the way?
The Trump administration's narrow reading
of what constitutes a "bona fide" relationship
has already elicited at least one challenge in
court.

What about visa holders?
Importantly, visas that have already been
approved will not be revoked, and senior
administration officials confirmed on
Thursday that previously scheduled visa
application appointments will not be
canceled.

Late Thursday, Hawaii filed an emergency
motion asking the federal district court judge
who originally blocked implementation of
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the travel ban in March to "clarify as soon as
possible that the Supreme Court meant what
it said," and issue an order confirming that the
court orders do not allow the Trump
administration to exclude grandparents,
grandchildren, brothers-in-law, sisters-inlaw, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews and
cousins of persons in the United States.
Experts say more legal battles are on the way,
given the way the Trump administration has
decided to interpret the Supreme Court's
ruling.
"I predict more litigation as people challenge
visa denials under these new instructions,"
said Cornell Law School Professor Stephen
Yale-Loehr. "Why can a stepsister visit the
United States but not a grandmother?"
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“Trump’s big travel ban win? Let’s not get carried away.”
The Washington Post
Aaron Blake
June 26, 2017

1) This wouldn't really be seen as a “win”
unless other judges hadn't halted the ban in
the first place. If the lower courts had upheld
the ban and this had been appealed to the
Supreme Court by the other side, the
narrative today would be that the Supreme
Court just put part of Trump's travel ban on
hold. It's also not altogether surprising that
the more left-leaning 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals would go further in halting the ban
than the Supreme Court would. And the sum
total is still that part of Trump's ban remains
blocked, with no ruling on the overall
constitutionality and the possibility that it
gets partially struck down for good.

Winning in politics is as much about beating
expectations as anything else. Democrats'
loss in the special election in a conservative
Georgia
district
wasn't
particularly
devastating in and of itself, but the fact that
they really went for it made it look like a
massive failure, with nothing but doom and
gloom ahead.
With that in mind, I present the White
House's gloating after the Supreme Court
partially reinstated its travel ban on Monday.
“It’s a huge win for the president and the
executive order,” Trump's lawyer, Jay
Sekulow, said on Fox Business Network
shortly after the ruling.

2) We are simply talking about whether
Trump overstepped his constitutional bounds
with the travel ban executive order — a very
low bar — and not whether the broader policy
is successful or popular. And in fact, a recent
poll showed Americans oppose the ban 5243.

Some conservative writers also hailed this as
a win for Trump. David French of the (not
exactly Trump-friendly) National Review
wrote: “Victory for Trump: SCOTUS
Restores Vast Majority of Travel Ban.”
This is what you might call the soft bigotry of
low expectations. Yes, the Supreme Court
allowed for part of the White House's travel
ban to go into effect after some judges had
put the whole thing on hold. But if this is
what passes for a big Trump win, it's going to
be a long four years for him.

3) The degree to which the ban is being
reinstated is in the eye of the beholder.
Basically, the court says the ban “may not be
enforced against foreign nationals who have
a credible claim of a bona fide relationship
with a person or entity in the United States.”
This is who actually sued over the ban in the
first place, and they remain exempt from it,
for now.

For a few reasons:
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4) This is the revised, scaled-back version of
Trump's initial travel ban, which was also
halted by the courts. And just a few weeks
ago, Trump didn't seem to be a big fan of
Version 2.0, tweeting, “The Justice Dept.
should have stayed with the original Travel
Ban, not the watered down, politically correct
version they submitted to S.C.” We are now
to believe that a ban Trump suggested was
inadequate and “watered down” is some big
victory for his agenda?

For a president who said we'd grow tired of
winning with him, to claim this as a big
victory is pretty telling.

5) As The Fix's Amber Phillips notes, the
whole purpose of the ban is now in doubt.
The White House initially pitched this as
temporary travel ban needed to address an
urgent national security concern while it
developed
more
foolproof
vetting
procedures. It said it needed 90 days to do
that (120 days for refugees); it's now been
150 days since the first attempt at a travel ban
and 102 since the second (with no attacks by
immigrants or refugees), but apparently the
ban is still necessary? Even in their ruling, the
judges seemed to allude to the idea that their
input might be moot because that window
had passed. Here's what the justices wrote:
In addition to the issues identified in the
petitions, the parties are directed to address
the following question: “Whether the
challenges to §2(c) became moot on June 14,
2017.”
Monday's ruling is a win for Trump only
insofar as it wasn't another big setback —
something he's become accustomed to both
legislatively and in the courts. But this is a
temporary ruling that is still blocking part of
a signature executive order that Trump
apparently isn't a huge fan of in the first place.
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“Court hands each side a partial victory in dispute over scope of travel
ban”
SCOTUSblog
Amy Howe
July 19, 2017

refugees who have a “credible claim” of a
genuine relationship with an individual or
institution in the United States.

On the same day that it scheduled oral
argument in the dispute over President
Donald Trump’s March 6 executive order,
the Supreme Court turned down a request by
the federal government to clarify exactly
what it meant when it said that individuals
with a close family relationship could
continue to apply for visas to enter the United
States even while the freeze on new visas for
travelers from six predominantly Muslim
countries is in place. Today’s order left in
place a ruling by a federal district judge in
Hawaii that had defined the relationships
more expansively than the government had
wanted – to include, among others,
grandparents and grandchildren. But the
justices also put a portion of that lower-court
ruling relating to refugees on hold while an
intermediate federal appeals court reviews it.

The Court’s June 26 order led to litigation
over the scope of the exception. The Trump
administration insisted that it extended to
parents (and stepparents), spouses (and
fiancés or fiancées), sons and daughters (as
well as stepchildren and sons- and daughtersin-law), and siblings, but not to a broader
group of relatives such as grandparents,
grandchildren, aunts and uncles, siblings-inlaw, nieces and nephews, and cousins. But
U.S. District Judge Derrick Watson agreed
with the state of Hawaii that the second and
broader group of relatives also have the kind
of “close” family relationship that should
allow them to apply for visas even while the
travel ban is in effect. The justices today
denied the federal government’s motion to
clarify which relatives can apply for a visa,
leaving Judge Watson’s more expansive
definition in place.

The president’s March 6 order, often known
as the “travel ban,” halted the issuance of new
visas for travelers from six predominantly
Muslim countries – Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria,
Somalia and Yemen – and temporarily
suspended the admission of refugees into the
United States. Two different lower courts
blocked the government from implementing
the order, but on June 26 the Supreme Court
allowed the government to go ahead and
enforce it, with an exception for travelers and

However, the justices did grant the
government’s request to put another portion
of Judge Watson’s ruling on hold while the
government goes to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit. Judge Watson
had ruled that, for purposes of the June 26
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order, the freeze on the admission of refugees
would not apply to refugees for whom the
federal government had already entered into
an agreement with an agency to help the
refugees with resettlement after they enter the
United States. The government had argued
that the judge’s ruling went too far, because a
resettlement agency does not actually have a
relationship with the refugees it is assisting
until they arrive in the United States, and that
the ruling effectively rendered the limits
imposed by the March 6 order meaningless.
Now the 9th Circuit will weigh in on whether
such refugees have enough of a connection to
the United States to come here. Notably,
three justices – Clarence Thomas, Samuel
Alito and Neil Gorsuch – indicated that they
would have put all of Judge Watson’s ruling
(rather than simply the part involving
refugees) on hold until the 9th Circuit can
rule on the government’s appeal.
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[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
Duane WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

the government must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the detainee is a
flight risk or a danger to the community to
justify the denial of bond. The government
appeals from that judgment. We affirm in
part and reverse in part.

This is the latest decision in our decade-long
examination of civil, i.e. non-punitive and
merely preventative, detention in the
immigration context. As we noted in our
prior decision in this case, Rodriguez v.
Robbins, thousands of immigrants to the
United States are locked up at any given time,
awaiting the conclusion of administrative and
judicial proceedings that will determine
whether they may remain in this country. In
2014, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) removed 315,943
individuals, many of whom were detained
during the removal process. According to the
most recently available statistics, ICE detains
more than 429,000 individuals over the
course of a year, with roughly 33,000
individuals in detention on any given day.

I. Background
On May 16, 2007, Alejandro Garcia
commenced this case by filing a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in the Central District
of California. Garcia's case was consolidated
with a similar case filed by Alejandro
Rodriguez, and the petitioners moved for
class certification. The motion was denied on
March 21, 2008.
A three-judge panel of our court reversed the
district court's order denying class
certification. We held that the proposed class
satisfied each requirement of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23: The government
conceded that the class was sufficiently
numerous; each class member's claim turned
on the common question of whether
detention for more than six months without a
bond hearing raises serious constitutional
concerns;
Rodriguez's
claims
were
sufficiently typical of the class's because “the
determination of whether [he] is entitled to a
bond hearing will rest largely on
interpretation of the statute authorizing his
detention”; and Rodriguez, through his
counsel, adequately represented the class.
The panel also noted that “any concern that
the differing statutes authorizing detention of
the various class members will render class
adjudication of class members' claims
impractical
or
undermine
effective
representation of the class” could be
addressed through “the formation of
subclasses.”

Alejandro Rodriguez, Abdirizak Aden Farah,
Jose Farias Cornejo, Yussuf Abdikadir, Abel
Perez
Ruelas,
and
Efren
Orozco
(“petitioners”) represent a certified class of
noncitizens who challenge their prolonged
detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b),
1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a) without
individualized
bond
hearings
and
determinations to justify their continued
detention. Their case is now on appeal for the
third time. After a three-judge panel of our
court reversed the district court's denial of
petitioners' motion for class certification, and
after our decision affirming the district
court's entry of a preliminary injunction, the
district court granted summary judgment to
the class and entered a permanent injunction.
Under the permanent injunction, the
government must provide any class member
who is subject to “prolonged detention”—six
months or more—with a bond hearing before
an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). At that hearing,
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statutes”— §§ 1225(b) and 1226(c). Under
the preliminary injunction, the government
was required to “provide each [detainee] with
a bond hearing” before an IJ and to “release
each Subclass member on reasonable
conditions of supervision ... unless the
government shows by clear and convincing
evidence that continued detention is justified
based on his or her danger to the community
or risk of flight.”

The government petitioned our court for
panel rehearing or rehearing en banc. In
response, the panel amended the opinion to
expand its explanation of why the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) does not bar
certification of the class and, with that
amendment, unanimously voted to deny the
government's petition. The full court was
advised of the suggestion for rehearing en
banc, and no judge requested a vote on
whether to rehear the matter. The government
did not file a petition for certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court.

The government appealed, and on April 16,
2013, we affirmed. We applied the Court's
preliminary injunction standard set forth in
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., which requires the petitioner to
“establish that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that
the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
that an injunction is in the public interest.”

On remand, the district court certified a class
defined as:
“…all non-citizens within the Central
District of California who: (1) are or were
detained for longer than six months pursuant
to one of the general immigration detention
statutes pending completion of removal
proceedings, including judicial review, (2)
are not and have not been detained pursuant
to a national security detention statute, and
(3) have not been afforded a hearing to
determine whether their detention is
justified.”

Evaluating petitioners' likelihood of success
on the merits, we began with the premise that
“[f]reedom
from
imprisonment—from
government custody, detention, or other
forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart
of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause
protects.” “Thus, the Supreme Court has held
that the indefinite detention of a onceadmitted alien ‘would raise serious
constitutional concerns.’ ”

The district court also approved the proposed
subclasses, which correspond to the four
statutes under which the class members are
detained—8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a),
1226(c), and 1231(a). The class does not
include suspected terrorists, who are detained
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1537. Additionally,
because the class is defined as non-citizens
who are detained “pending completion of
removal proceedings,” it excludes any
detainee subject to a final order of removal.

Addressing those concerns, we recognized
that we were not writing on a clean slate:
“[I]n a series of decisions since 2001, ‘the
Supreme Court and this court have grappled
in piece-meal fashion with whether the
various immigration detention statutes may
authorize indefinite or prolonged detention of
detainees and, if so, may do so without
providing a bond hearing.’ ” First, in
Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court
resolved statutory and due process challenges
to indefinite detention under 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6), which governs detention beyond

On September 13, 2012, the district court
entered a preliminary injunction that applied
to class members detained pursuant to two of
these four “general immigration detention
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the ninety-day removal period, where
removal was not practicable—for one
petitioner because he was stateless, and for
another because his home country had no
repatriation treaty with the United States.

removable and inadmissible aliens are
entitled to be free from detention that is
arbitrary or capricious.” Justice Kennedy
further noted that although the government
may detain non-citizens “when necessary to
avoid the risk of flight or danger to the
community,” due process requires “adequate
procedures to review their cases, allowing
persons once subject to detention to show that
through rehabilitation, new appreciation of
their responsibilities, or under *1068 other
standards, they no longer present special risks
or danger if put at large.”

Drawing on civil commitment jurisprudence,
the Court reasoned:
A statute permitting indefinite detention of an
alien would raise a serious constitutional
problem. The Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause forbids the Government to
“depriv[e]” any “person ... of ... liberty ...
without due process of law.” Freedom from
imprisonment—from government custody,
detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that
Clause protects. And this Court has said that
government detention violates that Clause
unless the detention is ordered in a criminal
proceeding with adequate procedural
protections, or, in certain special and
“narrow” nonpunitive “circumstances,”
where a special justification, such as harmthreatening mental illness, outweighs the
“individual's
constitutionally protected
interest in avoiding physical restraint.” To
avoid
those
“serious
constitutional
concerns,” the Court held that § 1231(a)(6)
does not authorize indefinite detention
without a bond hearing. Noting that the
“proceedings at issue here are civil, not
criminal,” the Court “construe[d] the statute
to contain an implicit ‘reasonable time’
limitation,” and recognized six months as a
“presumptively reasonable period of
detention.”

Second, in Demore v. Kim, the Court
addressed a due process challenge to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c), which applies to non-citizens
convicted of certain crimes. After discussing
Congress's
reasons
for
establishing
mandatory detention, namely, high rates of
crime and flight by removable non-citizens,
the Court affirmed its “longstanding view
that the Government may constitutionally
detain deportable aliens during the limited
period necessary for their removal
proceedings.” Distinguishing Zadvydas, the
Court in Demore stressed that detention
under § 1226(c) has “a definite termination
point” and typically “lasts for less than the 90
days we considered presumptively valid in
Zadvydas.” Although the Court therefore
upheld mandatory detention under § 1226(c),
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, which
created the majority, reasoned that “a lawful
permanent resident alien such as respondent
could be entitled to an individualized
determination as to his risk of flight and
dangerousness if the continued detention
became unreasonable or unjustified.”

Although in dissent, Justice Kennedy, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, disagreed with
the majority's application of the canon of
constitutional avoidance and argued that the
holding would improperly interfere with
international
repatriation
negotiations,
Justice Kennedy recognized that “both

After Zadvydas and Demore, our court
decided several cases that provided further
guidance for our analysis in Rodriguez II. In
Tijani v. Willis, we held that the
constitutionality of detaining a lawful
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under § 1226(c), we concluded that “the
government may not detain a legal permanent
resident such as Casas for a prolonged period
without providing him a neutral forum in
which to contest the necessity of his
continued detention.”

permanent resident under § 1226(c) for over
32 months was “doubtful.” “To avoid
deciding the constitutional issue, we
interpret[ed] the authority conferred by §
1226(c) as applying to expedited removal of
criminal aliens” and held that “[t]wo years
and eight months of process is not
expeditious.” We therefore remanded Tijani's
habeas petition to the district court with
directions to grant the writ unless the
government provided a bond hearing before
an IJ within sixty days.

Soon after, in Singh v. Holder, we clarified
the procedural requirements for bond
hearings held pursuant to our decision in
Casas (“Casas hearings”). In light of “the
substantial liberty interest at stake,” we held
that
“due
process
requires
a
contemporaneous record of Casas hearings,”
and that the government bears the burden of
proving “by clear and convincing evidence
that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the
community to justify denial of bond.” To
evaluate whether the government has met its
burden, we instructed IJs to consider the
factors set forth in In re Guerra, in particular
“the alien's criminal record, including the
extensiveness of criminal activity, the
recency of such activity, and the seriousness
of the offenses.”

We next considered civil detention in the
immigration context in Casas–Castrillon v.
Department of Homeland Security (Casas ).
There, a lawful permanent resident who had
been detained for nearly seven years under §
1226(c) and then § 1226(a) sought habeas
relief while his petition for review of his
removal order was pending before our court.
Applying Demore, we reasoned that §
1226(c) “authorize [s] mandatory detention
only for the ‘limited period of [the noncitizen's] removal proceedings,’ which the
Court estimated ‘lasts roughly a month and a
half in the vast majority of cases in which it
is invoked, and about five months in the
minority of cases in which the alien chooses
to appeal’ his removal order to the [Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) ].” We
therefore concluded that § 1226(c)'s
mandatory detention provision applies only
during
administrative
removal
proceedings—i.e. until the BIA affirms a
removal order. From that point until the
circuit court has “rejected [the applicant's]
final petition for review or his time to seek
such review expires,” the government has
discretionary authority to detain the noncitizen pursuant to § 1226(a). We noted,
however, that “[t]here is a difference between
detention being authorized and being
necessary as to any particular person.”
Because the Court's holding in Demore
turned on the brevity of mandatory detention

Finally, in Diouf v. Napolitano, we extended
the procedural protections established in
Casas to individuals detained under §
1231(a)(6). We held that “prolonged
detention under § 1231(a)(6), without
adequate procedural protections,” like
prolonged detention under § 1226(a), “would
raise ‘serious constitutional concerns.’ ” To
address those concerns, we held that “an alien
facing prolonged detention under §
1231(a)(6) is entitled to a bond hearing
before an immigration judge and is entitled to
be released from detention unless the
government establishes that the alien poses a
risk of flight or a danger to the community.”
In Diouf II, we also adopted a definition of
“prolonged” detention—detention that “has
lasted six months and is expected to continue
more than minimally beyond six months”—
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found that this argument reflected “a
distinction without a difference”: “
‘Regardless of the stage of the proceedings,
the same important interest is at stake—
freedom from prolonged detention.’ ”

for purposes of administering the Casas bond
hearing requirement. We reasoned that:
“When detention crosses the six-month
threshold and release or removal is not
imminent, the private interests at stake are
profound. Furthermore, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of liberty in the
absence of a hearing before a neutral
decisionmaker is substantial. The burden
imposed on the government by requiring
hearings before an immigration judge at this
stage of the proceedings is therefore a
reasonable one.”

We also noted that our conclusion was
consistent with the decisions of the two other
circuits that have directly addressed this
issue. In Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security, the
Third Circuit, applying the canon of
constitutional avoidance, construed § 1226(c)
to “authorize [ ] detention for a reasonable
amount of time, after which the authorities
must make an individualized inquiry into
whether detention is still necessary to fulfill
the statute's purposes of ensuring that an alien
attends removal proceedings and that his
release will not pose a danger to the
community.” Applying that holding to the
facts of the case, the Third Circuit held that
the petitioner's detention, which had lasted
nearly three years, “was unconstitutionally
unreasonable and, therefore, a violation of
the Due Process Clause.” Although the court
declined to adopt a categorical definition of a
“reasonable amount of time” to detain a noncitizen without a bond hearing, it read
Demore as we do—to connect the
constitutionality of detention to its length and
to authorize detention only for a “limited
time.”

Applying these precedents to Rodriguez class
members detained under § 1226(c), which
requires civil detention of non-citizens
previously convicted of certain crimes who
have already served their state or federal
periods of incarceration, we have concluded
that “the prolonged detention of an alien
without an individualized determination of
his dangerousness or flight risk would be
constitutionally doubtful.” To avoid these
constitutional concerns, we held that “ §
1226(c)'s mandatory language must be
construed ‘to contain an implicit reasonable
time limitation, the application of which is
subject to federal-court review.’ ” “[W]hen
detention becomes prolonged,” i.e., at the
six-month mark, “ § 1226(c) becomes
inapplicable”; the government's authority to
detain the non-citizen shifts to § 1226(a),
which provides for discretionary detention;
and detainees are then entitled to bond
hearings.

Likewise, in Ly v. Hansen, the Sixth Circuit
held that, to avoid a constitutional problem,
removable non-citizens may be detained
under § 1226(c) only “for a reasonable period
of time required to initiate and conclude
removal proceedings promptly.” Finding that
the petitioner's 500–day–long detention was
“unreasonable,” the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court's grant of a writ of habeas
corpus. While maintaining that a “bright-line
time limitation, as imposed in Zadvydas,
would not be appropriate for the pre-removal
period,” the court recognized that Demore's

In so holding, we rejected the government's
attempt to distinguish Casas on the basis that
“Casas concerned an alien who had received
an administratively final removal order,
sought judicial review, and obtained a
remand to the BIA,” whereas this case
involves “aliens awaiting the conclusion of
their initial administrative proceedings.” We
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holding “rel[ies] on the fact that Kim, and
persons like him, will normally have their
proceedings completed within a short period
of time and will actually be deported, or will
be released.”

injunction” because “the deprivation of
constitutional
rights
unquestionably
constitutes
irreparable
injury.”
The
preliminary
injunction
safeguards
constitutional rights by ensuring that
“individuals whom the government cannot
prove constitute a flight risk or a danger to
public safety, and sometimes will not succeed
in removing at all, are not needlessly
detained.” Similarly, we found that the
balance of equities favored the class
members because “needless prolonged
detention” imposes “major hardship,”
whereas the government “cannot suffer harm
from an injunction that merely ends an
unlawful practice or reads a statute as
required to avoid constitutional concerns.”
Finally, we held that the preliminary
injunction was consistent with the public
interest, which is “implicated when a
constitutional right has been violated,” and
“benefits from a preliminary injunction that
ensures that federal statutes are construed and
implemented in a manner that avoids serious
constitutional questions.” We therefore
affirmed the district court's order.

As to the Rodriguez subclass detained under
§ 1225(b), we found “no basis for
distinguishing
between”
non-citizens
detained under that section and under §
1226(c). The cases relied upon by the
government for the proposition that arriving
aliens are entitled to lesser due process
protections—namely, Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei and Barrera–Echavarria
v. Rison—were decided under pre-IIRIRA
law and, as such, were inapposite. We
therefore held that “to the extent detention
under § 1225(b) is mandatory, it is implicitly
time-limited.” As we had with § 1226(c), we
explained that “the government's detention
authority does not completely dissipate at six
months; rather, the mandatory provisions of
§ 1225(b) simply expire at six months, at
which point the government's authority to
detain the non-citizen would shift to §
1226(a), which is discretionary and which we
have already held requires a bond hearing.”

During the pendency of Rodriguez II, the
parties conducted discovery, and class
counsel adduced extensive evidence detailing
the circumstances under which class
members are detained. The parties then filed
cross-motions for summary judgment, and
the petitioners moved for a permanent
injunction to extend and expand the
preliminary injunction.

After establishing that class members
detained under § 1226(c) and § 1225(b) are
entitled to bond hearings after six months of
detention, we clarified that the procedural
requirements set forth in Singh apply to those
hearings. These requirements include
proceedings before “a neutral IJ” at which
“the government bear[s] the burden of proof
by clear and convincing evidence,” a lower
burden of proof than that required to sustain
a criminal charge.

On August 6, 2013, after we issued our
decision in Rodriguez II, the district court
granted summary judgment to the class
members and entered a permanent injunction.
The permanent injunction applies to class
members detained under any of the four civil
“general immigration detention statutes”—
§§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a)—
and requires the government to provide each

Having found that the class was likely to
succeed on the merits, we turned to the other
preliminary injunction factors. We found that
the class members “clearly face irreparable
harm in the absence of the preliminary
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detainee with a bond hearing by his 195th day
of detention. Applying our decisions in
Casas, Singh, and Rodriguez II, the district
court further ordered that bond hearings
occur automatically, that detainees receive
“comprehendible
notice,”
that
the
government bear the burden of proving “by
clear and convincing evidence that a detainee
is a flight risk or a danger to the community
to justify the denial of bond,” and that
hearings are recorded. However, the district
court declined to order IJs to consider the
length of detention or the likelihood of
removal during bond hearings, or to provide
periodic hearings for detainees who are not
released after their first hearing.

or more months receive periodic bond
hearings every six months.

The government now appeals from the entry
of the permanent injunction, arguing that the
district court—and we—erred in applying the
canon of constitutional avoidance to each of
the statutes at issue. Relying on the Supreme
Court's decisions in Zadvydas and Demore,
the government argues that none of the
subclasses are categorically entitled to bond
hearings after six months of detention.
Accordingly, the government contends that
we should decertify the class and instead
permit as-applied challenges to individual
instances of prolonged detention, which
could occur only through habeas
proceedings. Petitioners counter that
Rodriguez II is the law of the case and law of
the circuit, requiring us to affirm the
permanent injunction as to the § 1225(b) and
§ 1226(c) subclasses, and that non-citizens
detained pursuant to § 1226(a) and § 1231(a)
are entitled to bond hearings for reasons
similar to those discussed in Rodriguez II.
Petitioners cross-appeal the district court's
order as to the procedural requirements for
bond hearings; they argue that the district
court erred in declining to require that IJs
consider the likelihood of removal and the
total length of detention, and in declining to
require that non-citizens detained for twelve

Non-citizens who vigorously pursue claims
for relief from removal face substantially
longer detention periods than those who
concede removability. Requesting relief from
an IJ increases the duration of class members'
detention by an average of two months;
appealing a claim to the BIA adds, on
average, another four months; and appealing
a BIA decision to the Ninth Circuit typically
leads to an additional eleven months of
confinement. Class members who persevere
through this lengthy process are often
successful: About 71% of class members
have sought relief from removal, and roughly
one-third of those individuals prevailed.
However, many detainees choose to give up
meritorious claims and voluntarily leave the
country instead of enduring years of
immigration detention awaiting a judicial
finding of their lawful status.

II. Nature of Civil Immigration Detention
Class members spend, on average, 404 days
in immigration detention. Nearly half are
detained for more than one year, one in five
for more than eighteen months, and one in ten
for more than two years. In some cases,
detention has lasted much longer: As of April
28, 2012, when the government generated
data to produce to the petitioners, one class
member had been detained for 1,585 days,
approaching four and a half years of civil
confinement.

Class members frequently have strong ties to
this country: Many immigrated to the United
States as children, obtained legal permanent
resident status, and lived in this country for
as long as twenty years before ICE initiated
removal proceedings. As a result, hundreds
of class members are married to U.S. citizens
or lawful permanent residents, and have
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children who were born in this country.
Further, many class members hold steady
jobs—including as electricians, auto
mechanics, and roofers—to provide for
themselves and their families. At home, they
are caregivers for young children, aging
parents, and sick or disabled relatives. To the
extent class members have any criminal
record—and many have no criminal history
whatsoever—it is often limited to minor
controlled substances offenses. Accordingly,
when class members do receive bond
hearings, they often produce glowing letters
of support from relatives, friends, employers,
and clergy attesting to their character and
contributions to their communities.

young children—also resides in the United
States as citizens or lawful permanent
residents. Before his removal proceedings
began, Rodriguez worked as a dental
assistant. In 2003, however, Rodriguez was
convicted of possession of a controlled
substance and sentenced to five years of
probation and no jail time. He had one
previous conviction, for “joyriding.”
In 2004, ICE commenced removal
proceedings and subjected Rodriguez to civil
detention. An IJ determined that Rodriguez's
prior conviction for “joyriding,” i.e. driving a
stolen vehicle, qualified as an “aggravated
felony” that rendered him ineligible for relief
in the form of cancellation of removal, and
therefore ordered him removed. Rodriguez
appealed the IJ's decision to the BIA, which
affirmed, and then to the Ninth Circuit. In
July 2005, a three-judge panel of our court
granted the government's motion to hold
Rodriguez's case in abeyance until the
Supreme Court decided a related case,
Gonzales v. Penuliar, which issued eighteen
months later, in January 2007. In Penuliar,
the Supreme Court vacated our court's
opinion and remanded for further
consideration in light of Gonzales v. Duenas–
Alvarez, which held that violating a
California statute prohibiting taking a vehicle
without the owner's consent qualifies as a
“theft offense.” Between July 2005 and
January 2007, while Rodriguez's case was in
abeyance, ICE conducted four custody
reviews on Rodriguez and repeatedly
determined that Rodriguez was required to
remain in detention until our court issued a
decision on the merits of his claim. In mid–
2007, about a month after Rodriguez had
moved for class certification, however, ICE
released him. At that point, Rodriguez had
been detained for 1,189 days, roughly three
years and three months. In April 2008, in the
related case on remand from the Supreme
Court, our court held that driving a stolen

Prolonged detention imposes severe hardship
on class members and their families. Civil
immigration detainees are treated much like
criminals serving time: They are typically
housed in shared jail cells with no privacy
and limited access to larger spaces or the
outdoors. Confinement makes it more
difficult to retain or meet with legal counsel,
and the resources in detention facility law
libraries are minimal at best, thereby
compounding the challenges of navigating
the complexities of immigration law and
proceedings. In addition, visitation is
restricted and is often no-contact,
dramatically disrupting family relationships.
While in detention, class members have
missed their children's births and their
parents' funerals. After losing a vital source
of income, class members' spouses have
sought government assistance, and their
children have dropped out of college.
Lead petitioner Alejandro Rodriguez's story
is illustrative. Rodriguez came to the United
States as an infant and has lived here
continuously since then. Rodriguez is a
lawful permanent resident of the United
States, and his entire immediate family—
including his parents, siblings, and three
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vehicle did not qualify as an aggravated
felony. On motion of the parties, we then
remanded Rodriguez's petition to the BIA,
which granted his application for cancellation
of removal, vindicating his right to lawfully
remain in the United States.

for class members detained for more than
twelve months. However, we reject the
class's suggestion that we mandate additional
procedural requirements.

III. Standard of Review

“In our society liberty is the norm, and
detention prior to trial or without trial is the
carefully limited exception.” Civil detention
violates the Due Process Clause except “in
certain special and narrow nonpunitive
circumstances, where a special justification,
such as harm-threatening mental illness,
outweighs the individual's constitutionally
protected interest in avoiding physical
restraint.” Consistent with these principles,
the Supreme Court has—outside of the
immigration context—found civil detention
constitutional without any individualized
showing of need only when faced with the
unique exigencies of global war or domestic
insurrection. And even in those extreme
circumstances, the Court's decisions have
been widely criticized. In all contexts apart
from immigration and military detention, the
Court has found that the Constitution requires
some individualized process and a judicial or
administrative finding that a legitimate
governmental interest justifies detention of
the person in question.

A. Civil Detention

“We review a grant of summary judgment de
novo.” “A permanent injunction ‘involves
factual, legal, and discretionary components,’
so we ‘review a decision to grant such relief
under several different standards.’” “We
review legal conclusions ... de novo, factual
findings for clear error, and the scope of the
injunction for abuse of discretion.”
IV. Discussion
In resolving whether the district court erred
in entering the permanent injunction, we
consider, first, petitioners' entitlement to
bond hearings and, second, the procedural
requirements for such hearings. Based on our
precedents, we hold that the canon of
constitutional avoidance requires us to
construe the statutory scheme to provide all
class members who are in prolonged
detention with bond hearings at which the
government bears the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that the class
member is a danger to the community or a
flight risk. However, we also conclude that
individuals detained under § 1231(a) are not
members of the certified class. We affirm the
district court's order insofar as it requires
automatic bond hearings and requires IJs to
consider alternatives to detention because we
presume, like the district court, that IJs are
already doing so when determining whether
to release a non-citizen on bond.5 Because
the same constitutional concerns arise when
detention approaches another prolonged
period, we hold that IJs must provide bond
hearings periodically at six month intervals

For example, in numerous cases addressing
the civil detention of mentally ill persons, the
Court has consistently recognized that such
commitment “constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty,” and so the state “must
have a constitutionally adequate purpose for
the confinement.” Further, the “nature and
duration of commitment” must “bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which
the individual is committed.”
Accordingly, the state may detain a criminal
defendant found incapable of standing trial,
but only for “the reasonable period of time
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necessary to determine whether there is a
substantial probability that he will attain [the]
capacity [to stand trial] in the foreseeable
future.” At all times, the individual's
“commitment must be justified by progress
toward that goal.” Likewise, the state may
detain a criminal defendant following an
acquittal by reason of insanity in order to
“treat the individual's mental illness and
protect him and society from his potential
dangerousness.” However, the detainee “is
entitled to release when he has recovered his
sanity or is no longer dangerous.” Further,
although the state may detain sexually
dangerous individuals even after they have
completed their criminal sentences, such
confinement must “take[ ] place pursuant to
proper
procedures
and
evidentiary
standards.” To “justify indefinite involuntary
commitment,” the state must prove both
“dangerousness” and “some additional
factor, such as a ‘mental illness' or ‘mental
abnormality.’ ”

sanctions do not serve their purpose of
coercing compliance and therefore violate the
Due Process Clause.
Early cases upholding immigration detention
policies were a product of their time. Yet
even these cases recognized some limits on
detention of non-citizens pending removal.
Such detention may not be punitive—
Congress may not, for example, impose
sentences of “imprisonment at hard labor” on
non-citizens awaiting deportation—and it
must be supported by a legitimate regulatory
purpose. Under these principles, the Court
authorized the “detention or temporary
confinement” of Chinese-born non-citizens
“pending the inquiry into their true character,
and while arrangements were being made for
their deportation.” The Court also upheld
executive detention of enemy aliens after the
cessation of active hostilities because
deportation is “hardly practicable” in the
midst of war, and enemy aliens' “potency for
mischief” continues “even when the guns are
silent.” Similarly, the Court approved
detention of communists to limit their
“opportunities to hurt the United States
during the pendency of deportation
proceedings.” The Court recognized,
however, that “purpose to injure could not be
imputed generally to all aliens subject to
deportation.” Rather, if the Attorney General
wished to exercise his discretion to deny bail,
he was required to do so at a hearing, the
results of which were subject to judicial
review.

Similarly, the Court has held that pretrial
detention of individuals charged with “the
most serious of crimes” is constitutional only
because, under the Bail Reform Act, an
“arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention
hearing” to determine whether his
confinement is necessary to prevent danger to
the community. Further, “the maximum
length of pretrial detention is limited by the
stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial
Act.”
In addition, the Court has held that
incarceration of individuals held in civil
contempt is consistent with due process only
where the contemnor receives adequate
procedural protections and the court makes
specific findings as to the individual's ability
to comply with the court order. If compliance
is impossible—for instance, if the individual
lacks the financial resources to pay courtordered child support—then contempt

More recently, the Supreme Court has drawn
on decades of civil detention jurisprudence to
hold that “[a] statute permitting indefinite
detention of an alien would raise a serious
constitutional problem.” Although the state
has legitimate interests in “ensuring the
appearance of aliens at future immigration
proceedings”
and
“protecting
the
community,” post-removal period detention
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does not uniformly “ ‘bear[ ] [a] reasonable
relation to the purpose for which the
individual [was] committed.’ ” To avoid
constitutional concerns, the Court construed
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), the statute governing
post—removal period detention, to “limit[ ]
an alien's post-removal-period detention to a
period reasonably necessary to bring about
that alien's removal from the United States.”
Detention beyond that point requires “strong
procedural protections” and a finding that the
non-citizen is “specially dangerous.”

“between detention being authorized and
being necessary as to any particular person.”
Bond hearings do not restrict the
government's legitimate authority to detain
inadmissible or deportable non-citizens;
rather, they merely require the government to
“justify denial of bond” with clear and
convincing “evidence that an alien is a flight
risk or danger to the community.” And, in the
end, the government is required only to
establish that it has a legitimate interest
reasonably related to continued detention; the
discretion to release a non-citizen on bond or
other conditions remains soundly in the
judgment of the immigration judges the
Department of Justice employs.

Soon after Zadvydas, the Court rejected a due
process challenge to mandatory detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which applies to
non-citizens convicted of certain crimes.
While affirming its “longstanding view that
the Government may constitutionally detain
deportable aliens during the limited period
necessary for their removal proceedings,” the
Court emphasized that detention under §
1226(c) was constitutionally permissible
because it has “a definite termination point”
and typically “lasts for less than ... 90 days.”

Prior decisions have also clarified that
detention becomes “prolonged” at the sixmonth mark. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court
recognized six months as a “presumptively
reasonable period of detention.” By way of
background, the Court noted that in 1996,
Congress had “shorten[ed] the removal
period from six months to 90 days.” The
Court then explained:

Since Zadvydas and Demore, our court has
“grappled in piece-meal fashion with whether
the various immigration detention statutes
may authorize indefinite or prolonged
detention of detainees and, if so, may do so
without providing a bond hearing.” As we
recognized in Casas, “prolonged detention
without adequate procedural protections
would raise serious constitutional concerns.”
We have therefore held that non-citizens
detained pursuant to § 1226(a) and §
1231(a)(6) are entitled to bond hearings
before an IJ when detention becomes
prolonged.

While an argument can be made for
confining any presumption to 90 days, we
doubt that when Congress shortened the
removal period to 90 days in 1996 it believed
that all reasonably foreseeable removals
could be accomplished in that time. We do
have reason to believe, however, that
Congress
previously
doubted
the
constitutionality of detention for more than
six months. Consequently, for the sake of
uniform administration in the federal courts,
we recognize that period.
Following Zadvydas, we have defined
detention as “prolonged” when “it has lasted
six months and is expected to continue more
than minimally beyond six months.” At that
point, we have explained, “the private
interests at stake are profound,” and “the risk

While the government falsely equates the
bond hearing requirement to mandated
release from detention or facial invalidation
of a general detention statute, our precedents
make clear that there is a distinction
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not lead to automatic release,” because the
government retains discretionary authority to
detain the individual under § 1226(a).
Instead, such a determination allows the IJ to
consider granting bond under the § 1226(a)
standards, namely, whether the detainee
would pose a danger or flight risk if released.

of an erroneous deprivation of liberty in the
absence of a hearing before a neutral
decisionmaker is substantial.”
B. Entitlement to a Bond Hearing
With this well-established precedent of the
Supreme Court and our Court in mind, we
review the district court's grant of summary
judgment and entry of a permanent
injunction. We consider, in turn, whether
individuals detained under §§ 1226(c),
1225(b), 1226(a), and 1231(a) are entitled to
bond hearings after they have been detained
for six months.

As a result of § 1226(c)'s mandatory language
and the limited review available through a
Joseph hearing, individuals are often
detained for years without adequate process.
Members of the § 1226(c) subclass also tend
to be detained for longer periods than other
class members: The longest-detained class
member was confined for 1,585 days and
counting as of April 28, 2012, and the
average subclass member faces detention for
427 days. These lengthy detention times bear
no relationship to the seriousness of class
members' criminal history or the lengths of
their previously served criminal sentences. In
several instances identified by class counsel,
a class member was sentenced to one to three
months in prison for a minor controlled
substances offense, then endured one or two
years in immigration detention. Nor do these
detention durations bear any relation to the
merits of the subclass members' claims: Of
the § 1226(c) subclass members who apply
for relief from removal, roughly 40% are
granted such relief, a rate even higher than
that of the overall class.
In Rodriguez II, we held that “the prolonged
detention of an alien [under § 1226(c) ]
without an individualized determination of
his dangerousness or flight risk would be
constitutionally doubtful.” To avoid these
“constitutional concerns, § 1226(c)'s
mandatory language must be construed ‘to
contain an implicit reasonable time
limitation.’ ” Accordingly, at the six-month
mark, “when detention becomes prolonged, §
1226(c) becomes inapplicable,” and “the
Attorney General's detention authority rests

1. The § 1226(c) Subclass
Section 1226(c) requires that the Attorney
General detain any non-citizen who is
inadmissible or deportable because of his
criminal history upon that person's release
from imprisonment, pending proceedings to
remove him from the United States.
Detention under § 1226(c) is mandatory.
Individuals detained under that section are
not eligible for release on bond or parole;
they may be released only if the Attorney
General deems it “necessary” for witness
protection purposes, id. § 1226(c)(2).
An individual detained under § 1226(c) may
ask an IJ to reconsider whether the mandatory
detention provision applies to him, but such
review is limited in scope and addresses only
whether the individual is properly included in
a category of non-citizens subject to
mandatory detention based on his criminal
history. At a “Joseph hearing,” a detainee
“may avoid mandatory detention by
demonstrating that he is not an alien, was not
convicted of the predicate crime, or that the
[DHS] is otherwise substantially unlikely to
establish that he is in fact subject to
mandatory detention.” “A determination in
favor of an alien” at a Joseph hearing “does
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with § 1226(a).” Under Casas, those
detainees are then entitled to a bond hearing.

general rule for ‘conclusions on pure issues
of law.’ ”

Contrary to the government's argument, this
holding is consistent with the text of §
1226(c), which requires that the government
detain certain non-citizens but does not
mandate such detention for any particular
length of time. Our holding is also consistent
with the Supreme Court's decision in
Demore, which turned on the brevity of the
detention at issue.

The question resolved in Rodriguez II—
whether non-citizens subject to prolonged
detention under § 1226(c) are entitled to bond
hearings—is a pure question of law. We
interpreted the statute by applying the canon
of constitutional avoidance, and were bound
to do so by our prior precedent. The decision
was not made “hastily”; it provided a “fully
considered appellate ruling” on the legal
issues.

Since Rodriguez II, no intervening changes in
the law have affected our conclusions.
Neither the Supreme Court nor our Circuit
has had occasion to reexamine these issues,
and the Third and Sixth Circuits have not
changed the positions they adopted in Diop
and Ly, respectively.

2. The § 1225(b) Subclass
Section 1225(b) applies to “applicants for
admission” who are stopped at the border or
a port of entry, or who are “present in the
United States” but “ha[ve] not been
admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). The statute
provides that asylum seekers “shall be
detained pending a final determination of
credible fear of persecution and, if found not
to have such a fear, until removed.” As to all
other applicants for admission, the statute
provides that “if the examining immigration
officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be
detained” for removal proceedings.

Moreover, district courts have relied on
Rodriguez II in resolving numerous habeas
petitions filed by immigration detainees.
Thus, Rodriguez II is law of the case and law
of the circuit. As we recently explained, the
“law of the case doctrine” provides that “a
court will generally refuse to reconsider an
issue that has already been decided by the
same court or a higher court in the same
case.” Likewise, pursuant to the “ ‘law of the
circuit’ rule,” “a published decision of this
court constitutes binding authority which
‘must be followed unless and until overruled
by a body competent to do so.’ ”

Under DHS regulations, non-citizens
detained pursuant to § 1225(b) are generally
not eligible for release on bond. If there are
“urgent humanitarian reasons or significant
public benefit[s]” at stake, however, the
Attorney General has discretion to
temporarily parole such an individual into the
United States, provided that the individual
presents neither a danger nor a risk of flight.
Because parole decisions under § 1182 are
purely discretionary, they cannot be appealed
to IJs or courts. This lack of review has
proven especially problematic when
immigration officers have denied parole

The “ ‘general rule’ is that our decisions ‘at
the preliminary injunction phase do not
constitute the law of the case.’ ” Because
preliminary injunction decisions are often
“made hastily and on less than a full record,”
they “may provide little guidance as to the
appropriate disposition on the merits.”
However, “there is an exception to the
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based on blatant errors: In two separate cases
identified by the petitioners, for example,
officers apparently denied parole because
they had confused Ethiopia with Somalia.
And in a third case, an officer denied parole
because he had mixed up two detainees' files.
As with § 1226(c), the government often cites
§ 1225(b)'s mandatory language to justify
indefinite civil detention without an
individualized determination as to whether
the detainee would pose a danger or flight
risk if released. Section 1225(b) subclass
members have been detained for as long as
831 days, and for an average of 346 days
each. These individuals apply for and receive
relief from removal at very high rates: 94%
apply, and of those who apply, 64% are
granted relief. In illustrative cases identified
by the petitioners, non-citizens fled to the
United States after surviving kidnapping,
torture, and murder of their family members
in their home countries. Upon arrival, these
individuals were detained under § 1225(b),
and they remained in detention until the
government
granted
their
asylum
applications hundreds of days later.

be detained at the border and hence as never
having effected entry into this country.” Such
non-citizens therefore “enjoy very limited
protections under the United States
constitution.” However, even if the majority
of prolonged detentions under § 1225(b) are
constitutionally permissible, “the Supreme
Court has instructed that, where one possible
application of a statute raises constitutional
concerns, the statute as a whole should be
construed through the prism of constitutional
avoidance.” Section 1225(b) applies to
several categories of lawful permanent
residents who are not subject to the entry
fiction doctrine but may be treated as seeking
admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C).
Because those persons are entitled to due
process protections under the Fifth
Amendment, prolonged detention without
bond hearings would raise serious
constitutional concerns. We therefore
construed the statutory scheme to require a
bond hearing after six months of detention
under § 1225(b).
The government now argues that “[d]espite
years of discovery, petitioners have not
identified any member of the Section 1225(b)
subclass who is a [lawful permanent
resident].” Petitioners represent that they
have found lawful permanent residents who
have been detained for more than six months
under § 1225(b), although their submissions
do not identify any specific individuals who
fit that description. The question, however, is
whether “one possible application of [the]
statute raises constitutional concerns.”
Because the government concedes that
detention of lawful permanent residents
under § 1225(b) is possible under §
1101(a)(13)(C), “the statute as a whole
should be construed through the prism of
constitutional avoidance.”

In Rodriguez II, we extended Casas and held
that to avoid serious constitutional concerns,
mandatory detention under § 1225(b), like
mandatory detention under § 1226(c), must
be construed as implicitly time-limited.
Accordingly, “the mandatory provisions of §
1225(b) simply expire at six months, at which
point the government's authority to detain the
alien shifts to § 1226(a), which is
discretionary and which we have already held
requires a bond hearing.”
In so holding, we recognized that many
members of the § 1225(b) subclass are
subject to the “entry fiction” doctrine, under
which non-citizens seeking admission to the
United States “may physically be allowed
within its borders pending a determination of
admissibility,” but “are legally considered to

The government also argues that lawful
permanent residents treated as seeking
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admission are entitled to lesser due process
protections than other lawful permanent
residents. But the government has not
provided any authority to support that
proposition: The cases cited in the
government's brief address statutory and
regulatory distinctions between lawful
permanent residents treated as applicants for
admission and other lawful permanent
residents; they do not reflect any
constitutional distinction between those
groups.

Accordingly, we adhere to Rodriguez II's
holding regarding the § 1225(b) subclass as
law of the case and law of the circuit. The
government's
attempts
to
re-litigate
Rodriguez II are unavailing.
3. The § 1226(a) Subclass
Section 1226(a) authorizes detention
“pending a decision on whether the alien is to
be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a). The statute expressly authorizes
release on “bond of at least $1,500” or
“conditional parole.” Following an initial
custody determination by DHS, a non-citizen
may apply for a review or redetermination by
an IJ, and that decision may be appealed to
the BIA. At these hearings, the detainee bears
the burden of establishing “that he or she does
not present a danger to persons or property, is
not a threat to the national security, and does
not pose a risk of flight.” “After an initial
bond redetermination,” a request for another
review “shall be considered only upon a
showing that the alien's circumstances have
changed materially since the prior bond
redetermination.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). The
government has taken the position that
additional time spent in detention is not a
“changed circumstance” that entitles a
detainee to a new bond hearing.

Finally, the government argues that, instead
of requiring bond hearings, we could avoid
constitutional concerns by interpreting §
1225(b) not to apply to lawful permanent
residents. This argument relies on an
implausible construction of the statutes at
issue. Section 1225(b) applies to “applicants
for admission,” and § 1101 defines six
categories of lawful permanent residents as
“seeking an admission into the United States
for purposes of the immigration laws.”
The Supreme Court's decision in Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding is not to the contrary. Chew
involved a pre-IIRIRA immigration
regulation that applied to “excludable” noncitizens. Because the regulations were silent
as to whether that category included lawful
permanent residents returning from voyages
abroad, the Court distinguished between the
“exclusion” of newly arriving non-citizens
and the “expulsion” of lawful permanent
residents, thereby holding that the regulation
did not authorize the Attorney General to
detain arriving lawful permanent residents
without hearings. Section 1101(a)(13)(C)
forecloses an analogous construction of §
1225(b) because it provides that “applicants
for admission” includes several groups of
lawful permanent residents. In any event, the
government's alternative construction of §
1225(b) was never raised before the district
court; the argument is therefore forfeited.

Although § 1226(a) provides for
discretionary, rather than mandatory,
detention and establishes a mechanism for
detainees to seek release on bond, noncitizens often face prolonged detention under
that section. In an extreme case identified by
the petitioners, a non-citizen with no criminal
record entered the United States on a tourist
visa and affirmatively applied for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture shortly after that
visa expired. ICE detained him throughout
the ensuing proceedings before the IJ, the
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BIA, and the Ninth Circuit. At the time
petitioners generated their report, he had been
detained for 1,234 days with no definite end
in sight.

Section 1231(a) governs detention of noncitizens who have been “ordered removed.” 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a). The statute provides for
mandatory detention during a ninety-day
removal period. Id. § 1231(a)(2). Under the
statute:

The district court's decision regarding the §
1226(a) subclass was squarely controlled by
our precedents. In Casas, we held that a noncitizen subjected to prolonged detention
under § 1226(a) is entitled to a hearing to
establish whether continued detention is
necessary because he would pose a danger to
the community or a flight risk upon release.
Since deciding Casas, we have repeatedly
affirmed its holding.

The removal period begins on the latest of the
following:

The government does not contest that Casas
is the binding law of this circuit or that
individuals detained under § 1226(a) are
entitled to bond hearings. Instead, the
government argues that § 1226(a) affords
detainees the right to request bond hearings,
so there is no basis for requiring the
government to automatically provide bond
hearings after six months of detention. This
argument is foreclosed by Casas, which held
that “ § 1226(c) must be construed as
requiring the Attorney General to provide the
alien with [a bond] hearing.” The record
evinces the importance of Casas's holding on
this point: Detainees, who typically have no
choice but to proceed pro se, have limited
access to legal resources, often lack Englishlanguage proficiency, and are sometimes
illiterate. As a result, many class members are
not aware of their right to a bond hearing and
are poorly equipped to request one.
Accordingly, we conclude that class
members are entitled to automatic bond
hearings after six months of detention. We
address the other procedural requirements for
these hearings in Section IV.B, infra.

(i)

The date the order of removal
becomes administratively final.

(ii)

If the removal order is judicially
reviewed and if a court orders a
stay of the removal of the alien,
the date of the court's final order.

(iii)

If the alien is detained or confined
(except under an immigration
process), the date the alien is
released from detention or
confinement.

The removal period may be extended beyond
ninety days if a detainee “fails or refuses” to
cooperate in his removal from the United
States.
“If the alien does not leave or is not removed
within the removal period,” he “shall be
subject to supervision,” but detention is no
longer mandatory. Rather, the Attorney
General has discretion to detain certain
classes of non-citizens and to impose
conditions of release on others. Before
releasing a detainee, the government must
conclude that removal is “not practicable or
not in the public interest,” that the detainee is
“non-violent” and “not likely to pose a threat
to the community following release,” and that
the detainee “does not pose a significant
flight risk” and is “not likely to violate the
conditions of release.”

4. The § 1231(a) Subclass

275

Here, the class is defined, in relevant part, as
non-citizens who are detained “pending
completion of removal proceedings,
including judicial review.” The class
therefore by definition excludes any detainee
subject to a final order of removal.

1. Burden and Standard of Proof
The government argues that the district court
erred in requiring the government to justify a
non-citizen's detention by clear and
convincing evidence, an intermediate burden
of proof that is more than a preponderance of
the evidence but less than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. As we noted in Rodriguez
II, however, we are bound by our precedent
in Singh, which held that “the government
must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the
community to justify denial of bond at a
Casas hearing.”

Petitioners describe the § 1231(a) subclass as
individuals detained under that section who
have received a stay of removal from the BIA
or a court. However, if a non-citizen has
received a stay of removal from the BIA
pending further administrative review, then
the order of removal is not yet
“administratively final.” The non-citizen has
not been “ordered removed,” and the removal
period has not begun, so § 1231(a) is
inapplicable. Similarly, as long as a noncitizen's removal order is stayed by a court
pending judicial review, that non-citizen is
not subject to “the court's final order.” In such
circumstances, § 1231(a) is, again,
inapplicable.

In Singh, we explained that the “Supreme
Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle
that ‘due process places a heightened burden
of proof on the State in civil proceedings in
which the individual interests at stake ... are
both particularly important and more
substantial than mere loss of money.’ ” In the
civil commitment context, for example, the
Supreme Court has recognized “the state's
interest in committing the emotionally
disturbed,” but has held that “the individual's
interest in not being involuntarily confined
indefinitely ... is of such weight and gravity
that due process requires the state to justify
confinement by proof more substantial than a
mere preponderance of the evidence.”
Drawing on this jurisprudence, Singh
concluded that “a clear and convincing
evidence standard of proof provides the
appropriate level of procedural protection” in
light of “the substantial liberty interest at
stake.”

Simply put, the § 1231(a) subclass does not
exist. The district court's grant of summary
judgment and permanent injunction are
therefore reversed to the extent they pertain
to individuals detained under § 1231(a).
C. Procedural Requirements
In addition to challenging the class members'
entitlement to automatic bond hearings after
six months of detention, the government
objects to the district court's order regarding
the burden and standard of proof at such
hearings. The government also appeals the
district court's ruling that IJs must consider
alternatives to detention. Petitioners crossappeal the district court's rulings that IJs are
not required to consider the ultimate
likelihood of removal, assess the total length
of detention, or conduct periodic hearings at
six-month intervals. We address each issue in
turn.

The government now contends that Singh
was wrongly decided. However, it is well
established that only a full court, sitting en
banc, may overrule a three-judge panel
decision. Right or wrong, we are bound to
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may be released” and to “ameliorat[e] the
conditions” of release imposed by DHS.
Accordingly, if DHS detains a non-citizen, an
IJ is already empowered to “ameliorat[e] the
conditions” by imposing a less restrictive
means of supervision than detention.

follow Singh unless intervening Supreme
Court authority is to the contrary.
2. Restrictions Short of Detention
The government also argues that the district
court erred in “determin [ing] that IJs are
required to consider the use of alternatives to
detention in making bond determinations.”
As the district court's order states, however,
IJs “should already be considering
restrictions short of incarceration.” Indeed,
Rodriguez II affirmed a preliminary
injunction that directed IJs to “release each
Subclass member on reasonable conditions of
supervision, including electronic monitoring
if necessary, unless the government” satisfied
its burden of justifying continued detention.

Finally, the government argues that IJs lack
the resources to engage in continuous
monitoring of released individuals. However,
the government fails to cite any law or
evidence indicating that IJs, rather than DHS
or ICE agents, would be responsible for
implementing the conditions of release.
Moreover, the record indicates that Congress
authorized and funded an ICE alternatives-todetention program in 2002, and DHS has
operated such a program, called the Intensive
Supervision and Appearance Program, since
2004. It is abundantly clear that IJs can and
do17 consider conditions of release on bond
when determining whether the government's
interests can be served by detention only, and
we conclude that DHS will administer any
such conditions, regardless of whether they
are imposed by DHS in the first instance or
by an IJ upon later review.

The government's objections to this
requirement are unpersuasive. First, the
government relies on Demore for the
proposition that the government is not
required “to employ the least burdensome
means” of securing immigration detainees.
But Demore applies only to “brief period[s]”
of immigration detention. “When the period
of detention becomes prolonged, ‘the private
interest that will be affected by the official
action’ is more substantial; greater
procedural
safeguards
are
therefore
required.” Further, the injunction does not
require that IJs apply the least restrictive
means of supervision; it merely directs them
to “consider” restrictions short of detention.
The IJ ultimately must decide whether any
restrictions short of detention would further
the government's interest in continued
detention.

3. Length of Detention
Likelihood of Removal

and

In their cross-appeal, petitioners argue that
the district court erred in failing to require IJs
to consider the length of a non-citizen's past
and likely future detention and, relatedly, the
likelihood of eventual removal from the
United States. In our prior decisions, we have
not directly addressed whether due process
requires consideration of the length of future
detention at bond hearings. We have noted,
however, that “the due process analysis
changes as ‘the period of ... confinement
grows,’ ” and that longer detention requires
more robust procedural protections.
Accordingly, a non-citizen detained for one
or more years is entitled to greater solicitude

Second, the government argues that IJs are
not empowered to impose conditions of
release. However, federal regulations
authorize IJs to “detain the alien in custody,
release the alien, and determine the amount
of bond, if any, under which the respondent
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than a non-citizen detained for six months.
Moreover, Supreme Court precedent
provides that “detention incidental to
removal must bear a reasonable relation to its
purpose.” At some point, the length of
detention could “become[ ] so egregious that
it can no longer be said to be ‘reasonably
related’ to an alien's removal.” An IJ
therefore must consider the length of time for
which a non-citizen has already been
detained.

The district court here did not address this
proposed requirement. For the same reasons
the IJ must consider the length of past
detention, we hold that the government must
provide periodic bond hearings every six
months so that noncitizens may challenge
their continued detention as “the period of ...
confinement grows.”
V. Conclusion
This decision flows from the Supreme
Court's and our own precedent bearing on the
constitutional
implications
of
our
government's prolonged civil detention of
individuals, many of whom have the legal
right to live and work in our country. By
upholding the district court's order that
Immigration Judges must hold bond hearings
for certain detained individuals, we are not
ordering Immigration Judges to release any
single individual; rather we are affirming a
minimal procedural safeguard—a hearing at
which the government bears only an
intermediate
burden
of
proof
in
demonstrating danger to the community or
risk of flight—to ensure that after a lengthy
period of detention, the government
continues to have a legitimate interest in the
further deprivation of an individual's liberty.
Immigration Judges, a specialized and
experienced group within the Department of
Justice, are already entrusted to make these
determinations, and need not release any
individual they find presents a danger to the
community or a flight risk after hearing and
weighing the evidence. Accordingly, we
affirm all aspects of the district court's
permanent injunction, with three exceptions:
We reverse as to the § 1231(a) subclass, and
we hold that IJs must consider the length of
detention and provide bond hearings every
six months. We hereby remand to the district
court to enter a revised injunction consistent
with our instructions.

As to the likely duration of future detention
and the likelihood of eventual removal,
however, those factors are too speculative
and too dependent upon the merits of the
detainee's claims for us to require IJs to
consider during a bond hearing. We therefore
affirm the district court's ruling that
consideration of those factors “would require
legal and political analyses beyond what
would otherwise be considered at a bond
hearing” and is therefore not appropriate. We
note that Zadvydas and its progeny require
consideration of the likelihood of removal in
particular circumstances,18 but we decline to
require such analysis as a threshold inquiry in
all bond hearings.
4. Periodic Hearings
The record shows that many class members
are detained well beyond the six-month
mark: Almost half remain in detention at the
twelve-month mark, one in five at eighteen
months, and one in ten at twenty-four
months. Petitioners argue that due process
requires additional bond hearings at sixmonth intervals for class members who are
detained for more than six months after their
initial bond hearings. We have not had
occasion to address this issue in our previous
decisions, and it has been a source of some
contention in the district courts.
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AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN
PART; REMANDED.
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“No decision in two immigration-enforcement cases”
SCOTUSblog
Kevin Johnson
June 26, 2017

President Donald Trump has made
immigration enforcement a top priority. Two
immigration-enforcement cases looked likely
to have a big impact on the Trump
administration’s plans. Both were argued
before the confirmation of Justice Neil
Gorsuch. Today, the Supreme Court,
apparently deadlocked, ordered reargument
of the cases.

In a class-action challenge to immigrant
detention, Jennings v. Rodriguez raised the
question whether immigrants, like virtually
any U.S. citizen placed in criminal or civil
detention, must be guaranteed a bond
hearing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
9th Circuit affirmed a district court injunction
requiring bond hearings every six months for
immigrant detainees.

One of the cases, Jennings v. Rodriguez,
involved immigration detention. Detained
immigrants ordinarily have been eligible to
post bond and be allowed release from
custody. In a January 25, 2017, executive
order, among numerous immigrationenforcement initiatives, Trump announced an
end to the “catch and release” of immigrants
facing removal from the United States.
Detention without bond thus became official
immigration-enforcement policy.

Indefinite detention without a hearing and
possible release is difficult to justify as a
matter of constitutional law. At the same
time, however, some justices at oral
argument expressed concern that the 9th
Circuit had acted more like a legislature than
a court in mandating a bond hearing every six
months. In the end, the court apparently
needed a tiebreaking vote and will address
immigration detention next term.
Another case that the court did not decide
involved criminal removal. In the last few
years, the Supreme Court has decided a
steady number of criminal-removal cases. In
light of the Trump administration’s stated
emphasis on the removal of “criminal aliens,”
we will likely see more criminal removal
cases in the future. Most of the removal cases
that have recently come before the court,
including Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions
decided earlier this term, have raised ordinary

Generally speaking, criminal and civil
detention of U.S. citizens is subject to basic
constitutional safeguards. Such a rightsbased system, however, fits uncomfortably
into the much more limited constitutional
protections
historically
offered
to
noncitizens. Reflecting this tension, the
Supreme Court’s immigration-detention
decisions are not altogether consistent.
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issues of statutory interpretation
administrative deference.

Supreme Court’s 2015 opinion in Johnson v.
United States, in which court found the
Armed Career Criminal Act’s similarly
worded definition of “violent felony” was so
vague as to violate due process.

and

Sessions v. Dimaya instead was a
constitutional challenge to a criminalremoval provision in the immigration laws,
which historically have been largely immune
from judicial review. The court appears to be
moving
toward
applying
ordinary
constitutional norms to the immigration laws.
Earlier this term, for example, the court in
Sessions v. Santana-Morales held that gender
distinctions favoring women over men in the
derivative-citizenship provisions of the
immigration laws violated the Constitution’s
equal protection guarantee.

The application of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine to the immigration laws apparently
divided the court. At oral argument, the
justices seemed to agree that the court should
review immigration-removal provisions
under the standard due process test for
vagueness. However, they appeared to be
divided as to whether the case at hand was
distinguishable from Johnson and thus
whether Section 16(b) is unconstitutionally
vague.

A noncitizen, including a lawful permanent
resident, who is convicted of an “aggravated
felony” is subject to mandatory removal. The
Immigration and Nationality Act defines
“aggravated felonies” expansively. That
definition incorporates 18 U.S.C. §16(b),
known as the “residual clause,” which
defines a “crime of violence” to encompass
“any … offense that is a felony and that, by
its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the person or property
of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.”

For the last decade, immigration cases have
been a bread-and-butter part of the Supreme
Court’s docket. The Supreme Court has
slowly but surely moved immigration law
toward the constitutional mainstream. We
will have to wait until the next term to see if
the court continues that trend with respect to
immigrant detention and criminal removal.

James Garcia Dimaya, who immigrated
lawfully from the Philippines in 1992, has
two residential burglary convictions; neither
involved violence. Based on the convictions,
the immigration court and the Board of
Immigration Appeals ordered Dimaya
removed from the United States. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit found
that Section 16(b) was unconstitutionally
vague and vacated the order. To reach that
conclusion, the 9th Circuit relied on the
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“Supreme Court to Review No-Bail Policy for Immigrants Awaiting
Hearings”
The Wall Street Journal
Jess Bravin
June 20, 2016

The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to
hear a Justice Department appeal of a 2015
lower-court decision requiring bail hearings
for immigrants who have been in detention
for at least six months awaiting deportation
proceedings.

The majority opinion in that case stressed the
“very limited” length of no-bail detentions at
issue, relying on figures showing the average
detention in 2001 was 47 days, while the 15%
of immigrants who appeal a deportation order
were in detention for about 4½ months. The
figures were provided by the Executive
Office for Immigration Review, which
conducts the hearings.

However, the American Civil Liberties
Union—which won a lower-court ruling
requiring bail hearings after six months—
said recently disclosed hearing records show
a 2003 high-court precedent the Justice
Department cited to bolster its case was
partly based on government-supplied
information that understated the length of
immigration detentions.

The ACLU, which worked on the 2003 case,
said the actual average detention time in 2001
was 2½ half weeks longer. “The real number
is 65 days,” said Michael Tan, an ACLU
attorney. The group learned of issues with
statistics in the earlier case through a
Freedom of Information Act request filed
during the current litigation.

It isn’t clear whether a difference in the time
frame would have affected the outcome of the
2003 case. But critics of the government’s
immigration policies say that prehearing
detention with no chance for bail becomes
less reasonable the longer it lasts.

Mr. Tan said the government reached the
lower number by factoring in categories of
aliens that an immigration judge was required
to deport—cases that are resolved quickly
because there are no issues for the hearing to
resolve. Mr. Tan also said the government
counted as completed cases that weren’t over
but only transferred—with the immigrant still
in detention—to another immigration court.

The 2003 case, Demore v. Kim, upheld by a
5-4 vote the government’s practice of holding
without bail immigrants—even those who are
permanent U.S. residents with “green
cards”—who became eligible for deportation
because they committed a crime.

Justice Department spokesman Patrick
Rodenbush said officials were re-examining
the numbers provided in the Kim case, but
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after an initial review, “we feel our
information to the court was appropriate.”

In 2012, the department told the court it had
incorrectly stated in 2009 that it “facilitated”
the return to the U.S. of deported aliens who
later win their immigration appeals. The
government then altered its practice to
conform to what it told the court it already
had been doing, government and immigration
lawyers say.

A 2012 Justice Department inspector general
report criticized the Executive Office for
Immigration Review for reporting its
performance in ways that are “incomplete
and overstate the actual accomplishments” of
its courts.

Last year, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals in San Francisco held the
Constitution’s
due-process
guarantee
requires a bail hearing where detained
immigrants can argue they will show up later
for their date in immigration court and pose
no risk to public safety. The Obama
administration appealed that decision to the
Supreme Court.

Theodore Olson, who as solicitor general
argued the government’s position in 2003,
said he had little recollection of the case and
didn’t remember any internal dispute over the
length of detentions.“Statistics like that
would presumably have come from the
agency or agencies responsible,” Mr. Olson
said. It would be “highly unlikely” for
lawyers in his office to delve “into such
statistics at a granular level.”

In deciding the class-action suit, the Ninth
Circuit relied on both the Kim precedent and
an earlier case holding that immigrants
detained indefinitely are entitled to a bail
hearing after six months. The appeals court
observed that affected immigrants “spend, on
average, 404 days in immigration detention,”
which is considered an administrative matter
rather than a form of punishment.

David Strauss, a law professor at the
University of Chicago, said the possibility of
error in a solicitor general brief was troubling
because unlike other litigants, the office often
introduces new information at the Supreme
Court level.
“What the (solicitor general) says in its brief
is not subject to the usual testing the legal
system provides for its claims,” Mr. Strauss
said. “The court is really counting on them to
get it right because there’s no other check.”
The court will hear the case on bail hearings
in its next term, which begins in October.
The Kim case marks the second time in recent
years that a records disclosure suggested the
Justice Department provided incorrect
information to the Supreme Court regarding
immigration practices.
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“High Court To Decide If Immigrants Entitled To Bond Hearings”
Law360
Allissa Wickham
June 20, 2016

The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday decided
to hear a case over whether certain
immigrants are entitled to automatic bond
hearings following six months of detention,
adding another layer to the national debate
over immigrant detention.

challenging their detention, had asked the
justices not to hear the appeal.
“The government’s contention that certiorari
is warranted to preserve its ability to control
the borders and reduce the risk of terrorism is
hyperbolic and unsupported by anything in
the decision below or the voluminous record
compiled in the district court,” Rodriguez had
argued.

The high court granted certiorari to Jennings
v. Rodriguez, in which the Ninth Circuit
ruled, among other things, that immigrants
are entitled to bond hearings after six months
if they were detained under a provision
allowing the government to hold immigrants
during their deportation proceedings. As is
customary, the justices did not explain their
reasoning for taking up the case.

If the high court were to affirm the Ninth
Circuit, the impact of such a ruling could be
significant, according to Denise Gilman, the
director of the immigration clinic at the
University of Texas School of Law. Such a
decision would mean "whole swaths of the
country" would be in a situation where people
held under mandatory detention provisions
would have a right to detention review, she
previously told Law360.

In its March 25 petition, the U.S. Department
of Justice had strongly urged the justices to
review the October ruling from the Ninth
Circuit. The agency claimed the appeals
court’s “wholesale revision” of the law on the
detention of immigrants during deportation
proceedings “oversteps the proper judicial
role.”

However, if the justices upheld the Ninth
Circuit,
the
already
overburdened
immigration courts across the country could
find themselves overwhelmed with having to
set new hearings, according to Holly Cooper,
the associate director of the immigration law
clinic at University of California Davis
School of Law, who submitted an amicus
brief in the Rodriguez appeal.

The government also argued that the court’s
decision gets in the way of the Department of
Homeland Security’s ability to control U.S.
borders.
But Alejandro Rodriguez, a green card holder
representing a class of noncitizens

"It would be enormous if every circuit
adopted this ruling," Cooper said, noting that
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"immigration courts would probably almost
buckle with the overwhelming need to set
new hearings."
The issue of immigrant detention has also
popped up in other courts, such as the Second
Circuit. The appeals court held in October
that the government cannot indefinitely
detain immigrants awaiting deportation
proceedings following criminal offenses,
saying they must be given a bail hearing
within six months of being taken into
custody.
And in another case, the federal government
is asking the Ninth Circuit to overturn a
ruling that found the Obama administration’s
detention of immigrant families violated a
1997 agreement that set national standards
for dealing with undocumented children.
The federal petitioners are represented by
Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr.
The respondents have been represented in the
case by Ahilan Thevanesan Arulanantham of
the ACLU Foundation of Southern
California, Sean Ashley Commons of Sidley
Austin LLP and others.
The case is David Jennings v. Alejandro
Rodriguez, case number 15-1204, in the U.S.
Supreme Court.
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“Courts Say Detained Non-Citizens Have The Right To Bond Hearings”
NPR
Richard Gonzales
October 29, 2015

At the same time that immigration is a hotbutton issue on the presidential campaign
trail, in the courts, immigration advocates are
chipping away at the government's authority
to detain non-citizens indefinitely.

"Every circuit [appeals] court has ruled that it
is unlawful to hold a detainee without that
person having the possibility of a hearing,"
said Ahilan Arulanantham, deputy legal
director of the ACLU of Southern California.

Two rulings issued this week from the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New
York and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in California say that detainees have the right
to a bond hearing while they are fighting their
deportation cases.

The Ninth Circuit, in Rodriguez v. Robbins,
ruled that the government has to justify "by
clear and convincing evidence that an alien is
a flight risk or a danger to the community to
justify denial of bond." It also ruled the
government has to consider alternatives to
detention such as electronic monitoring
devices. Finally, it said detainees should get
a bond hearing every six months.

The practical impact? Thousands of
immigrants, legal or not, who were held for
indefinite periods now have the right to a
release hearing where it will be up to an
immigration judge to decide whether they are
dangerous or present a flight risk. The courts'
rulings apply in the states covered by those
circuits.

"This decision substantially decreases the
likelihood people will get lost in the system
for years on end because there will be some
examination of why the person is still locked
away. It provides them with an elemental
component of due
process," said
Arulanantham.

Ever since 1996, when Congress passed the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act, the government has
detained broad categories of non-citizens for
prolonged periods and denied them the right
to challenge their detention.

In a more limited ruling, the Second Circuit
in New York, in a case called Lora v.
Shanahan adopted what it called "a brightline rule" that detainees must get a hearing
within six months of his or her detention.

The constitutionality of that section of the
law was first challenged in 2003. Since then,
there's been a flurry of court rulings.

Two other appellate courts, the Third and the
Sixth Circuits, have ruled that a detainee
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must file a habeas petition or a lawsuit before
getting a hearing.
With respect to the Ninth Circuit ruling, a
spokesman for U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement said his agency " is
aware of the judges' order and reviewing it."
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Sessions v. Dimaya
15-1498
Ruling Below: Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015)
Petitioner James Dimaya seeks review of the Board of Immigration’s decision that his
convictions for first-degree burglary qualify as crimes of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(a)(43)(F). Based on the 2015 Johnson v. United States ruling, he claims that the definition of
“violent crime” under which he was convicted is vague, and therefore unconstitutional.
The Court of Appeals affirms the right of a noncitizen to bring a challenge of vagueness to the
definition of a crime of violence. The Court ruled that the language under which Dimaya was
convicted is unconstitutionally vague.
Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and
Nationality Act's provisions governing an alien's removal from the United States, is
unconstitutionally vague.

Loretta Lynch, Attorney General,
v.
James Dimaya.
United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit
Decided on October 19, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
(“ACCA”) so-called “residual clause”
definition of a “violent felony” is
unconstitutionally vague. In this case, we
consider whether language similar to
ACCA’s residual clause that is incorporated
into § 1101(a)(43)(F)’s definition of a crime
of violence is also void for vagueness. We
hold that it suffers from the same
indeterminacy as ACCA’s residual clause
and, accordingly, grant the petition for
review.

OPINION
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner James Garcia Dimaya seeks review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA)
determination that a conviction for burglary
under California Penal Code Section 459 is
categorically a “crime of violence” as defined
by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), a
determination which rendered petitioner
removable for having been convicted of an
aggravated felony. During the pendency of
petitioner’s appeal, the United States
Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which held
that the Armed Career Criminal Act’s

I
Petitioner, a native and citizen of the
Philippines, was admitted to the United
States in 1992 as a lawful permanent resident.
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In both 2007 and 2009, petitioner was
convicted of first-degree residential burglary
under California Penal Code section 459 and
sentenced each time to two years in prison. If
a non-citizen is convicted of an aggravated
felony, he is subject to removal. 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Citing petitioner’s two
first-degree burglary convictions, the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
charged that petitioner was removable
because he had been convicted of a “crime of
violence . . . for which the term of
imprisonment [was] at least one year”—an
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(F). That statute defines a “crime
of violence” by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16,
which provides the following definition:

imprisonment for each conviction was
greater than one year, the IJ determined that
these convictions were crimes of violence.
On the basis of this conclusion, the IJ held
that petitioner was removable and ineligible
for any relief. The BIA dismissed petitioner’s
appeal on the same ground. Citing § 16(b)
and Becker, the BIA concluded that
“[e]ntering a dwelling with intent to commit
a felony is an offense that by its nature carries
a substantial risk of the use of force,” and
therefore affirmed the IJ’s holding that
petitioner was convicted of a crime of
violence.
Petitioner filed a timely petition with this
Court for review of the BIA’s decision. After
the parties argued this case, the United States
Supreme Court decided Johnson and,
because the definition of a crime of violence
that the BIA relied on in this case is similar
to the unconstitutional language in ACCA’s
residual clause, we ordered supplemental
briefing and held a supplemental oral
argument regarding whether § 16(b), as
incorporated into the INA, is also
unconstitutionally
vague.
We
have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)
to review questions of law, including whether
language in the immigration statutes is void
for vagueness. See Alphonsus v. Holder, 705
F.3d 1031, 1036–37 (9th Cir. 2013). That
question, as a pure question of law, receives
de novo review from this Court. AguilarRamos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 704 (9th Cir.
2010).

(a) an offense that has as an
element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of
physical force against the
person or property of another,
or
(b) any other offense that is a
felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the
person or property of another
may be used in the course of
committing the offense.
The Immigration Judge (IJ) agreed with DHS
that first degree burglary in California is a
crime of violence. Citing § 16(b) and United
States v. Becker, the IJ explained that
“unlawful entry into a residence is by its very
nature an offense where is apt to be violence
[sic], whether in the efforts of the felon to
escape or in the efforts of the occupant to
resist the felon.” Because the charging
documents for each conviction alleged an
unlawful entry, and because the term of

II
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
“requires that a penal statute define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness
that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that
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group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3)(A). Under cancellation of
removal, immigration authorities may cancel
the removal of a lawful permanent resident
who satisfies certain criteria based on length
of residency, good behavior, and exceptional
hardship. Id. § 1229b(b)(1). Non-citizens
who commit certain criminal offenses are
ineligible for these forms of relief. See id. §§
1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), 1229b(b)(1)(C). As with
denial of withholding of removal, then,
denial of cancellation of removal renders an
alien ineligible for relief, making deportation
“a virtual certainty.” United States v. Bonilla,
637 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 2011).

does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.” Alphonsus,
705 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
Although most often invoked in the context
of criminal statutes, the prohibition on
vagueness also applies to civil statutes,
including those concerning the criteria for
deportation. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S.
223, 231 (1951) (“Despite the fact that this is
not a criminal statute, we shall nevertheless
examine the application of the vagueness
doctrine to this case. We do this in view of
the grave nature of deportation.”); see also
A.B. Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 267
U.S. 233, 239 (1925) (“The defendant
attempts to distinguish [prior vagueness]
cases because they were criminal
prosecutions. But that is not an adequate
distinction. The ground or principle of the
decisions was not such as to be applicable
only to criminal prosecutions.”).

The government argues that our circuit’s
reliance on Jordan “is misguided as Jordan
did not authorize vagueness challenges to
deportation statutes.” We find this suggestion
baffling. Jordan considered whether the term
“crime involving moral turpitude” in section
19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917, a type
of offense that allowed for a non-citizen to
“be taken into custody and deported,” was
void for vagueness. 341 U.S. at 225–31
(emphasis added). In considering this
challenge, the Court explicitly rejected the
argument that the vagueness doctrine did not
apply. Id. at 231. The government also argues
that subsequent Supreme Court decisions
rejected due process challenges to various
immigration statutes. See Marcello v. Bonds,
349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955); Galvan v. Press,
347 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1954); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–91 (1952).
None of these cases, however, suggests that
the Due Process Clause does not apply to
deportation proceedings. Nor could they, for
it “is well established that the Fifth
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of
law in deportation proceedings.” Demore v.
Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

Previously, we have recognized the
vagueness doctrine’s applicability in the
context of withholding of removal “because
of the harsh consequences attached to . . .
denial of withholding of removal.”
Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1042 (citing Jordan,
341 U.S. at 230–31). In this case, Petitioner
challenges a statute as unconstitutionally
vague in the context of denial of cancellation
of removal.
For due process purposes, this context is
highly analogous to denial of withholding of
removal because both pose the harsh
consequence of almost certain deportation.
Under withholding of removal, a non-citizen
who is otherwise removable cannot be
deported to his home country if he establishes
that his “life or freedom would be threatened
in that country because of [his] race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social
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As the Supreme Court recognized in Jordan,
a necessary component of a non-citizen’s
right to due process of law is the prohibition
on vague deportation statutes. Recently, the
Supreme Court noted the need for
“efficiency, fairness, and predictability in the
administration of immigration law.” Mellouli
v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1987 (2015).
Vague immigration statutes significantly
undermine these interests by impairing noncitizens’ ability to “anticipate the
immigration consequences of guilty pleas in
criminal court.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 356, 364 (2010) (“[A]ccurate legal
advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has
never been more important” because
“deportation is an integral part—indeed,
sometimes the most important part—of the
penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen
defendants who plead guilty to specified
crimes.” (footnote omitted)). For these
reasons, we reaffirm that petitioner may bring
a void for vagueness challenge to the
definition of a “crime of violence” in the
INA.

physical force against the person or property
of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
Had Congress written out the relevant
definition in full instead of relying on crossreferencing, a lawful permanent resident
would be removable if “convicted of an
offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may
be used in the course of committing the
offense” (emphasis added). The language in
ACCA that Johnson held unconstitutional is
similar. The ACCA provision defined a
“violent felony” as “any crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
[i.e., a felony] . . . that . . . involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. §
924(e)(2)(B)(ii)
(emphasis
added).
Importantly, both the provision at issue here
and ACCA’s residual clause are subject to the
same mode of analysis. Both are subject to
the categorical approach, which demands that
courts “look to the elements and the nature of
the offense of conviction, rather than to the
particular facts relating to petitioner’s
crime.” Leocal v. Ashcroft. Specifically,
courts considering both § 16(b) and the
residual clause must decide what a “‘usual or
ordinary’ violation” of the statute entails and
then determine how great a risk of injury that
“ordinary case” presents.

III
To understand Johnson’s effect on this case,
it is helpful to view §16(b), as incorporated
into the INA, alongside the residual clause at
issue in Johnson. The INA provides for the
removal of non-citizens who have been
“convicted of an aggravated felony.” 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Its definition of
an aggravated felony includes numerous
offenses, including “a crime of violence (as
defined in section 16 of Title 18 . . . ).” 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). The subsection of
18 U.S.C. § 16 that the BIA relied on in this
case defines a crime of violence as an
“offense that is a felony and that, by its
nature, involves a substantial risk that

In Johnson, the Supreme Court recognized
two features of ACCA’s residual clause that
“conspire[d] to make it unconstitutionally
vague.” 135 S. Ct. at 2557. First, the Court
explained, the clause left “grave uncertainty”
about “deciding what kind of conduct the
‘ordinary case’ of a crime involves.” That is,
the provision “denie[d] fair notice to
defendants
and
invite[d]
arbitrary
enforcement by judges” because it “tie[d] the
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judicial assessment of risk to a judicially
imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a crime, not to
real-world facts or statutory elements.”
Second, the Court stated, ACCA’s residual
clause left “uncertainty about how much risk
it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent
felony.” By combining these two
indeterminate inquiries, the Court held, “the
residual
clause
produces
more
unpredictability and arbitrariness than the
Due Process Clause tolerates.” On that
ground it held the residual clause void for
vagueness. The Court’s reasoning applies
with equal force to the similar statutory
language and identical mode of analysis used
to define a crime of violence for purposes of
the INA. The result is that because of the
same combination of indeterminate inquiries,
§ 16(b) is subject to identical unpredictability
and arbitrariness as ACCA’s residual clause.
In sum, a careful analysis of the two sections,
the one at issue here and the one at issue in
Johnson, shows that they are subject to the
same constitutional defects and that Johnson
dictates that § 16(b) be held void for
vagueness.

We see no reason why this aspect of Johnson
would not apply here, and indeed the
government concedes that it does. As with
the residual clause, the INA’s definition of a
crime of violence at issue in this case offers
“no reliable way to choose between these
competing accounts” of what a crime looks
like in the ordinary case.
B
In many circumstances, of course, statutes
require judges to apply standards that
measure various degrees of risk. The vast
majority of those statutes pose no vagueness
problems because they “call for the
application of a qualitative standard such as
‘substantial risk’ to real-world conduct.” The
statute at issue in Johnson was not one of
those statutes, however. Nor is the provision
at issue here. If the uncertainty involved in
describing the “ordinary case” of a crime was
not enough, its combination with the
uncertainty in determining the degree of risk
was. ACCA’s violent felony definition
requires judges to apply “an imprecise
‘serious potential risk’ standard . . . to [the]
judge-imagined abstraction” of a crime in the
ordinary case. The same is equally true of the
INA’s definition of a crime of violence at
issue here. Section 16(b) gives judges no
more guidance than does the ACCA
provision as to what constitutes a substantial
enough risk of force to satisfy the statute.
Accordingly, Johnson’s holding with respect
to the imprecision of the serious potential risk
standard is also clearly applicable to § 16(b).
As with ACCA’s residual clause, § 16(b)’s
definition of a crime of violence, combines
“indeterminacy about how to measure the
risk posed by a crime with indeterminacy
about how much risk it takes for the crime to
qualify as” a crime of violence.

A
In Johnson, the Supreme Court condemned
ACCA’s residual clause for asking judges “to
imagine how the idealized ordinary case of
the crime subsequently plays out.” To
illustrate its point, the Court asked
rhetorically whether the “ordinary instance”
of witness tampering involved “offering a
witness a bribe” or instead “threatening a
witness with violence.”
As with ACCA’s residual clause, the INA’s
crime of violence provision requires courts to
“inquire whether ‘the conduct encompassed
by the elements of the offense, in the ordinary
case, presents’” a substantial risk of force.
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committing the offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
First, we doubt that this phrase actually
creates a distinction between the two clauses.
For example, we have consistently held that
California’s burglary statute (the very statute
at issue in this case) is a crime of violence for
the purposes of the INA precisely because of
the risk that violence will ensue after the
defendant has committed the acts necessary
to constitute the offense. By the time the risk
of physical force against an occupant arises,
however, the defendant has frequently
already satisfied the elements of the offense
of burglary under California law. More
important, even if such a distinction did exist,
it would not save the INA’s definition of a
crime of violence from unconstitutionality.
The Court, in Johnson, held ACCA’s residual
clause to be unconstitutionally vague because
it combined the indeterminate inquiry of
“how to measure the risk posed by a crime”
in the ordinary case with “indeterminacy
about how much risk it takes for the crime to
qualify as a violent felony.” This reasoning
applies equally whether the inquiry considers
the risk of violence posed by the commission
and the aftereffects of a crime, or whether it
is limited to consideration of the risk of
violence posed by acts necessary to satisfy
the elements of the offense.

C
Notwithstanding the undeniable identity of
the constitutional defects in the two statutory
provisions, the government and dissent offer
several unpersuasive arguments in an attempt
to save the INA provision at issue in this case.
First, the government and dissent argue that
the Supreme Court found ACCA’s standard
to be arbitrary in part because the residual
clause “force[d] courts to interpret ‘serious
potential risk’ in light of the four enumerated
crimes” in the provision, crimes which are
“far from clear in respect to the degree of risk
each poses.” It is true that, after the Court set
forth its holding in Johnson, it cited the
provision’s four enumerated offenses in
responding to the government’s argument
that the Court’s holding would cast doubt on
the many criminal statutes that include
language similar to the indeterminate term
“serious potential risk.” In doing so,
however, it stated that while the listed
offenses added to the uncertainty, the
fundamental reason for the Court’s holding
was the residual clause’s “application of the
‘serious potential risk’ standard to an
idealized ordinary case of the crime.” In
short, this response clearly reiterated that
what distinguishes ACCA’s residual clause
from many other provisions in criminal
statutes was, consistent with its fundamental
holding, the use of the “ordinary case”
analysis. Johnson therefore made plain that
the residual clause was void for vagueness in
and of itself for the reasons stated in reaching
its decision, and not because of the clause’s
relation to the four listed offenses.

The government also argues that § 16(b) has
not generated the same degree of confusion
among courts that ACCA’s residual clause
generated. It notes that, in contrast to the five
residual clause cases that the Supreme Court
has decided in addition to Johnson, the Court
has decided only a single case interpreting
section 16(b). That the Supreme Court has
decided more residual clause cases than §
16(b) cases, however, does not indicate that
it believes the latter clause to be any more
capable of consistent application. We can
discern very little regarding he merits of an

Next, the government argues that ACCA’s
residual clause requires courts to consider the
risk that would arise after completion of the
offense, and that § 16(b) applies only to
violence occurring “in the course of
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clause and that of the INA’s definition of a
crime of violence, none undermines the
applicability of Johnson’s fundamental
holding to this case. As with ACCA, section
16(b) (as incorporated in 8 U.S.C.
§1101(a)(43)(F)) requires courts to 1)
measure the risk by an indeterminate
standard of a “judicially imagined ‘ordinary
case,’” not by real world-facts or statutory
elements and 2) determine by vague and
uncertain standards when a risk is sufficiently
substantial. Together, under Johnson, these
uncertainties render the INA provision
unconstitutionally vague.

issue from the composition of the Supreme
Court’s docket. The Court has
repeatedly indicated that a
denial of certiorari means
only that, for one reason or
another which is seldom
disclosed,
and
not
infrequently for conflicting
reasons which may have
nothing to do with the merits
and certainly may have
nothing to do with any view of
the merits taken by a majority
of the Court, there were not
four members of the Court
who thought the case should
be heard.

We GRANT the petition for review
and REMAND to the BIA for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Moreover, the Supreme Court in recent years
has decided substantially more federal
criminal appeals than immigration appeals.
The Court’s history of deciding ACCA
residual clause cases in greater numbers than
INA crime of violence cases is thus
consistent with its greater interest in federal
criminal cases than in immigration cases. In
fact, over this period the ratio of federal
criminal cases to immigration cases
significantly exceeds the ratio of ACCA
residual clause cases to INA crime of
violence cases on which the government
relies.

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Contrary to the majority’s perspective, the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Johnson v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), does
not infect 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) —or other
statutes—with unconstitutional vagueness.
Rather, the Supreme Court carefully
explained that the statute there in issue, a
provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), is
unconstitutionally vague for two specific
reasons: the clause (1) “leaves grave
uncertainty about how to estimate the risk
posed by a crime”; and (2) “leaves
uncertainty about how much risk it takes for
a crime to qualify as a violent crime.” Id. at
2557–58. In contrast, §16(b), as it has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit, has neither of these
shortcomings. The majority’s contrary
conclusion fails to appreciate the purpose of
§ 16(b), elevates the Supreme Court’s
reference to “ordinary cases” from an
example to a rule, and ignores the Court’s

IV
In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that
ACCA’s residual clause “produces more
unpredictability and arbitrariness than the
Due Process Clause tolerates” by “combining
indeterminacy about how to measure the risk
posed by a crime with indeterminacy about
how much risk it takes for the crime to
qualify as a violent felony.” Although the
government can point to a couple of minor
distinctions between the text of the residual
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statement that it was not calling other statutes
into question (which explains why the Court
did not even mention Leocal v. Ashcraft, 543
U.S. 1 (2004)). Accordingly, I dissent.

S. Ct. 2276 (2013), and Moncrieffe v. Holder,
133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013). Although the terms
“crime of violence,” “violent felony,” and
“aggravated felonies” may appear to be
synonymous to a lay person, courts have
recognized that, as used in their statutory
contexts, they are distinct terms of art
covering distinct acts with different legal
consequences.

Our criminal and immigration laws are not as
simple as the majority opinion implies.
Accordingly, I first describe the purpose of §
16 and how courts have interpreted the
statute, before reviewing the Supreme
Court’s decision in Johnson, and concluding
that the twin concerns expressed by the
Supreme Court in Johnson do not infect §
16(b).

A.
In Descamps, the Government sought an
enhancement of Descamps’ sentence under
the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), on the basis
that his California conviction for burglary
was a “violent felony.” Descamps, 133 S. Ct.
at 2281–82. In Taylor v. United States, 495
U.S. 575 (1990), the Supreme Court had
established a “rule for determining when a
defendant’s prior conviction counts as one of
ACCA’s enumerated predicate offenses.”
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283. In other words,
Taylor focused on whether the state crime
and the enumerated federal predicate offense
had the same elements. In Taylor, the Court
first determined the federal definition of
burglary, and then considered how courts
were to determine whether a state conviction
met that definition. The Court, concerned
with the substantive and practical problems
of determining that the state conviction met
the criteria for a federal offense, set forth a
“categorical
approach”
instructing
sentencing courts to look at the statutory
definitions and not to the particular facts
underlying a conviction. Descamps, 133 S.
Ct. at 2283 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600).

I.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 16 contains two distinct
definitions of “crime of violence,” with
distinct purposes, effects, and judicial
pedigrees. Subsection (a) defines “crime of
violence” as “an offense that has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person or
property of another.” (emphasis added).
Subsection (b) sets forth a distinct definition
that covers offenses that are not within
subsection (a)’s definition. It states that
“crime of violence” means “any other offense
that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may
be used in the course of committing the
offense.” It follows that an offense that is a
“crime of violence” under subsection (a) also
meets the criteria in subsection (b), but that
subsection (b) covers offenses that do not
meet the criteria in subsection (a). These
subsections serve different functions with
different consequences.

In Shepard v United States, 544 U.S. 13
(2005), the Court had established the
“modified categorical approach,” which
allows a sentencing court to scrutinize a
restricted set of materials to determine

An appreciation of the differences between
the subsections and their roles informs my
understanding of the Supreme Court’s
opinions in Descamps v. United States, 133
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whether a state conviction matches the
generic federal offense. The Supreme Court
later explained in Descamps that the
modified categorical approach was a tool “to
identify, from among several alternatives, the
crime of conviction so that the court can
compare it to the generic offense.” 133 S. Ct.
at 2285. The Court reiterated that its
“elements-centric” approach was based on
three grounds: (1) “it comports with ACCA’s
test and history”; (2) “it avoids the Sixth
Amendment concerns that would arise from
sentencing courts making findings of fact that
properly belong to juries”; and (3) “it averts
the practical difficulties and potential
unfairness of a factual approach.” Id. at 2287
(internal citation omitted).

prescribe felony punishment for that
offense.” Id. at 1685. The Court concluded
that Moncrieffe’s state conviction failed to
meet this standard, and accordingly, he was
not convicted of an aggravated felony. Id. at
1687.
In both Descamps and Moncrieffe, the critical
inquiry was whether the underlying state
criminal conviction fit within a generic
federal definition of a crime so that a
defendant could be expected to have asserted
all relevant defenses in his state trial. The
underlying concerns had been set forth by the
Supreme Court in Shepard:
Developments in the law
since Taylor, and since the
First Circuit’s decision in
Harris, provide a further
reason to adhere to the
demanding requirement that
any sentence under the ACCA
rest on a showing that a prior
conviction
“necessarily”
involved (and a prior plea
necessarily admitted) facts
equating to generic burglary.
The Taylor Court, indeed, was
prescient in its discussion of
problems that would follow
from allowing a broader
evidentiary enquiry. “If the
sentencing court were to
conclude, from its own review
of the record, that the
defendant
[who
was
convicted under a nongeneric
burglary statute] actually
committed a generic burglary,
could the defendant challenge
this conclusion as abridging
his right to a jury trial?” 495
U.S. at 601. The Court thus
anticipated the very rule later
imposed for the sake of

Similar concerns with fairness underlie the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Moncrieffe, 133
S. Ct. 1678. The Court stated that it granted
certiorari “to resolve a conflict among the
Courts of Appeals with respect to whether a
conviction under a statute that criminalizes
conduct described by both [21 U.S.C.] §
841’s felony provision and its misdemeanor
provision, such as a statute that punishes all
marijuana distribution without regard to the
amount or remuneration, is a conviction for
an offense that ‘proscribes conduct
punishable as a felony under’ the CSA
[Controlled Substance Act].” Id. at 1684.
This, in turn, required a determination of
whether the state conviction qualified as an
“aggravated felony” under the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101
et seq. Id. The Court, accordingly, applied the
categorical approach “to determine whether
the state offense is comparable to an offense
listed in the INA.” Id. It explained that in
order to satisfy the categorical approach, the
state drug offense “must ‘necessarily’
proscribe conduct that is an offense under the
CSA, and the CSA must ‘necessarily’
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preserving
the
Sixth
Amendment right, that any
fact other than a prior
conviction sufficient to raise
the limit of the possible
federal sentence must be
found by a jury, in the absence
of any waiver of rights by the
defendant. Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 243, n. 6
(1999); see also Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
490 (2000).

the negligent operation of a
vehicle. It simply covers
offenses that naturally involve
a person acting in disregard of
the risk that physical force
might be used against another
in committing an offense. . . .
The classic example is
burglary. A burglary would be
covered under § 16(b) not
because the offense can be
committed in a generally
reckless way or because
someone may be injured, but
because burglary, by its
nature, involves a substantial
risk that the burglar will use
force against a victim in
completing the crime.

544 U.S. at 24 (alteration in original). Thus,
for purposes such as sentencing under the
ACCA, a state conviction is only an
aggravated felony under § 16(a) if the court
can fairly conclude that the conviction
included all the elements of a federal offense.

543 U.S. at 10 (footnote omitted). Thus,
when applying § 16(b), courts do not ask
whether the state conviction contained the
elements of a federal offense, but whether
there was a “risk that the use of physical force
against another might be required in
committing” the state crime. 18 U.S.C. §
16(b).

B.
While 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) looks to whether the
state conviction contained the elements of a
federal offense, the Supreme Court and the
circuit courts have recognized that § 16(b)
asks a different question with different
parameters and consequences. In Leocal v.
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, a unanimous Court held
that a Florida conviction for driving under the
influence of alcohol was not a crime of
violence under § 16(a) or § 16(b). Id. at 4.
The opinion describes § 16(b) as follows:

We most recently recognized this distinct
treatment of § 16(b) in Rodriguez-Castellon
v. Holder, 733 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2013). In
this opinion, rendered after the Supreme
Court issued its decision in Descamps, we
explained:

Section 16(b) sweeps more
broadly than § 16(a), defining
a crime of violence as
including “any other offense
that is a felony and that, by its
nature, involves a substantial
risk that physical force against
the person or property of
another may be used in the
course of committing the
offense.” But § 16(b) does not
thereby
encompass
all
negligent misconduct, such as

Under 18 U.S.C. § 16, the
phrase “crime of violence”
has two meanings. First,
under § 16(a), a state crime of
conviction is a crime of
violence if it “has as an
element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of
physical force against the
person or property of
another.” . . . Second, even if
the state crime does not
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include one of the elements
listed in § 16(a), it is a “crime
of violence” under § 16(b) if it
is: (I) a felony; and (ii) “by its
nature, involves a substantial
risk that physical force against
the person or property of
another may be used in the
course of committing the
offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
The Supreme Court has
explained that § 16(b)
criminalizes conduct that
“naturally involve[s] a person
acting in disregard of the risk
that physical force might be
used against another in
committing an offense.”
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S.
1, 10 (2004).

in United States v. Becker,
919 F.2d 568, 573 (9th Cir.
1990), where we held that
“first-degree burglary under
California law is a ‘crime of
violence’” as defined by 18
U.S.C. § 16(b). See also
United States v. Park, 649
F.3d 1175, 1178–79 (9th Cir.
2011). We pointed out in
Becker that “[a]ny time a
burglar enters a dwelling with
felonious or larcenous intent
there is a risk that in the
course of committing the
crime he will encounter one of
its lawful occupants, and use
physical force against that
occupant either to accomplish
his illegal purpose or to
escape apprehension.” 919
F.2d at 571 (footnote
omitted).

733 F.3d at 853–54.
Our holding in Rodriguez-Castellon is
consistent with our prior opinions
recognizing that first-degree burglary under
California Penal Code § 459 remains an
“aggravated felony” under § 16(b) even if the
state crime did not include an element of the
federal crime and thus was not an
“aggravated felony” under § 16(a). See
United States v. Ramos-Medina, 706 F.3d
932, 937–38 (9th Cir. 2013).

Id. at 878.
Similarly, in United States v. Avila, 770 F.3d
1100, 1105 (4th Cir. 2014), the Fourth Circuit
concluded that “California first-degree
burglary qualifies as a crime of violence
under the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. §
16(b).” It held that it need look no further
than the Supreme Court’s opinion in Leocal,
543 U.S. at 10, in concluding that burglary
was the classic example of an offense
covered by § 16(b).

In Chuen Piu Kwong v. Holder, 671 F.3d 872
(9th Cir. 2011), we explained:
The question for decision,
then, is whether Kwong’s
[burglary] offense “by its
nature, involves a substantial
risk that physical force against
the person or property of
another may be used in the
course of [its commission].”
18 U.S.C. § 16(b).

Thus, the Supreme Court, our prior decisions,
and the Fourth Circuit, all recognize that the
inquiries under § 16(a) and § 16(b) are
distinct, and that even though a state
conviction for burglary may not include an
element of a generic federal offense, as
required to come within § 16(a), a burglary
conviction nonetheless involves a substantial
risk of physical force, and thus is covered by
§ 16(b).

We answered that question in
the affirmative some time ago
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much risk it takes for the
crime to qualify as a violent
felony, the residual clause
produces
more
unpredictability
and
arbitrariness than the Due
Process Clause tolerates.

II.
Having set forth the scope of § 16(b) and the
courts’ treatment of the section, I turn to the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Johnson.
A.
The Supreme Court held that the residual
clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act of
1984 violates the Constitution’s guarantee of
due process. The Court concluded “that the
indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry
required by the residual clause both denies
fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary
enforcement by judges.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct.
at 2557. The Court concluded that two
features of the residual clause “conspire to
make it unconstitutional.” Id. at 2557. “In the
first place, the residual clause leaves grave
uncertainty about how to estimate the risk
posed by a crime. It ties judicial assessment
of risk to a judicially imagined ‘ordinary
case’ of a crime, not to real world facts or
statutory elements.” Id. Second, “the residual
clause leaves uncertainty about how much
risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent
felony.” Id. at 2558.

Id. at 2558.
The Court then reviewed its prior efforts to
establish a standard and concluded that
“James, Chambers, and Sykes failed to
establish any generally applicable test that
prevents the risk comparison required by the
residual clause from devolving into
guesswork and intuition.” Id. at 2559. The
Court further noted that in the lower courts,
the residual clause has created numerous
splits and the clause has proved nearly
impossible to apply consistently. Id. at 2560.
The Court concluded that “[n]ine years’
experience trying to derive meaning from the
residual clause convinces us that we have
embarked on a failed enterprise.” Id.
The Court stated, in rejecting the argument
that because there may be straightforward
cases under the residual clause, the clause is
not constitutionally vague:

By asking whether the crime
“otherwise involves conduct
that presents a serious
potential risk,” moreover, the
residual clause forces courts
to interpret “serious potential
risk” in light of the four
enumerated
crimes—
burglary, arson, extortion, and
crimes involving the use of
explosives. These offenses are
“far from clear in respect to
the degree of risk each poses.”
Begay [v. United States], 553
U.S. [137] 143 [(2008)] . . . .
By combining indeterminacy
about how to measure the risk
posed by a crime with
indeterminacy about how

The Government and the
dissent next point out that
dozens of federal and state
criminal laws use terms like
“substantial risk,” “grave
risk,” and “unreasonable
risk,” suggesting that to hold
the
residual
clause
unconstitutional is to place
these
provisions
in
constitutional doubt. See post,
at 2558–2559. Not at all.
Almost none of the cited laws
links a phrase such as
“substantial risk” to a
confusing list of examples.
“The phrase ‘shades of red,’
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The Court also declined the dissent’s
invitation “to save the residual clause from
vagueness by interpreting it to refer to the risk
posed by the particular conduct in which the
defendant engaged, not the risk posed by the
ordinary case of the defendant’s crime.” Id. at
2562. It explained:

standing alone, does not
generate
confusion
or
unpredictability; but the
phrase ‘fire-engine red, light
pink, maroon, navy blue, or
colors that otherwise involve
shades of red’ assuredly does
so.” James, 550 U.S., at 230,
n. 7, (Scalia, J., dissenting).
More importantly, almost all
of the cited laws require
gauging the riskiness of
conduct
in
which
an
individual defendant engages
on a particular occasion. As a
general matter, we do not
doubt the constitutionality of
laws that call for the
application of a qualitative
standard such as “substantial
risk” to real-world conduct;
“the law is full of instances
where a man’s fate depends
on his estimating rightly . . .
some matter of degree,” Nash
v. United States, 229 U.S.
373, 377 (1913). The residual
clause, however, requires
application of the “serious
potential risk” standard to an
idealized ordinary case of the
crime. Because “the elements
necessary to determine the
imaginary ideal are uncertain
both in nature and degree of
effect,” this abstract inquiry
offers
significantly
less
predictability than one “[t]hat
deals with the actual, not with
an imaginary condition other
than the facts.” Int. Harvester
Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 216, 223 (1914).

In the first place, the
Government has not asked us
to abandon the categorical
approach in residual-clause
cases. In addition, Taylor had
good reasons to adopt the
categorical approach, reasons
that apply no less to the
residual clause than to the
enumerated crimes. Taylor
explained that the relevant
part of the Armed Career
Criminal Act “refers to ‘a
person who . . . has three
previous convictions’ for—
not a person who has
committed—three previous
violent felonies or drug
offenses.” 495 U.S. at 600.
This emphasis on convictions
indicates that “Congress
intended the sentencing court
to look only to the fact that the
defendant had been convicted
of crimes falling within
certain categories, and not to
the facts underlying the prior
convictions.” Ibid. Taylor
also pointed out the utter
impracticability of requiring a
sentencing
court
to
reconstruct, long after the
original
conviction,
the
conduct
underlying that
conviction.
Id. at 2562.

Id. at 2561.

Finally, the opinion’s penultimate paragraph
reads:
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We hold that imposing an
increased sentence under the
residual clause of the Armed
Career Criminal Act violates
the Constitution’s guarantee
of due process. Our contrary
holdings in James and Sykes
are
overruled.
Today’s
decision does not call into
question application of the
Act to the four enumerated
offenses, or the remainder of
the Act’s definition of a
violent felony.

the categorical approach, which, as noted,
looks to the “ordinary case.” See Descamps,
133 S. Ct. at 2285 (holding the categorical
approach’s central feature is “a focus on the
elements, rather than the facts, of a crime”).
It is true that Descamps, like § 16(a), looks to
the elements of a crime, not to the potential
risk from the crime. Nonetheless, in declining
the dissent’s suggestion that it “jettison for
the residual clause . . . the categorical
approach,” the Court recognized that there
were “good reasons to adopt the categorical
approach,” one of which is “the utter
impracticability of requiring a sentencing
court to reconstruct, long after the original
conviction, the conduct underlying that
conviction.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2562.
Thus, Johnson does not prohibit all use of the
“ordinary case.” It only prohibits uses that
leave uncertain both how to estimate the risk
and amount of risk necessary to qualify as a
violent crime.

Id. at 2563.
B.
I read Johnson as setting forth a two-part test:
whether the statute in issue (1) “leaves grave
uncertainty about how to estimate the risk
posed by the crime”; and (2) “leaves
uncertainty about how much risk it takes for
a crime to qualify as a violent felony.” Id. at
2557–58. Applying this test, the Court
faulted the residual clause for requiring
potential risk to be determined in light of
“four enumerated crimes—burglary, arson,
extortion, and crimes involving the use of
explosives . . . [which] are far from clear in
respect to the degree of risk each poses.” Id.
at 2558 (internal citation omitted). The
Court’s concern was clarified by its reference
to a prior dissent by Justice Scalia: “The
phrase ‘shades of red,’ standing alone does
not generate confusion or unpredictability;
but the phrase ‘fire-engine red, light pink,
maroon, navy blue or colors that otherwise
involve shades of red’ assuredly does so.” Id.
at 2561.

Indeed, such an interpretation seems
compelled in light of the fact that Johnson did
not even mention Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543
U.S. 1. In Leocal, the Supreme Court
recognized the breadth of § 16(b) and noted
that it “simply covers offenses that naturally
involve a person acting in disregard of the
risk that physical force might be used against
another in committing the offense.” Id. at 10.
Finally, I note that perhaps in an attempt to
foreclose approaches such as that offered by
today’s majority in this appeal, the Supreme
Court concluded by stating that its decision
“does not call into question application of the
Act to the four enumerated offenses [which
include burglary] or the remainder of the
Act’s definition of a violent felony.”
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563.

The Court also faulted the residual clause for
tying “the judicial assessment of risk to a
judicially imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a
crime, not to real-world facts or statutory
elements.” Id. at 2557. However, the Court
specifically stated that it was not abandoning

III.
After such an esoteric discussion, it would be
easy to lose sight of what is at issue in this
case. Dimaya, a native and citizen of the
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Philippines, was twice convicted of firstdegree residential burglary under California
Penal Code § 459 and sentenced each time to
two years in prison. The Department of
Homeland Security charged Dimaya with
being removable because he had been
convicted of an aggravated felony under 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), which is a “crime of
violence . . . for which the term of
imprisonment [was] at least one year.” That
statute in turn defines “crime of violence” by
reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16. Thus, we are
asked whether the statutory scheme is
somehow so vague or ambiguous as to
preclude the BIA from concluding that
Dimaya’s two first-degree burglaries under
California law are “crimes of violence” under
§ 16(b). Supreme Court precedent and our
case law answer the question in the negative.

encounter one of its lawful occupants, and
use physical force against that occupant
either to accomplish his illegal purpose or to
escape apprehension.”); Lopez-Cardina v.
Holder, 662 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2011)
(noting that “Becker itself recognized that the
California crime of burglary might not be a
‘crime of violence’ under a federal statute
defining the term by reference to the generic
crime, even though it is a ‘crime of violence’
under the risk-focused text of § 16(b)”);
Chuen Piu Kwong, 671 F.3d at 877
(reaffirming that “first-degree burglary under
[Cal. Penal Code] § 459 is a crime of violence
because it involves a substantial risk that
physical force may be used in the course of
committing the offense.”).
Nor is there any uncertainty as to “how much
risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent
felony,” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558, when
burglary is at issue. Section 16(b) itself
requires a “substantial risk” of the use of
physical force. As noted, neither the Supreme
Court nor the Ninth Circuit has had any
trouble in applying this standard. See Leocal,
543 U.S. at 10; Chuen Piu Kwong, 671 F.3d
at 877; Becker, 919 F.2d at 571. Any person
intent on committing a burglary inherently
contemplates the risk of using force should
his nefarious scheme be detected. Is this not
what the Supreme Court was referring to
when it noted “we do not doubt the
constitutionality of laws that call for the
application of a qualitative standard such as
‘substantial risk’ to real-world conduct”?
Johnson 135 S. Ct. at 2561.

There is no uncertainty as to how to estimate
the risk posed by Dimaya’s burglary crimes.
The Supreme Court held in Leocal that §
16(b) “covers offenses that naturally involve
a person acting in disregard of the risk that
physical force might be used against another
in committing an offense.” 543 U.S. at 10.
The court emphasized that burglary as “the
classic example” of a crime covered by 16(b)
because “burglary, by its nature involves a
substantial risk that the burglar will use force
against a victim in completing the crime.” Id.
See also Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599 (a person has
been convicted of a crime for sentencing
enhancement “if he is convicted of any crime,
regardless of its exact definition or label,
having the basic elements of unlawful or
unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a
building or structure, with intent to commit a
crime”).

IV.
In Johnson, after nine years of trying to
derive meaning from the residual clause, the
Supreme Court held that it was
unconstitutionally vague. Section 16(b) is not
the ACCA’s residual clause; nor has its
standard proven to be unworkably vague.
Over a decade ago, the Supreme Court in
Leocal held that § 16(b) “covers offenses that

We have consistently followed this line of
reasoning. See United States v. Becker, 919
F.2d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Any time a
burglar enters a dwelling with felonious or
larcenous intent there is a risk that in the
course of committing the crime he will
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naturally involve a person acting in disregard
of the risk that physical force might be used
against another in committing an offense.”
543 U.S. at 10. Moreover, as the Supreme
Court recognized, the statute sets forth the
test of a “substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of any may be
used in the course of committing the
offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Certainly, there
is no unconstitutional vagueness in this case,
which involves the hallmark “crime of
violence,” burglary. See Leocal, 543 U.S. at
10. The Supreme Court will be surprised to
learn that its opinion in Johnson rendered §
16(b) unconstitutionally vague, particularly
as its opinion did not even mention Leocal
and specifically concluded with the statement
limiting its potential scope. I fear that we
have again ventured where no court has gone
before and that the Supreme Court will have
to intervene to return us to our proper orbit.
Accordingly, I dissent.
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“U.S. Supreme Court Orders Second Argument in Deportation Case”
Bloomberg Politics
Greg Stohr
June 26, 2017

The U.S. Supreme Court said it will hear
another argument on the constitutionality of
a provision in federal immigration law used
to deport foreigners convicted of serious
crimes.
The move suggests that new Justice Neil
Gorsuch will break what is currently a 4-4 tie.
The case was argued in January, before
Gorsuch joined the court.
The case could affect the Trump
administration’s efforts to step up deportation
efforts.
The issue is whether the law’s definition of
"crime of violence" is so vague as to be
unconstitutional. People convicted of a
violent crime are subject to mandatory
deportation.
The case concerns James Dimaya, a
Philippine citizen who was twice convicted
of residential burglary in California and has
been fighting deportation efforts.
The new argument will take place after the
court returns from its three-month recess in
early October.
The case is Sessions v. Dimaya, 15-1498..
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“Supreme Court justices skeptical of deportation order against Bay Area
burglar”
Los Angeles Times
David G. Savage
January 17, 2017

The Supreme Court, hearing arguments
Tuesday in a California deportation case,
signaled it may make it harder for the
government to forcibly remove legal
immigrants with certain kinds of crimes on
their record.

If they conclude they were not, their ruling
could complicate efforts by the Trump
administration to speed up deportations.
President-elect Donald Trump has pledged to
accelerate the deportation of immigrants here
illegally who have been accused or convicted
of crimes.

The case involves a native Filipino and
longtime legal resident of the Bay Area who
was convicted of breaking into a garage and
an empty house in separate incidents.

The law in this area is not entirely clear.
Beginning in 1988, Congress ordered
deportation for noncitizens who are
convicted of an “aggravated felony,” and it
cited specific examples such as murder and
rape. Later the law was expanded to include
a general category of “crimes of violence.”
This was defined to include offenses that
involve a use of physical force or a
“substantial risk” that force would be used.

At issue is whether crimes such as home
burglary, fleeing from the police, money
laundering or child abuse can be considered
“crimes of violence” that trigger mandatory
deportation under federal law.
The ruling could set new rules for the Trump
administration if it seeks to forcibly remove
legal immigrants who have criminal records.

Judges have been divided as to what crimes
call for deportation. Looming over Tuesday’s
argument was an opinion written two years
ago by the late Justice Antonin Scalia. He
spoke for an 8-to-1 majority in striking down
part of a federal law known as the Armed
Career Criminal Act. It called for extra years
in prison for people convicted of more than
one violent felony.

James Garcia Dimaya was charged with
residential burglary under California law and
served more than five years in prison. U.S.
immigration officials said those crimes were
enough to trigger his deportation under the
law.
But in their questions, the justices cast doubt
on whether his crimes were properly
classified as “aggravated felonies.”

In that case, the extra prison term was
triggered by the defendant’s possession of a
shotgun. In frustration, Scalia and his
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colleagues
said
the
law
was
unconstitutionally vague because they could
not decide whether gun possession is itself
evidence of a violent crime.

years old. He went to high school, became a
lawful permanent resident and settled in
Hayward.
He was convicted and sent to state prison for
the burglaries of a garage in 2007 and an
empty house in 2009.

“You could say the exact same thing about
burglary,” Justice Elena Kagan said Tuesday.
A midday burglary of a home could result in
violence, she said, but perhaps not if it were
an empty garage or an abandoned house. “So
it seems like we’re replicating the same kind
of confusion,” she said.

Immigration judges agreed with deporting
Dimaya because his burglary convictions
were “crimes of violence” that qualified as
“aggravated felonies.”
But the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed in a 2-1 ruling and said this
provision was unconstitutionally vague.
Judge Stephen Reinhardt in Los Angeles
cited Scalia’s opinion and said the
immigration law had the same flaw as the
Armed Career Criminal Act. Judge Kim
McLane Wardlaw agreed to form the
majority, while Judge Consuelo Callahan
dissented.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer said judges have
no way to decide which crimes typically or
usually involve violence. “We’re just left
guessing,” he said, suggesting a better
approach would be “look at what the person
did.”
But Deputy Solicitor Gen. Edwin Kneedler
said a home burglary poses a risk of violence.
And he said the court should defer to the
government on matters of immigration. The
law, he said, calls for a “broad delegation” of
authority to executive officials.

The 7th Circuit Court in Chicago handed
down a similar ruling, while the 5th Circuit in
New Orleans ruled in favor of the
government.

This is the argument government lawyers
made in defense of President Obama’s use of
executive authority to try to shield millions of
immigrants from deportation. It is also the
argument that would call for upholding an
aggressive deportation policy if pursued by
the Trump administration.

The split prompted the high court to decide
the case of Lynch vs. Dimaya. By the time the
decision is handed down, the case will
probably be relabeled Sessions vs. Dimaya,
to reflect expected change of attorney
general.

In their legal briefs, government lawyers said
a ruling in favor of Dimaya, the Philippine
burglar, could have a domino effect and
prompt judges to block deportations that
were triggered by a host of other crimes.

Still pending before the court is a class-action
suit from Los Angeles challenging whether
immigrants facing possible deportation may
be arrested and jailed for more than six
months without a bail hearing.

Dimaya was born in the Philippines and came
to the United States in 1992, when he was 13
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“When Can Immigrants Be Deported for Crimes? Justices Hear Sides”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
January 17, 2017

The Supreme Court considered on Tuesday
how broad the government’s authority is to
deport immigrants who commit serious
crimes.

Philippines who became a lawful permanent
resident in 1992, when he was 13. In 2007
and 2009, he was convicted of residential
burglary.

The question was in one sense fairly
technical, concerning whether a federal law
on the subject was unconstitutionally vague.
In another sense, though, the argument was
part of a larger debate over the nation’s
immigration laws, which President-elect
Donald J. Trump has pledged to enforce
vigorously.

The government sought to deport him on the
theory that he had committed an “aggravated
felony,” which the immigration law defines
to include any offense “that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may
be used in the course of committing the
offense.”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor said the laws have
grown increasingly draconian.

In 2015, in Johnson v. United States, the
Supreme Court ruled that a similar criminal
law was unconstitutionally vague. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in San Francisco, said the reasoning
in the Johnson case also doomed the
provision of the immigration law.

“We have many more criminal sanctions with
harsher sentences now,” she said. “Today
what’s at stake is a lot more than what was at
stake decades ago.”
Edwin S. Kneedler, a deputy solicitor
general, said there was another side to the
question.

When the Johnson case was before the
Supreme Court, the government warned that
a ruling striking down the law at issue there
would make the law that was the subject of
Tuesday’s case “equally susceptible” to
constitutional attack.

“What’s at stake can’t be viewed just from
that perspective,” he said. “What’s at stake is
the fact that the immigration laws are vital to
the nation’s national security and foreign
relations and the safety and welfare of the
country.”

Both laws, the government said then, require
courts to identify features of a hypothetical
typical offense and then to judge the risk of
violence arising from them.

The case, Lynch v. Dimaya, No. 15-1498,
concerns James Dimaya, a native of the
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Justice Elena Kagan, quoting from Justice
Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion in the
2015 case, asked how judges are to decide the
features of a typical offense.

E. Joshua Rosenkranz, a lawyer for Mr.
Dimaya, said the 1951 case concluded the
matter.

Should they use, she asked, “a statistical
analysis” of reported decisions? “A survey?
Expert evidence? Google? Gut instinct?”

“In our view and in the view of all of the
lower courts,” he said, “Jordan settles the
question on whether it’s the same standard
for criminal deportation.”

“So that’s a multiple-choice test,” Justice
Kagan said, suggesting that all of the choices
risked unconstitutional vagueness. “What do
we do?”

But Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. said that
extending scrutiny that applies to criminal
laws challenged for vagueness to civil ones
would be a major step.

Mr. Kneedler said there were important
distinctions between the two cases, notably
that the one in 2015 arose from a criminal
prosecution and the one at issue on Tuesday
from an immigration proceeding, which is a
civil action.

“It certainly is true that deportation has more
severe consequences than the typical civil
case,” he said. “But there are many other civil
cases that can have a devastating impact on
someone, such as child custody, loss of a
professional license, complete destruction of
a business, loss of the home.”

In its brief in Tuesday’s case, the government
said civil laws are almost never so vague as
to violate the Constitution. “Although the
court has on occasion tested civil provisions
for vagueness,” the brief said, “it has struck
down those provisions under the due process
clause because they were so unintelligible as
to effectively supply no standard at all.”
A 1951 Supreme Court decision, Jordan v.
De George, indicated that both criminal and
immigration laws should be tested against the
same constitutional standard for vagueness
“in view of the grave nature of deportation.”
Mr. Kneedler asked the justices not to place
too much weight on that observation, saying
the question had not been raised in the briefs
at the time. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy did
not seem to think that mattered.
“Something has to be briefed before we say
it’s the law?” he asked.
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“9th Circ. Rules BIA's 'Crime Of Violence' Standard Vague”
Law360
Daniel Siegal
October 19, 2015

The Ninth Circuit on Monday ruled that, after
a recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling, the
federal test for a “crime of violence” is
unconstitutionally vague, reversing a Board
of Immigrant Appeals ruling that a citizen of
the Philippines can be deported after
committing felony burglary.

Judge Reinhardt wrote that the definition
contained in 18 U.S. Code Section 16(b) and
relied upon by the BIA is subject to the “same
mode of analysis" as the statute in Johnson,
which the Supreme court held left “grave
uncertainty” about what kind of conduct an
“ordinary case' of a crime involves, and
which left uncertainty about how much risk it
takes for a crime to qualify as a violent
felony.

Petitioner James Garcia Dimaya had asked
the Ninth Circuit to review the BIA's ruling
that a conviction for burglary is categorically
a “crime of violence” as defined by federal
code — a determination which rendered him
deportable under the Immigration and
Nationality Act for having been convicted of
an aggravated felony.

“The court’s reasoning applies with equal
force to the similar statutory language and
identical mode of analysis used to define a
crime of violence for purposes of the INA,”
Judge Reinhardt wrote. “In sum, a careful
analysis of the two sections, the one at issue
here and the one at issue in Johnson, shows
that they are subject to the same
constitutional defects and that Johnson
dictates that [Section] 16(b) be held void for
vagueness.”

In a published opinion, a three-judge panel
ruled 2 to 1 on Monday that the statutory
definition relied upon by the BIA violated
Dimaya's due process rights when taken in
light of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling this
summer in Johnson v. United States, which
struck down a different statute's definition of
a “violent felony” as unconstitutionally
vague. Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt,
writing for the panel, said that the Supreme
Court in Johnson held that a “necessary
component” of a non-citizen's right to due
process of law is a prohibition on vague
deportation statutes.

Holly S. Cooper, an associate director of the
Immigration Law Clinic at the University of
California Davis School of Law, told Law360
on Monday that the ruling could impact an
“extraordinary”
number
of
removal
proceedings, given the number of
immigration cases in the Ninth Circuit's
territory.
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Dimaya came to the U.S. from the
Philippines in 1992 and was convicted of
first-degree residential burglary in both 2007
and 2009, after which the Department of
Homeland Security sought to have him
removed from the country for having been
convicted of an aggravated felony, according
to the ruling.

16(b) is unconstitutionally vague, and on
Monday decided that it is.
Circuit Judge Consuelo Maria Callahan
dissented, however, writing that the
criticisms levied by the Supreme Court
against the ACCA in the Johnson ruling do
not apply to Section 16(b), given the
fundamental distinctions between the
statutes.

An Immigration Judge agreed with the DHS
that first-degree burglary in California is a
“crime of violence” and held that Dimaya
was removable, and the BIA dismissed his
appeal on the same ground, according to the
ruling.

“Although the terms 'crime of violence,'
'violent felony' and 'aggravated felonies' may
appear to be synonymous to a lay person,
courts have recognized that, as used in their
statutory contexts, they are distinct terms of
art covering distinct acts with different legal
consequences,” Judge Callahan wrote.

On June 2, while Dimaya's appeal was
pending, the BIA held in In the Matter of
Francisco-Alonzo that the correct way to
determine whether a state conviction is for an
aggravated felony crime of violence is to
apply an ordinary-case analysis, by looking
to the risk of violent force present in the
"ordinary case" rather than the particular case
in question in considering whether a state
offense is categorically a crime of violence
under 18 U.S.C. Section 16(b), the federal
statute that defines violent crimes.

Circuit Judges Stephen Reinhardt, Kim
McLane Wardlaw and Consuelo M. Callahan
sat on the panel that issued Monday's
opinion.
Dimaya is represented by Andrew Michael
Knapp of Immigrant Access to Justice
Assistance at Southwestern Law School.
The government is represented by Nancy
Canter, Jennifer Khouri, Stuart F. Delery and
Jennifer P. Levings of the U.S. Department of
Justice.

Weeks later, after Dimaya's appeal had been
already argued, the high court in Johnson v.
U.S. held that imposing an increased
sentence under the "residual clause" of the
Armed Career Criminal Act, which allowed a
crime to be classified as a violent felony if it
posed a serious risk of injury to others,
violates the Constitution’s guarantee of due
process, and it struck down the residual
clause.

The case is James Garcia Dimaya v. Loretta
E. Lynch, case number 11-71307, in the U.S.
Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit ordered additional briefing
and oral argument as to whether Section
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